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Intertemporal choice refers to decisions involving tradeoffs between costs and benefits at different times. The attribute-based models, such as tradeoff model and equate-to-differentiate theory, show that individuals tend to compare the difference between attributes of delay and outcome before deciding in a single attribute when selecting between a smaller, sooner outcome (SS) and a larger, later outcome (LL). However, the strength of this attribute-based difference judgment has not been examined. We will examine the relationship between the strength of attribute-based difference judgment and eye-tracking measures using eye-tracking technique.

This project examines the hypothesis that time preferences in social exchanges have a different shape than those in economic exchanges. Usually, the value of rewards decreases along with delay. However, the curve can be an inverse U letter shape in social exchanges.

This research investigates the impact of a mindfulness meditation induction on intertemporal decision-making and how that relationship is moderated by meditation experience and self-control. First, participants report their socioeconomic data. The mindfulness induction or a mind-wandering control condition follows. Then they do a delay discounting task. Post-questionnaires are: a state and a trait mindfulness questionnaire, the brief self-control scale, and questions assessing their meditation experience. The study's limitations include its reliance on self-reports and a relatively small sample size of 90 participants. Conducted online through the Prolific platform, the study aims to recruit 90 participants who indicated previously on prolific that they meditate and who are US-nationals and residents. Participants will be paid a fixed amount of 2.1 pounds (converted into USD). An additional amount will be paid to 10% of the participants (random). The bonus is paid out according to one of their choices in the DD task (random) and will be discounted by a randomly assigned factor between 1 and 10.

This research investigates the impact of a mindfulness meditation induction on intertemporal decision-making and how that relationship is moderated by meditation experience and self-control. First, participants report their socioeconomic data. The mindfulness induction or a mind-wandering control condition follows. Then they do a delay discounting task. Post-questionnaires are: a state and a trait mindfulness questionnaire, the brief self-control scale, and questions assessing their meditation experience. The study's limitations include its reliance on self-reports and a relatively small sample size of 90 participants. Conducted online through the Prolific platform, the study aims to recruit 90 participants who indicated previously on prolific that they meditate and who are US-nationals and residents. Participants will be paid a fixed amount of 2.1 pounds (converted into USD). An additional amount will be paid to 10% of the participants (random). The bonus is paid out according to one of their choices in the DD task (random) and will be discounted by a randomly assigned factor between 1 and 10.

See attached file for full pre-registration information

See attached file for full pre-registration information

People reason differently about potential gains and losses. Learning rates differ for rewards and punishments, risk preferences are independent between gains and losses, and recent research on risky decision-making suggests that the effectiveness of behavioural interventions might differ between the gain and loss domain. The current study seeks to extend these findings to temporal discounting. First, by attempting to replicate whether baseline discounting is independent for gains and losses within participants. Next, by evaluating whether the effect of interventions designed to alter discounting is moderated by the domain of choice. Our results are relevant for understanding the decision-mechanisms associated with gains and losses, and for linking findings from risky decision-making to intertemporal choice. They also have practical policy implications for financial decisions influenced by temporal discounting, such as student loans, credit card debts, and pension schemes.

The date/delay effect refers to the framing of time in intertemporal choice tasks. Framing time as dates rather than delays has repeatedly led to lower discount rates (e.g., LeBoeuf, 2006; Read et al., 2005). However, the cognitive mechanisms of this effect are largely unclear. This study therefore aims to investigate the validity of potential explanations of this effect referring to attentional processes (attention-focusing hypothesis; Read et al., 2005). Specifically, we will examine whether attentional processes differ when time in an intertemporal choice task is framed as a delay (e.g., in days) or as a date. To this end, we will assess decision making behavior and oculomotor activity during the choice process of an intertemporal choice task with two conditions (date vs. delay; Monetary Choice Questionnaire [MCQ]; Kirby et al., 1999) and examine associations between eye movements and the date/delay effect. As a secondary aim, we will explore relations of the date/delay effect with questionnaire measures of impulsivity (UPPS-P Impulsive Behavior Scale; Lynam et al., 2006) and time perspective (Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory [ZTPI]; Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999).

