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190 pages ; 21 cm

It's time for payoffs years in the making. Join us to discuss the explosive events of the latest episode of Game of Thrones: The Spoils of War.

We discuss the tropical analogues of several basic questions of convex duality. In particular, the polar of a tropical polyhedral cone represents the set of linear inequalities that its elements satisfy. We characterize the extreme rays of the polar in terms of certain minimal set covers which may be thought of as weighted generalizations of minimal transversals in hypergraphs. We also give a tropical analogue of Farkas lemma, which allows one to check whether a linear inequality is implied by a finite family of linear inequalities. Here, the certificate is a strategy of a mean payoff game. We discuss examples, showing that the number of extreme rays of the polar of the tropical cyclic polyhedral cone is polynomially bounded, and that there is no unique minimal system of inequalities defining a given tropical polyhedral cone.

Adaptive populations such as those in financial markets and distributed control can be modeled by the Minority Game. We consider how their dynamics depends on the agents' initial preferences of strategies, when the agents use linear or quadratic payoff functions to evaluate their strategies. We find that the fluctuations of the population making certain decisions (the volatility) depends on the diversity of the distribution of the initial preferences of strategies. When the diversity decreases, more agents tend to adapt their strategies together. In systems with linear payoffs, this results in dynamical transitions from vanishing volatility to a non-vanishing one. For low signal dimensions, the dynamical transitions for the different signals do not take place at the same critical diversity. Rather, a cascade of dynamical transitions takes place when the diversity is reduced. In contrast, no phase transitions are found in systems with the quadratic payoffs. Instead, a basin boundary of attraction separates two groups of samples in the space of the agents' decisions. Initial states inside this boundary converge to small volatility, while those outside diverge to a large one. Furthermore, when the preference distribution becomes more polarized, the dynamics becomes more erratic. All the above results are supported by good agreement between simulations and theory.

Rockland Selectmen Mike O'Loughlin hosts Abington Selectmen Alex Bezanson & Kevin DiMarzio prior to the Abington vs Rockland Football game on October 7, 2022

We consider the pricing problem related to payoffs that can have discontinuities of polynomial growth. The asset price dynamic is modeled within the Black and Scholes framework characterized by a stochastic volatility term driven by a fractional Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. In order to solve the aforementioned problem, we consider three approaches. The first one consists in a suitable transformation of the initial value of the asset price, in order to eliminate possible discontinuities. Then we discretize both the Wiener process and the fractional Brownian motion and estimate the rate of convergence of the related discretized price to its real value, the latter one being impossible to be evaluated analytically. The second approach consists in considering the conditional expectation with respect to the entire trajectory of the fractional Brownian motion (fBm). Then we derive a closed formula which involves only integral functional depending on the fBm trajectory, to evaluate the price; finally we discretize the fBm and estimate the rate of convergence of the associated numerical scheme to the option price. In both cases the rate of convergence is the same and equals $n^{-rH}$, where $n$ is a number of the points of discretization, $H$ is the Hurst index of fBm, and $r$ is the H\"{o}lder exponent of volatility function. The third method consists in calculating the density of the integral functional depending on the trajectory of the fBm via Malliavin calculus also providing the option price in terms of the associated probability density.

In a multitime hybrid differential game with mechanical work payoff, the multitime upper value function and the multitime lower value function are viscosity solutions of original PDEs of type Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs.

PAYOFF IN THE PACIFIC - Department of Defense 1960 - PIN 30124 - WAR IN THE PACIFIC CONTINUED - COVERS ISLAND-HOPPING VICTORIES OF THE ALLIES TO THE JAPANESE SURRENDER ABOARD THE BATTLESHIP MISSOURI.

PAYOFF IN THE PACIFIC - Department of Defense 1960 - PIN 30124 - WAR IN THE PACIFIC CONTINUED - COVERS ISLAND-HOPPING VICTORIES OF THE ALLIES TO THE JAPANESE SURRENDER ABOARD THE BATTLESHIP MISSOURI.