Intertemporal choice refers to the situation in which people need to choose between outcomes occurring at different times (Dai & Busemeyer, 2014). Numerous studies have demonstrated that the evaluation of a payoff would decrease as it is delayed into the future, that is, the phenomenon of delay discounting (e.g., Read, 2003). Several of studies have also investigated the impact of cognitive load on intertemporal choice and produced mixed results (Deck & Jahedi, 2015; Finn et al., 2015; Franco-Watkins et al., 2010; Getz, 2013; Hinson et al., 2003). Specifically, Hinson et al. (2003) examined how cognitive load affected the degree of delay discounting and found more impulsive behavior (i.e., a higher degree of delay discounting) under cognitive load. However, the relevant studies failed to consider the simultaneous impact of cognitive load on the degree of response randomness and thus might be misleading. Taking response randomness into consideration, Franco-Watkins et al. (2006) analyzed the same data and found that people did not necessarily become more impulsive under cognitive load but rather made more random responses. This finding was further supported in a follow-up empirical study by the same researchers (Franco-Watkins et al., 2010). Consequently, to understand the impact of cognitive load on intertemporal choice, one should consider the degrees of both delay discounting and response randomness. To this end, Dai et al. (2016) proposed a random utility model of delay discounting with two parameters: one for delay discounting and one for response randomness, and fitted the model to a dataset collected from a sample with externalizing psychopathology (EXT). It was found that imposing working memory load increased the levels of both delay discounting and response randomness. However, the same impact could not be replicated in a recent study of our laboratory using normal participants, and two other studies in our laboratory suggested that cognitive load increased the degree of response randomness but decreased the degree of delay discounting. These results were surprising but appeared reliable in our studies. Therefore, we would like to run a preregistered replication study of our recent research to obtain more convincing evidence for the impact of cognitive load on intertemporal choice.

This article is from Frontiers in Psychology , volume 5 . Abstract Intertemporal choice is a decision-making dilemma related to outcomes of different entity located at different time points. Economic and psychological literature on this topic showed the phenomen of temporal discounting, i.e., the proclivity to devalue the outcome distant in time on the basis of the time delay necessary to obtain it. The goals of this research are to investigate two different components of intertemporal choice separately, namely time and outcome, in school-age children, and the possible link among such components and the security of attachment style and theory of mind. Ninety one children aged between 6 and 10 years performed two intertemporal choice tasks, first and second order false belief tasks and the Separation Anxiety Task in the Family and School versions. Results showed that the two components of intertemporal choice (waiting tolerance and sensitivity to delayed outcome) are stately interrelated; the quality of the attachment to the family caregiver affects the tolerance to waiting time and first order false belief understanding affects both the components of intertemporal choice.

In this online study, we used a hypothetical intertemporal choice task with varying levels of time ambiguity (i.e., apart from using exactly-defined delays, we also used ranges of possible delivery times, varying from ranges of 2 days till 360 days). The main goal of the study is to investigate main and interaction effects of time ambiguity. The used task consists of 156 trials in each of which participants choose between a fixed sooner-smaller (SS) option and a variable later-larger (LL) option that varies in its level of time ambiguity, amount, and delay midpoint. We used two different versions of the intertemporal choice task, one using words, the other visual timelines. Data collection took place in two separate rounds, resulting in approximately 230 participants in total (85 participants in round 1; roughly 145 participants in round 2). Preregistration of the analyses took place after having analysed the data from round one (here, we had approximately 40 participants per version) but before analysing any data of round 2. Therefore, our goal is to use data from round 2 to replicate the results in the data from round 1. Additionally, we want to combine the two samples for a robustness check. Finally, we will use the data for computational modelling purposes; this has not yet been done for neither round 1 data nor for round 2 data: We will first analyse the data from round 1 and then attempt to replicate the results in sample 2; additionally, we will again analyse the combined sample.

Intertemporal choices, such as when choosing between rewards that are smaller but delivered sooner and those that are larger but delivered later, are influenced by the way in which time is framed. For instance, framing a reward in terms of deferring its arrival shifts preferences to the smaller-sooner option, whereas framing it in terms of speeding up its arrival shifts preferences to the larger-later option (defer-speedup effect). Similarly, framing the time of reward delivery as a calendar date shifts preferences to the larger-later option (date-delay effect). A mechanistic understanding of these framing effects is currently lacking, but could help the development of better decison-making models and more effective behavioral interventions. Here, we investigate the cognitive mechanisms underlying the defer-speedup and date-delay effecs in intertemporal choice, using computational modeling of choices and response times. For each framing effect, we test three hypotheses: (1) framing alters how outcomes are valued, (2) framing alters how times are perceived, and (3) framing alters both how outcomes are valued and how times are perceived. These hypotheses are implemented as parameterizations of the value and time functions of the computational model, respectively. In this preregistration, we report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusion criteria, all manipulations, and all measures in the study. Also, we describe the task, procedure, and modeling approach. [Data management plan: https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.4720978; Intertemporal choice task: https://github.com/bramzandbelt/itch_time_framing_task; Computational model: https://github.com/bramzandbelt/itchmodel]

In uni-modal intertemporal decisions, the options differ on a few attributes (e.g., a chocolate now versus a chocolate later), while in cross-modal decisions, the options differ on multiple attributes (e.g., a pen now versus a chocolate later). Previous research has found that time preferences influence uni-modal and cross-modal decisions differently, explaining this result using the attentional dilution effect (Read et al., 2023). The purpose of this study is to examine whether this finding remains stable when controlling for individual differences and to provide deeper process evidence using the eye-tracking technique.

In uni-modal intertemporal choices, options differ by a few attributes (e.g., a chocolate now versus a chocolate later), whereas in cross-modal decisions, options differ across multiple attributes (e.g., a pen now versus a chocolate later). Previous research has shown that time preferences influence uni-modal and cross-modal decisions differently, explaining this difference to the cross-modal effect (Read et al., 2023). Building on these findings, we aim to explore the potential impact of replacing items with similar alternatives (e.g., a chocolate now versus a gummy candy later), hypothesizing that this modification could weaken the cross-modal effect.

Intertemporal choice refers to decisions involving tradeoffs between costs and benefits at different times. The dimension-based models, such as tradeoff model and equate-to-differentiate theory, show that individuals tend to compare the difference between dimensions of delay and outcome before deciding in a single dimension when selecting between a smaller, sooner outcome (SS) and a larger, later outcome (LL). However, the strength of this dimension-based difference judgment has not been examined. We will examine the relationship between the strength of dimension-based difference judgment and eye-tracking measures using eye-tracking technique.

The current study employed the temporal discounting task to assess differences in intertemporal decision-making between hearing-impaired and normal children across self-oriented and other-oriented choices. The results showed that: (1) No significant difference was observed between hearing-impaired and normal children when making intertemporal choices for themselves; (2) When decisions were made for close family, hearing-impaired children exhibited a significantly higher preference for immediate rewards compared to normal children; (3) Conversely, when making choices for strangers, no significant difference was noted in the immediate reward selection rates between hearing-impaired and normal children. Extant research corroborates that normal children display greater patience in intertemporal decision-making for close family compared to hearing-impaired children. The construal level theory and responsibility aversion hypothesis were expand.

Environmental issues caused by irrational environmental intertemporal choices are becoming increasingly severe. There is an urgent need to find an effective way to solve this problem. Vertical position as an concept which closely related to our lives was proved to have an impact on people's intertemporal choices. Therefore, in this research, we decide to use vertical position as an intervention to prompt individuals to make more rational intertemporal choices. However, different from previous researches, this research will focus on the impact of vertical position on individuals' environmental intertemporal choices, and based on previous researches, we will conduct this reseach not only from the perspective of space, but also from the perspective of plane, in order to futher explore the impact of vertical position on intertemporal choices from multi-angle. Furthermore, the sign effect in the environmental intertemporal choice field will also be studied.

People reason differently about potential gains and losses. Learning rates differ for rewards and punishments, risk preferences are independent between gains and losses, and recent research on risky decision-making suggests that the effectiveness of behavioural interventions might differ between the gain and loss domain. The current study seeks to extend these findings to temporal discounting. First, by attempting to replicate whether baseline discounting is independent for gains and losses within participants. Next, by evaluating whether the effect of interventions designed to alter discounting is moderated by the domain of choice. Our results are relevant for understanding the decision-mechanisms associated with gains and losses, and for linking findings from risky decision-making to intertemporal choice. They also have practical policy implications for financial decisions influenced by temporal discounting, such as student loans, credit card debts, and pension schemes.