- Quick Payoff for GM Heavy Duty Investment- Tariffs Could Create A Lot of American Jobs- Barn Find- Tesla Denied Tariff Exemption- AutoDrive Challenge Winner- New Safety Technology Could be Mandated- Alpine A110S- Magna Develops New Seat Foam

How-to tips on projects that payoff.Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Includes bibliographical references (p. 249-255) and indexes

Call Writer Payoff Diagram

This group of papers was presented as part of a symposium entitled "Classroom Observation of Students and Teachers (COST): A Multiple Payoff Approach to Inservice Training." The first paper, "Films for Inservice Teacher Training: A Miniworkshop," outlines the rationale and development of the film series of which the film, Consequences of Behavior, is a part. The second paper, "Modifying Student Behavior: What Works, and With Whom" presents some of the evaluation research done to date. The third paper, "The Teacher Approval-Disapproval Scale (TADS): From the Mouths of Babes," describes a behaviorally-focused elementary school attitude questionnaire. The fourth paper, "Hyperkinesis in the Classroom: If Cerebral Stimulants are the Last Resort, What Would Be A First Resort?", describes one part of a project designed to compare the progress of hyperkinetic children treated by means of cerebral stimulants with those managed through behavioral counseling of parents and teachers. (Author/HMV)

Rail Baron Payoffs

Department of Defense PIN 30123 PAYOFF IN THE PACIFIC WAR IN THE PACIFIC, FROM PEARL HARBOR AND LOSS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE B-29 BASES CONSTRUCTED ON SAIPAN.

A general architectural design sequence is described to create a highly efficient, operable, and supportable design that achieves an affordable, repeatable, and sustainable transportation function. The paper covers the following aspects of this approach in more detail: (1) vehicle architectural concept considerations (including important strategies for greater reusability); (2) vehicle element propulsion system packaging considerations; (3) vehicle element functional definition; (4) external ground servicing and access considerations; and, (5) simplified guidance, navigation, flight control and avionics communications considerations. Additionally, a technology integration strategy is forwarded that includes: (a) ground and flight test prior to production commitments; (b) parallel stage propellant storage, such as concentric-nested tanks; (c) high thrust, LOX-rich, LOX-cooled first stage earth-to-orbit main engine; (d) non-toxic, day-of-launch-loaded propellants for upper stages and in-space propulsion; (e) electric propulsion and aero stage control.

I've had clients close to retirement to asking, \"Should I pay off my mortgage before I retire?\"  The bottom line up front is that in the long run, dollar for dollar its very likely you would much better keeping a low interest mortgage and investing that cash in a moderate risk portfolio. But YOUR decision to keep or pay off your mortgage depends on a lot more than just a spreadsheet. First do you have the cash available to pay off your mortgage or  some extra income now that you can use to make extra payments and pay it off sooner? Why are you considering paying it off early?  Will it help you sleep at night? Honestly, if having a mortgage payment in retirement will have you living in fear of losing your home, it doesn't really matter what the numbers say or what opportunities you leave on the table.Other benefits of paying it off are you won't have to pay  interest on a loan you don't have. No mortgage can improve your cash flow with lower fixed costs each month. This can be a big help if your circumstances change. And keeping your mortgage? First, you'll need to have income coming in to make a mortgage payment along with your other expenses. If you can, you may end up much better off if you don't pay that mortgage off now. And instead invest that money, and enjoy years of compounding growth. Especially if you financed or can refinance at these historically low home mortgage interest rates.Let's say you have a mortgage with a 3% interest rate,  balance right now of $200,000, and 15 years of payments left. Or refinance to a 15 year mortgage at 3%.  Over 15 years, you would pay just over $48,000 in interest. Pay off now and you save $48,000. Now  instead of pay off the mortgage, you invest that $200,000  in a fairly conservative, diversified investment portfolio of half stocks and half bonds. Historically, this will earn you a return of at least 6%. That $200,000 invested for 15 years with a 6% annual return will grow to just over $490,000. That's a profit of $290,000. Now you still had to pay $48,000 of mortgage interest. Which still leaves you more than $250,000 better off by keeping your mortgage and investing!I mentioned your decision is about more than just a spreadsheet. Paying off your mortgage is a sure thing. That $200,00 disappears form you bank account and you own your home free and clear, period. If you keep your mortgage, with a fixed interest rate that interest cost is a sure thing. BUT, that investment return is not guaranteed. For keeping your mortgage to be a better option for you, your overall return on your investments needs to be higher than your mortgage interest rate over the life of your loan. Even with conservative investment portfolio there is a very good chance that keeping your mortgage with a low interest rate is better choice, but there is no guarantee. Again, this is where having a reliable cash flow in retirement and emergency fund are key.In the end it comes down to what options are available to you and how you tolerate uncertainty.  Let's do a quick review. If you are comfortable with some uncertainty, you will have reliable income to pay your expenses in retirement, including a mortgage payment, and you can lock in a mortgage interest rate that is lower than the profit you can expect from investing, keeping that mortgage could be a very good choice for you and leave you with a higher net worth.If you don't think you'll have the income to cover all your retirement expenses and a mortgage, or you won't sleep at night with a mortgage payment having over you head, no matter what the numbers say, your best choice will probably be to go with the sure thing and pay it off. And if you still have a mortgage over 3% your window for getting a lower rate is is probably closing. For more info on the refinance decision go back to Episode 18. 

We consider concurrent games played by two-players on a finite-state graph, where in every round the players simultaneously choose a move, and the current state along with the joint moves determine the successor state. We study a fundamental objective, namely, mean-payoff objective, where a reward is associated to each transition, and the goal of player 1 is to maximize the long-run average of the rewards, and the objective of player 2 is strictly the opposite. The path constraint for player 1 could be qualitative, i.e., the mean-payoff is the maximal reward, or arbitrarily close to it; or quantitative, i.e., a given threshold between the minimal and maximal reward. We consider the computation of the almost-sure (resp. positive) winning sets, where player 1 can ensure that the path constraint is satisfied with probability 1 (resp. positive probability). Our main results for qualitative path constraints are as follows: (1) we establish qualitative determinacy results that show that for every state either player 1 has a strategy to ensure almost-sure (resp. positive) winning against all player-2 strategies, or player 2 has a spoiling strategy to falsify almost-sure (resp. positive) winning against all player-1 strategies; (2) we present optimal strategy complexity results that precisely characterize the classes of strategies required for almost-sure and positive winning for both players; and (3) we present quadratic time algorithms to compute the almost-sure and the positive winning sets, matching the best known bound of algorithms for much simpler problems (such as reachability objectives). For quantitative constraints we show that a polynomial time solution for the almost-sure or the positive winning set would imply a solution to a long-standing open problem (the value problem for turn-based deterministic mean-payoff games) that is not known to be solvable in polynomial time.

This paper studies an incentive structure for cooperation and its stability in peer-assisted services when there exist multiple content providers, using a coalition game theoretic approach. We first consider a generalized coalition structure consisting of multiple providers with many assisting peers, where peers assist providers to reduce the operational cost in content distribution. To distribute the profit from cost reduction to players (i.e., providers and peers), we then establish a generalized formula for individual payoffs when a "Shapley-like" payoff mechanism is adopted. We show that the grand coalition is unstable, even when the operational cost functions are concave, which is in sharp contrast to the recently studied case of a single provider where the grand coalition is stable. We also show that irrespective of stability of the grand coalition, there always exist coalition structures which are not convergent to the grand coalition under a dynamic among coalition structures. Our results give us an incontestable fact that a provider does not tend to cooperate with other providers in peer-assisted services, and be separated from them. Three facets of the noncooperative (selfish) providers are illustrated; (i) underpaid peers, (ii) service monopoly, and (iii) oscillatory coalition structure. Lastly, we propose a stable payoff mechanism which improves fairness of profit-sharing by regulating the selfishness of the players as well as grants the content providers a limited right of realistic bargaining. Our study opens many new questions such as realistic and efficient incentive structures and the tradeoffs between fairness and individual providers' competition in peer-assisted services.