The environmental issues caused by irrational environmental intertemporal choices are becoming increasingly severe. Researchers advocate using power as an intervention to prompt individuals to make more rational environmental intertemporal choices. However, most of the existing researches adopt explicit methods to induce the sense of power, drawing inconsistent conclusions regarding the relationship between power and environmental intertemporal choice. To address this issue, the present research manipulated power at the implicit level, which had been proved to be able to better activate the abstract concepts of power and resulting behaviors. By employing size metaphor, body posture metaphor, and color metaphor of power to initiate participants with a sense of power unconsciously, the present research explored the embodied metaphor effect of power on environmental intertemporal choice. Furthermore, the sign effect was studied in the environmental intertemporal choice field.

Intertemporal choice refers to decisions in which people choose between an option whose delivery time is sooner, but its reward amount is smaller (SS option) and an option whose delivery time is later however, its reward amount is larger (LL option). Due to their commonness in daily life, intertemporal choices have been widely studied in psychological and behavioral economics research. However, previous intertemporal choice tasks neglect one vital aspect of daily confronted intertemporal decisions: In everyday intertemporal decisions, the exact delivery time is often unknown; instead, we only have a rough idea of the delivery time. Such uncertainty about the option attribute (often referred to as ambiguity) has been quite extensively studied in the domain of risky choice, where the information about the outcome probability can be partly or completely unknown (i.e., probability ambiguity). In contrast, in the domain of intertemporal choice, time ambiguity has only recently been started to be studied, namely by Ikink et al. (2019). In this study, Ikink et al. identified two computational models to capture the effect of time ambiguity on intertemporal choice: the time perception and the additive model. Both models showed equally good statistical model fits with nearly identical log-likelihoods. A critical shortcoming of the computational models in Ikink et al. (2019) is that the models only considered the choice data as the predicted variable. In contrast, the DDM (Drift Diffusion Model) simultaneously models the response time and choice data, thus making use of a richer set of information, which can contribute to model-fitting and model-identification (Ballard & McClure, 2019; Miletić et al., 2020; Shahar et al., 2019). The first goal of the study pre-registered here is to use DDM to model the role of time ambiguity in an intertemporal choice task. The second goal of the present study is to identify whether there is a general ambiguity aversion factor across both the probability and time domains: As mentioned above, ambiguity preferences have been studied quite extensively in the probability domain (Ellsberg, 1961; Levy et al., 2010; Tymula et al., 2012), but far less so in the time domain. Therefore, we are interested in investigating to what extent individual differences in ambiguity preferences in the probability and time domain are associated versus independent of each other.

In this project, we aim to investigate the date/delay effect in temporal discounting (Read et al., 2005) as well as associations between schizotypy, temporal discounting and the date/delay effect. Specifically, we want to (a) replicate the date/delay effect, (b) examine the association of temporal discounting and schizotypy in the general population, and (c) find out whether the magnitude of the date/delay effect is associated with schizotypy.

In this project, we aim to investigate the date/delay effect in temporal discounting (Read et al., 2005) as well as associations between schizotypy, temporal discounting and the date/delay effect. Specifically, we want to (a) replicate the date/delay effect, (b) examine the association of temporal discounting and schizotypy in the general population, and (c) find out whether the magnitude of the date/delay effect is associated with schizotypy.

In this project, we aim to investigate the date/delay effect in temporal discounting (Read et al., 2005) as well as associations between schizotypy, temporal discounting and the date/delay effect. Specifically, we want to (a) replicate the date/delay effect, (b) examine the association of temporal discounting and schizotypy in the general population, and (c) find out whether the magnitude of the date/delay effect is associated with schizotypy.

In this project, we aim to investigate the date/delay effect in temporal discounting (Read et al., 2005) as well as associations between schizotypy, temporal discounting and the date/delay effect. Specifically, we want to (a) replicate the date/delay effect, (b) examine the association of temporal discounting and schizotypy in the general population, and (c) find out whether the magnitude of the date/delay effect is associated with schizotypy.