Mean-payoff games on timed automata are played on the infinite weighted graph of configurations of priced timed automata between two players, Player Min and Player Max, by moving a token along the states of the graph to form an infinite run. The goal of Player Min is to minimize the limit average weight of the run, while the goal of the Player Max is the opposite. Brenguier, Cassez, and Raskin recently studied a variation of these games and showed that mean-payoff games are undecidable for timed automata with five or more clocks. We refine this result by proving the undecidability of mean-payoff games with three clocks. On a positive side, we show the decidability of mean-payoff games on one-clock timed automata with binary price-rates. A key contribution of this paper is the application of dynamic programming based proof techniques applied in the context of average reward optimization on an uncountable state and action space.

The well-known theory of audience costs assumes that voters in a democracy punish leaders for inconsistency between military threats against an adversary and their subsequent inactions. The anticipation of such costs deters leaders from issuing empty threats, thereby enhancing their credibility during international crises. However, when the public values belligerent rhetoric, leaders may not be penalized for making threats regardless of whether their actions are inconsistent. In such contexts, the ‘‘costs’’ of inconsistency may be offset by a ‘‘belligerence benefit,’’ effectively nullifying the net audience cost. We expect this benefit to be particularly salient for Republican presidents.

With gold at record highs, more people are swapping jewelry for cash but do your homework before you sell.

This week, Alex Gervasi dives into something that was completely unplanned for: dating people with \"potential\" and watching them leave the relationship better than they found out. Alex and Erica also talk about life updates in quarantine, their highs and lows of life right now, and staying in contact with exes.

This week, Alex Gervasi dives into something that was completely unplanned for: dating people with \"potential\" and watching them leave the relationship better than they found out. Alex and Erica also talk about life updates in quarantine, their highs and lows of life right now, and staying in contact with exes.

MIAMI HERALD JAN 1 7 1963 Approved For Release 2000/06/13 : CIA-RDP wW 4111 toed Says -.= How-Much Did Payoff To Castro Cost Us? Lich Pret _. Was rjiaintaiued, , e4' Kennedy tell the re at' that it Jas ablatant. lies that, ~t~i V 3ym nlaed.__stary of the ay of the Ke nndys Pigsrisonr yxc~iange. We've pht.hetic onlookers. Bob b v been fed a bushel and a peck didn't miss the religious an- of d ubl t about that. We , gfe. He telephoned Cardinal we told our goveyrntrient` Cushing in Boston, which is the Kennedy voting address, ,if anythip ? were done, the ad- of his, and the Kennedys it ministration said, private citi- faith iPns mu*t' CYo lt, even though Whitt individuals and eorpo iprivate citizens have no right I rations do is their own affair to deal with a foreign govern- What: another omg ter They officials di ment, Even the day before the ;: I our tax dollars. How m u c prisoners arrived in Miami, Al-wail used to buy prisoners fron turner fiani3c S]onovaD, "N~' h o 'It how many dollar ~. _11: Castro Pot, and could not, have And the Cardinal raised a mii !'conducted. negotiations, s and oil companies won't ii ded tl Big Barbuda, paid? t~loilgh citizens had arrged We are loader ,, t o the. C;yie for 3i2 milli s in food and yy~y;`6~~~~hQ[tytit tterrtent. mt*d1Gal s milli l t l i m e Mx Kennedy e r rion svan Zias negotiator. The ed the air. After All, this president's brother, AttorneV his conscience fund for wha General Boii>y Kennedy, Miff- happened at. the Bay of Pig `ed l.he If that didn't Lj?.who'11 have to pays goo make things "official, please A part of the tab, want to i explain, Mr. Moto, uu h at. told lust how ,~o.f?,ur.:do I Ias wen th run.7tiai. would? T WF PhurmaceutieaI eorrt anti -hat Rep Ford is skint for. I were told that ff the? 1