Exploratory analyses of a previous study dataset (osf.io/y2krq) revealed that gender unexpectedly moderated the effect of a map-based navigation task on temporal discounting, with male (but not female) participants discounting future rewards more steeply after thinking about navigating between two locations from the perspective of an arrow on the map (ego-moving condition).The aim of the present research is to replicate the unexpected interaction effect and to explore its potential mechanisms.

This study explores the impact of state anxiety on intertemporal decision-making and the role of memory bias and cognitive reappraisal. In Experiment 1, 81 subjects with moderate anxiety level were selected to induce high and low state anxiety by watching videos, and then the free recall paradigm was used to measure the time memory bias of the subjects, and finally the intertemporal decision-making task was completed. In Experiment 2, 94 subjects were re-recruited. On the basis of Study 1, the cognitive reappraisal task was added to examine the mediating role of memory bias in the influence of state anxiety on intertemporal choice and the moderating role of cognitive reappraisal.

The paper extends existing models of inter-temporal bank asset management in the following respects: (a) Bank customers are identified, with requirements that their demands for loan renewals be satisfied. Opportunities are provided for attracting new customers; (b) feedback relationships between loans and deposits are introduced; (c) costs of servicing loans with different degrees of risk are introduced explicitly; (d) future deposits and loan repayments are expressed as jointly dependent random variables; (e) the Federal Reserve Board's liquidity leverage suggestions are replaced by chance-constraints on meeting demands for loans. This leads to a policy of balancing maturities in the bond portfolio. The format of the model is that of chance- constrained programming, with piecewise linear approximations to the non-linear constraints. A 5-period example, with parameterizing on the right hand side, is presented.

We investigate the impact of payoff contextual volatility on drift-diffusion model parameters in an online intertemporal choice task.

Delay satisfaction can predict personal achievement but can be painful. We aim to test the hypothesis that the physical painkiller acetaminophen (paracetamol) can reduce delay discounting and drive people choose more longer but larger monetary reward.

Participants from universities in China were asked to think about different time points in life and then made choices between smaller-sooner and larger-later rewards, and rated their positive and negative feelings.

Investigating relationships between behavioural and self-report measures of perspective-taking, future self-continuity, and intertemporal decision-making.

Investigate overlapping neural substrates underlying delay discounting across different time horizons (seconds, days)

People tend to attach less value to a good if they know a delay will occur before they obtain it. For example, people value receiving $100 dollars tomorrow more than receiving $100 in 10 years. We explore one reason for this tendency (due to Derek Parfit, 1984): In terms of psychological properties, such as beliefs, values, and goals, the decision maker is more closely linked to the person (his or her future self) receiving $100 tomorrow than to the person receiving $100 in 10 years. For this reason, she prefers her nearer self to have the $100 than her more remote self. Studies 1 and 2 show that the greater the rated psychological connection between two parts of a participant's life, the less she discounts future monetary and nonmonetary benefits (good days at work) over that interval. In Studies 3-5, participants read about characters who undergo large life-changing (and connectedness-weakening) events at different points in their lives, and then make decisions about the timing of benefits on behalf of these characters. All five studies reveal a relation between perceived psychological connectedness and intertemporal choice: Participants prefer benefits to occur before large changes in connectedness, but prefer costs to occur after these changes. The six characters presented to participants in Studies 3 and 5 are appended. (Contains 4 endnotes, 4 figures, and 3 tables.)

People tend to attach less value to a good if they know a delay will occur before they obtain it. For example, people value receiving $100 dollars tomorrow more than receiving $100 in 10 years. We explore one reason for this tendency (due to Derek Parfit, 1984): In terms of psychological properties, such as beliefs, values, and goals, the decision maker is more closely linked to the person (his or her future self) receiving $100 tomorrow than to the person receiving $100 in 10 years. For this reason, she prefers her nearer self to have the $100 than her more remote self. Studies 1 and 2 show that the greater the rated psychological connection between two parts of a participant's life, the less she discounts future monetary and nonmonetary benefits (good days at work) over that interval. In Studies 3-5, participants read about characters who undergo large life-changing (and connectedness-weakening) events at different points in their lives, and then make decisions about the timing of benefits on behalf of these characters. All five studies reveal a relation between perceived psychological connectedness and intertemporal choice: Participants prefer benefits to occur before large changes in connectedness, but prefer costs to occur after these changes. The six characters presented to participants in Studies 3 and 5 are appended. (Contains 4 endnotes, 4 figures, and 3 tables.)

Previous research has shown that intertemporal choices, i.e., choices between smaller-sooner and larger-later rewards, are subject to framing effects (see Rung & Madden, 2018; Scholten et al., 2019, for reviews). One of these effects is the date/delay effect (LeBoeuf, 2006; Read et al., 2005). Specifically, people show less temporal discounting when faced with decisions in which delays are framed as specific dates (e.g., 29th of October 2021) rather than in units of delay (e.g., 7 days). While this effect has been replicated several times (e.g., Dshemuchadse et al., 2013; Jiang & Dai, 2021; LeBoeuf, 2006; Read et al., 2005), the cognitive and neural mechanisms of this effect remain largely unclear. Indeed, while different explanations about the cognitive mechanisms of the date/delay effect have been discussed (e.g., Dshemuchadse et al., 2013; LeBoeuf, 2006; Read et al., 2005), no study to date has examined its neural underpinnings. Therefore, using fMRI, we aim to examine which brain regions show different activation in the two conditions in order to deduce potential cognitive mechanisms. Additionally, we will apply eye-tracking methods to gain further insights into the potentially mediating attentional mechanisms of the date/delay effect (cf. Dshemuchadse et al., 2013; Read et al., 2005).

Previous research has shown that intertemporal choices, i.e., choices between smaller-sooner and larger-later rewards, are subject to framing effects (see Rung & Madden, 2018; Scholten et al., 2019, for reviews). One of these effects is the date/delay effect (LeBoeuf, 2006; Read et al., 2005). Specifically, people show less temporal discounting when faced with decisions in which delays are framed as specific dates (e.g., 29th of October 2021) rather than in units of delay (e.g., 7 days). While this effect has been replicated several times (e.g., Dshemuchadse et al., 2013; Jiang & Dai, 2021; LeBoeuf, 2006; Read et al., 2005), the cognitive and neural mechanisms of this effect remain largely unclear. Indeed, while different explanations about the cognitive mechanisms of the date/delay effect have been discussed (e.g., Dshemuchadse et al., 2013; LeBoeuf, 2006; Read et al., 2005), no study to date has examined its neural underpinnings. Therefore, using fMRI, we aim to examine which brain regions show different activation in the two conditions in order to deduce potential cognitive mechanisms. Additionally, we will apply eye-tracking methods to gain further insights into the potentially mediating attentional mechanisms of the date/delay effect (cf. Dshemuchadse et al., 2013; Read et al., 2005).

Includes bibliographical references (p. 31-33)

Based on the cognitive-emotional dual system theory and economic reasoning, we conducted 4 experiments to examine the combined nudge effects of time perspective and self-other decision-making differences on the time-based intertemporal choices of college students. We also explored the psychological mechanisms, boundary conditions, and practical applications of the nudge. Experiment 1 demonstrated a combined nudge effect of time perspective and self-other decision-making differences on college students' time-based intertemporal choices. Experiment 2 revealed that when participants adopted a linear perspectives and made decisions for themselves, the nudge effect was mediated by subjective time perception. Conversely, when participants adopted a cyclical perspectives and made decisions for others, the nudge effect was mediated by opportunity costs. Experiment 3 showed that the presence of a time marker could 'eliminate' the nudge effect of time perspective on time-based intertemporal choice, though it did not affect the nudge effect of self-other decision-making differences. The field experiment in Experiment 4 demonstrated that modifying how choice options were described significantly increased college students' allocation of study time and reduced their entertainment time allocation over the following three days. Our findings provide a cost-effective strategy and empirical insights for enhancing time management among college students.

Intertemporal choice is a choice between a smaller sooner amount of money and a larger later amount of money. People often tend to be impatient in these choices and what we want to see whether asking them to daydream about the ways they will use the money in advance could increase their patience. We would expect them to do this naturally when choosing, if this does change their behaviour, it suggests that this not the process that people make decisions.