An active participation of players in evolutionary games depends on several factors, ranging from personal stakes to the properties of the interaction network. Diverse activity patterns thus have to be taken into account when studying the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. Here we study the weak prisoner's dilemma game, where the activity of each player is determined in a probabilistic manner either by its degree or by its payoff. While degree-correlated activity introduces cascading failures of cooperation that are particularly severe on scale-free networks with frequently inactive hubs, payoff-correlated activity provides a more nuanced activity profile, which ultimately hinders systemic breakdowns of cooperation. To determine optimal conditions for the evolution of cooperation, we introduce an exponential decay to payoff-correlated activity that determines how fast the activity of a player returns to its default state. We show that there exists an intermediate decay rate, at which the resolution of the social dilemma is optimal. This can be explained by the emerging activity patterns of players, where the inactivity of hubs is compensated effectively by the increased activity of average-degree players, who through their collective influence in the network sustain a higher level of cooperation. The sudden drops in the fraction of cooperators observed with degree-correlated activity therefore vanish, and so does the need for the lengthy spatiotemporal reorganization of compact cooperative clusters. The absence of such asymmetric dynamic instabilities thus leads to an optimal resolution of social dilemmas, especially when the conditions for the evolution of cooperation are strongly adverse.

An active participation of players in evolutionary games depends on several factors, ranging from personal stakes to the properties of the interaction network. Diverse activity patterns thus have to be taken into account when studying the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. Here we study the weak prisoner's dilemma game, where the activity of each player is determined in a probabilistic manner either by its degree or by its payoff. While degree-correlated activity introduces cascading failures of cooperation that are particularly severe on scale-free networks with frequently inactive hubs, payoff-correlated activity provides a more nuanced activity profile, which ultimately hinders systemic breakdowns of cooperation. To determine optimal conditions for the evolution of cooperation, we introduce an exponential decay to payoff-correlated activity that determines how fast the activity of a player returns to its default state. We show that there exists an intermediate decay rate, at which the resolution of the social dilemma is optimal. This can be explained by the emerging activity patterns of players, where the inactivity of hubs is compensated effectively by the increased activity of average-degree players, who through their collective influence in the network sustain a higher level of cooperation. The sudden drops in the fraction of cooperators observed with degree-correlated activity therefore vanish, and so does the need for the lengthy spatiotemporal reorganization of compact cooperative clusters. The absence of such asymmetric dynamic instabilities thus leads to an optimal resolution of social dilemmas, especially when the conditions for the evolution of cooperation are strongly adverse.

"Quantitative languages are extension of boolean languages that assign to each word a real number. Mean-payoff automata are finite automata with numerical weights on transitions that assign to each infinite path the long-run average of the transition weights. The class of \emph{mean-payoff automaton expressions}, introduced in [1], is a class of quantitative languages, which is robust: it is closed under the four pointwise operations of max, min, sum and numerical complement."[1] In this paper we improve the computational complexity for solving the classical decision problems for mean-payoff automaton expressions: while the previously best known upper bound was 4EXPTIME, and no lower bound was known, we give an optimal PSPACE complete bound. As a consequence we also obtain a conceptually simple algorithm to solve the classical decision problems for mean-payoff automaton expressions.

Quantitative games are two-player zero-sum games played on directed weighted graphs. Total-payoff games (that can be seen as a refinement of the well-studied mean-payoff games) are the variant where the payoff of a play is computed as the sum of the weights. Our aim is to describe the first pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for total-payoff games in the presence of arbitrary weights. It consists of a non-trivial application of the value iteration paradigm. Indeed, it requires to study, as a milestone, a refinement of these games, called min-cost reachability games, where we add a reachability objective to one of the players. For these games, we give an efficient value iteration algorithm to compute the values and optimal strategies (when they exist), that runs in pseudo-polynomial time. We also propose heuristics allowing one to possibly speed up the computations in both cases.

Mean-payoff games (MPGs) are infinite duration two-player zero-sum games played on weighted graphs. Under the hypothesis of perfect information, they admit memoryless optimal strategies for both players and can be solved in NP-intersect-coNP. MPGs are suitable quantitative models for open reactive systems. However, in this context the assumption of perfect information is not always realistic. For the partial-observation case, the problem that asks if the first player has an observation-based winning strategy that enforces a given threshold on the mean-payoff, is undecidable. In this paper, we study the window mean-payoff objectives that were introduced recently as an alternative to the classical mean-payoff objectives. We show that, in sharp contrast to the classical mean-payoff objectives, some of the window mean-payoff objectives are decidable in games with partial-observation.

Mean-payoff games (MPGs) are infinite duration two-player zero-sum games played on weighted graphs. Under the hypothesis of perfect information, they admit memoryless optimal strategies for both players and can be solved in NP-intersect-coNP. MPGs are suitable quantitative models for open reactive systems. However, in this context the assumption of perfect information is not always realistic. For the partial-observation case, the problem that asks if the first player has an observation-based winning strategy that enforces a given threshold on the mean-payoff, is undecidable. In this paper, we study the window mean-payoff objectives that were introduced recently as an alternative to the classical mean-payoff objectives. We show that, in sharp contrast to the classical mean-payoff objectives, some of the window mean-payoff objectives are decidable in games with partial-observation.

Aggregating statistically diverse renewable power producers (RPPs) is an effective way to reduce the uncertainty of the RPPs. The key question in aggregation of RPPs is how to allocate payoffs among the RPPs. In this paper, a payoff allocation mechanism (PAM) with a simple closed-form expression is proposed: It achieves stability (in the core) and fairness both in the "ex-post" sense, i.e., for all possible realizations of renewable power generation. Furthermore, this PAM can in fact be derived from the competitive equilibrium in a market. The proposed PAM is evaluated in a simulation study with ten wind power producers in the PJM interconnection.

The Aspen Health Forum, 7/26/2009. Medical science research can improve lives, reduce health care costs, and create jobs? a bright constellation in a darkened economy. But many fear that medical innovation will lead to more expensive treatments. Hear advocates discuss the payoffs of biomedical research beyond the act of discovery. The Hon. John E. Porter; Chairman, Research!America The Hon. Billy Tauzin; President and CEO, PhRMA Donald Berwick, MD; President and CEO, Institute for Healthcare Improvement Moderator: Cliff Leaf; Journalist and Advocate Born of the recognition that there is exploding interest in the future of health care, the Aspen Health Forum brings cutting-edge medical science and health care discussions to the public square. It is the world’s only public gathering that offers a lay audience the opportunity to exchange ideas with Nobel laureates, prominent officials from the National Institutes of Health, health care industry leaders and other top experts in health policy and biomedicine. Follow us on: Facebook https://www.facebook.com/aspenideas Twitter https://twitter.com/aspenideas LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/channels/aspenideas You can also follow the Aspen Institute: Instagram http://instagram.com/aspeninstitute Facebook https://www.facebook.com/AspenInstitute Twitter https://twitter.com/aspeninstitute LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/the-aspen-institute Pinterest http://www.pinterest.com/aspeninstitute

We consider both finite-state game graphs and recursive game graphs (or pushdown game graphs), that can model the control flow of sequential programs with recursion, with multi-dimensional mean-payoff objectives. In pushdown games two types of strategies are relevant: global strategies, that depend on the entire global history; and modular strategies, that have only local memory and thus do not depend on the context of invocation. We present solutions to several fundamental algorithmic questions and our main contributions are as follows: (1) We show that finite-state multi-dimensional mean-payoff games can be solved in polynomial time if the number of dimensions and the maximal absolute value of the weight is fixed; whereas if the number of dimensions is arbitrary, then problem is already known to be coNP-complete. (2) We show that pushdown graphs with multi-dimensional mean-payoff objectives can be solved in polynomial time. (3) For pushdown games under global strategies both single and multi-dimensional mean-payoff objectives problems are known to be undecidable, and we show that under modular strategies the multi-dimensional problem is also undecidable (whereas under modular strategies the single dimensional problem is NP-complete). We show that if the number of modules, the number of exits, and the maximal absolute value of the weight is fixed, then pushdown games under modular strategies with single dimensional mean-payoff objectives can be solved in polynomial time, and if either of the number of exits or the number of modules is not bounded, then the problem is NP-hard. (4) Finally we show that a fixed parameter tractable algorithm for finite-state multi-dimensional mean-payoff games or pushdown games under modular strategies with single-dimensional mean-payoff objectives would imply the solution of the long-standing open problem of fixed parameter tractability of parity games.