Mixed intertemporal choice involve health, economic, and social domains, yet the neural mechanisms underlying outcome evaluation in such choices remain insufficiently explored. Using event-related potential (ERP) technique, two experiments investigated the neural mechanisms of outcome evaluation for “smaller and sooner loss, larger and later gain” (SSL-LLG) and “smaller and sooner gain, larger and later loss” (SSG-LLS) options under separate and joint evaluation conditions. The results indicated that loss-condition feedback elicited more negative FRN amplitudes and significantly lower P300 amplitudes compared to gain-condition feedback. (Experiment 1). The SSG-LLS and SSL-LLG conditions showed non-significant differences in raw FRN and P3 amplitudes compared to pure-loss intertemporal choice. The average FRN difference amplitudes were more negative for SSL-LLG condition than SSG-LLS condition, while the average P300 difference amplitudes did not differ significantly between the two conditions (Experiment 2). This suggests that loss choices elicited stronger loss perception and reduced cognitive resource allocation; emotional experience and cognitive resource allocation in outcome evaluation of mixed gain-loss options were similar to those of the pure loss intertemporal choice. Loss perception was greater in SSL-LLG than SSG-LLS conditions, eliciting stronger negative emotions, though the cognitive resources consumed in both conditions were equivalent, highlighting emotion played a more prominent role than cognition in mixed intertemporal choice outcome evaluation. This explains individuals’ preference for SSG-LLS condition as a strategy of “choosing the lesser of two evils”. Therefore, understanding the neural mechanisms of loss perception holds practical significance for encouraging more rational decision-making behavior.

In this study, we constructed a three-dimensional categorization framework of emotional valence (positive, negative, and mixed valence), used a three-level random-effects model to examine its impact on intertemporal choice, and conducted moderating-effects analyses, in order to provide comprehensive and objective quantitative evidence for refining the theoretical framework of emotion and decision-making.

In this study, we constructed a three-dimensional categorization framework of emotional valence (positive, negative, and mixed valence), used a three-level random-effects model to examine its impact on intertemporal choice, and conducted moderating-effects analyses, in order to provide comprehensive and objective quantitative evidence for refining the theoretical framework of emotion and decision-making.

In this study, we constructed a three-dimensional categorization framework of emotional valence (positive, negative, and mixed valence), used a three-level random-effects model to examine its impact on intertemporal choice, and conducted moderating-effects analyses, in order to provide comprehensive and objective quantitative evidence for refining the theoretical framework of emotion and decision-making.

In this study, we constructed a three-dimensional categorization framework of emotional valence (positive, negative, and mixed valence), used a three-level random-effects model to examine its impact on intertemporal choice, and conducted moderating-effects analyses, in order to provide comprehensive and objective quantitative evidence for refining the theoretical framework of emotion and decision-making.

In these experiments, we will be replicating and extending findings from the previous experiments in this study, and examining differences in cognitive processes between meta-preferential decision-making, evaluative judgment-based decision-making, and the control group.

In these experiments, we will be replicating and extending findings from the previous experiments in this study, and examining differences in cognitive processes between meta-preferential decision-making, evaluative judgment-based decision-making, and the control group.

In our previous studies, we found that framing intertemporal decisions (i.e., selecting between a smaller, sooner reward [SS] and a larger, later reward [LL]) as rejections attenuate people’s preferences compared to choices. In particular, people are more patient in rejection than choice when the interest rate is low and less patient in rejection than choice when the interest rate is high. This study aims to replicate the above findings and examine the generalizability of intertemporal decisions involving losses.

The main question is whether physical painkiller acetaminophen (paracetamol) can reduce the pain of delay satisfaction. We predict that acetaminophen can drive people choose longer but larger monetary reward.

The main question is whether physical painkiller acetaminophen (paracetamol) can reduce the pain of delay satisfaction. We predict that acetaminophen can drive people choose longer but larger monetary reward.

As a special type of decision making, intertemporal choice requires individuals to weigh and choose among options at different time points, and is closely related to individuals' health and wealth. Whether gender differences also exist in intertemporal choice has been an elusive question. Researchers have conducted relevant experiments on animals and humans, but the results are inconsistent. For these reasons, this study aims to summarize (qualitatively) and analyze (quantitatively) the results of the studies on gender differences in intertemporal choice.