Zero-sum mean payoff games can be studied by means of a nonlinear spectral problem. When the state space is finite, the latter consists in finding an eigenpair $(u,\lambda)$ solution of $T(u)=\lambda \mathbf{1} + u$ where $T:\mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}^n$ is the Shapley (dynamic programming) operator, $\lambda$ is a scalar, $\mathbf{1}$ is the unit vector, and $u \in \mathbb{R}^n$. The scalar $\lambda$ yields the mean payoff per time unit, and the vector $u$, called the bias, allows one to determine optimal stationary strategies. The existence of the eigenpair $(u,\lambda)$ is generally related to ergodicity conditions. A basic issue is to understand for which classes of games the bias vector is unique (up to an additive constant). In this paper, we consider perfect information zero-sum stochastic games with finite state and action spaces, thinking of the transition payments as variable parameters, transition probabilities being fixed. We identify structural conditions on the support of the transition probabilities which guarantee that the spectral problem is solvable for all values of the transition payments. Then, we show that the bias vector, thought of as a function of the transition payments, is generically unique (up to an additive constant). The proof uses techniques of max-plus (tropical) algebra and nonlinear Perron-Frobenius theory.

No Description

This is the first preregistration for the project "Payoff-dependent utility, norm-dependent utility, and political ideology".

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After decades of making minor tweaks to the U.S. financial aid system, there is a need to develop truly novel approaches to paying for college. Until now, the goal of financial aid has been narrowly framed as providing young adults with enough money to pay for college while minimizing the short-term burden to taxpayers. Because of this narrow framing, student loans have emerged as the dominant form of financial aid in America (Elliott & Lewis, 2017). However, research has increasingly demonstrated that a strong debt-based approach to financial aid fails to equalize college opportunity and has exacerbated post-college inequities over the past thirty years. These failures raise questions about whether financial aid dollars could be better spent. Child Savings Accounts (CSAs) represent a promising alternative to student loan debt. CSAs are accounts typically opened at birth or kindergarten that leverage families' investments with an initial deposit (usually from $25 to $1,000) and savings matches, usually on a 1:1 ratio. This brief begins with a closer look at the defining attributes and prevalence of CSAs across the nation. Then it discusses CSAs potential effects on the education pipeline (early childhood, school years, college years, and post-college years). It concludes by describing the challenges facing CSA programs and suggests innovations to address these problems.

Wage rates and earnings can mislead public and private decisionmakers about the social benefits of certain kinds of education and training investments. This confusion arises because (1) workers and employers prefer employment contracts that downplay productivity differences among workers doing the same job; and (2) important dimensions of educational and training accomplishment (skill, knowledge, and competencies) are often not signaled to potential employers and therefore have limited influence on job allocations. This situation results in significant productivity differentials among workers receiving the same pay for the same job. Some differentials are related to inefficiently signaled educational and training accomplishments (or academic achievement). This paper develops a simple signaling/implicit contract model of the labor market. True productivity depends on general intellectual achievement and educational credentials, but since the former is unobservable, pay is based on credentials and supervisory assessments of doubtful reliability. The labor market tends to overcompensate credentials and undercompensate academic achievement. Next, the paper refutes an assumed equality between simple wage and individual marginal revenue products. A hypothesis equating productivity with wage effects of general intellectual achievement is also refuted. Finally, the paper develops a method of estimating academic achievement's true impact on productivity and applies it to data on 31,399 workers' productivity. The analysis strongly supports signaling theory. The tendency to underreward academic achievement may help explain why American high school students devote less time and energy to learning than do their counterparts abroad. Included are 19 endnotes, 71 references, 3 tables, and a worker evaluation questionnaire. (Author/MLH)

Another payoff to Ransomware hackers. Facebook to launch a smartwatch? Microsoft to launch a dedicated game streaming device? Samsung unveils a tiny, tiny camera sensor. Stripe wants to handle your sales tax headache. And can the creator economy take off in a world of App Stores with 30% rakes?Sponsors:Skiff.org/rideCybereason.comLinks:JBS Paid $11 Million to Resolve Ransomware Attack (Wall Street Journal)Facebook plans first smartwatch for next summer with two cameras, heart rate monitor (The Verge)Microsoft is building its own streaming devices as part of a major Xbox Game Pass expansion (Protocol)Samsung pushes pixel size even further with new camera sensor (The Verge)Payments giant Stripe launches Stripe Tax to integrate sales tax calculations for 30+ countries (Tech Crunch)The creator economy is running into the Apple Tax - this startup is fighting back (The Verge)

Another payoff to Ransomware hackers. Facebook to launch a smartwatch? Microsoft to launch a dedicated game streaming device? Samsung unveils a tiny, tiny camera sensor. Stripe wants to handle your sales tax headache. And can the creator economy take off in a world of App Stores with 30% rakes?Sponsors:Skiff.org/rideCybereason.comLinks:JBS Paid $11 Million to Resolve Ransomware Attack (Wall Street Journal)Facebook plans first smartwatch for next summer with two cameras, heart rate monitor (The Verge)Microsoft is building its own streaming devices as part of a major Xbox Game Pass expansion (Protocol)Samsung pushes pixel size even further with new camera sensor (The Verge)Payments giant Stripe launches Stripe Tax to integrate sales tax calculations for 30+ countries (Tech Crunch)The creator economy is running into the Apple Tax - this startup is fighting back (The Verge)

Briefing notes regarding prospects for HSI(Hyperspectral Imaging) and SAR(Synthetic Aperture Radar) sensor fusion towards HPI(High-resolution Panchromatic Imaging).

We consider concurrent mean-payoff games, a very well-studied class of two-player (player 1 vs player 2) zero-sum games on finite-state graphs where every transition is assigned a reward between 0 and 1, and the payoff function is the long-run average of the rewards. The value is the maximal expected payoff that player 1 can guarantee against all strategies of player 2. We consider the computation of the set of states with value 1 under finite-memory strategies for player 1, and our main results for the problem are as follows: (1) we present a polynomial-time algorithm; (2) we show that whenever there is a finite-memory strategy, there is a stationary strategy that does not need memory at all; and (3) we present an optimal bound (which is double exponential) on the patience of stationary strategies (where patience of a distribution is the inverse of the smallest positive probability and represents a complexity measure of a stationary strategy).

The Integrated High Payoff Rocket Propulsion Technology Program (IHPRPT) is a structured Government and Industry program to improve U.S. rocket propulsion systems. The program is technology driven, goal oriented, and application focused. Integration of the technologies developed by the IHPRPT program is accomplished through key demonstrations. These demonstrators are used to verify compliance with goals. The achievement of the IHPRPT goals and the transition to operational systems provide significant payoff as well as a high return on investment. The IHPRPT program is being conducted as a fully coordinated, but not joint, effort. Each agency and Department of Defense component is responsible for funding and managing their respective portions of the effort. The effort is headed by the IHPRPT Steering Committee, which has representatives from each participating agency and service. Industry plays an active role in the program through an involvement in planning, participation at Steering Committee meetings, conducting of technology programs, identification of commercial transition opportunities, advocacy of the program, and teaming.

http://thedukemitchell.uk/ for more weird videos plus strange film nights in London.   VHS trailer for the 1991 action film Payoff, directed by Stuart Cooper, starring Keith Carradine, Kim Greist and more.

- Mobility Sales Double That of Auto Industry- Chevy Bolt Will Kill Other EV Sales- Honda and GM Consider Joint Fuel-Cell Plant- Lincoln Tweaks Continental Concept for Production- Hella's Damage Detection Technology

xvi, 174 p. : 24 cm