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This report summarizes the actions and outcomes of a seminar attended by State Education Agency (SEA) directors of gifted and talented programs in December 1994. The meeting identified important issues in the gifted field, including: lack of gifted preservice course work and training programs; service for students in the regular classroom; the need for quality assurance through evaluation, state accountability systems, and dissemination of research; the need to mobilize parents; and the need to build on Goals 2000 and other federal legislation. Action steps the directors need to take are described, including: creating a means for communication, dialogue, and meeting with one another; consolidating findings of projects and research; developing and publishing best practice models for identifying and providing services to gifted students; endorsing the adoption of national standards for a more challenging curriculum for all students; and creating a forum that allows SEA directors and preservice/postservice providers to narrow the gap between practice and what is being taught in professional development courses. Appendices include a list of participants, an Ohio Javits Project description, a summary of SEA Action Seminar evaluations, and a comprehensive list of challenging issues developed at the seminar. (CR)

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Philip Morris Records; pleading; drft, draft; extr, extra

The sense of agency (SoA) is the term referring to the experience that one controls external events via one’s own action (Haggard & Chambon, 2012). Although many previous studies on the SoA have dealt with the relationship between one action and one effect (Haggard et al., 2002), some previous studies examined the SoA of multi-step actions (Garrido-Vásquez & Rock, 2020) and of two effects presented successively (Ruess et al., 2018). However, there are few studies on whether the association between the number of actions and a set size of effects affects the SoA. We will investigate this issue by manipulating the number of both actions and effects. As a dependent variable, we will ask participants to rate the SoA with a visual analog scale (VAS). Therefore, in this experiment, we will target the explicit SoA (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014).

When people receive a negative outcome such as a loss from their stock investment, or poor pedagogy of a course, the emotions they feel are regret and disappointment. Disappointment is the emotion that is associated with a realization that the received outcome is less favorable than the outcome hoped for. Regret is the emotion that accompanies the thoughts that one could have done something to receive a real or imaginary superior foregone outcome (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). Researchers have conducted many studies to juxtapose the effect of personal agency, (defined as a personal responsibility choosing a course of action), and assigned agency (i.e. being assigned a choice made by someone else) on regret and disappointment (Zeelenberg et al., 2000b). Results of these studies suggested that while personal agency is an antecedent of regret, it is not an antecedent of disappointment. Researchers have also conducted many studies investigating the effect of action (making a choice to switch away to a course resulting in a negative outcome) versus inaction (declining to switch away from the same course resulting in a negative outcome) on regret (Kahneman & Tverskey, 1982). Results of these studies suggested that individuals’ tend to perceive a decision to be worse—and experience more regret—when the outcome results from action as opposed to inaction. Based on the results of the aforementioned studies, it is assumed that an inaction decision is similar to being assigned a course of action, whereas action decision is associated with choosing a course and is similar to personal agency (Zeelenberg et al., 1998a). Therefore, regret and disappointment literature suggests that responsibility for choosing a course of action is associated with greater regret because an individual who is personally responsible for the choice that led to the negative outcome perceives the self as the cause of the outcome (self-blame or self-agency). It is also argued that, decision agency is not an antecedent of disappointment and it is proposed that disappointment is felt when the negative outcome is ascribed to uncontrollable circumstances (random agency) or some other person (other agency) (Zeelenberg et al., 1998b). In this study, we manipulate decision agency at three levels; action/personal agency (i.e. choosing a course), inaction (i.e. choosing not to switch and maintain the current course), and assigned agency (i.e. being assigned a choice made by someone else) to juxtapose its effect on regret and disappointment. We also manipulate outcome reversibility (Interim versus Terminal) and superior outcome of the foregone option (Known versus Unknown) to investigate their moderating role for the effect of decision agency on disappointment and regret. We highlight the findings from the escalation of commitment literature, which documents that upon receiving an interim negative outcome, individuals responsible for choosing a course of action are likely to self-justify their decisions to reduce cognitive dissonance (Staw, 1976). We also point out that upon receiving an interim negative outcome, self-choosers perceive the received outcome as more positive as well as maintain a favorable belief about future outcome of the course of action. Then, we propose conditional effects of decision agency on regret and disappointment to be reported in two papers as follows: In the first paper, in contrast to much of the previous literature on action effect, we argue that inaction also involves choosing one of the available options for a justified reason, and it is similar to personal agency and different from assigned agency (Bobocel & Meyer, 1994). Therefore, we posit that an inaction decision should also, just like an action decision, prevent individuals from thinking about undoing their decision (that is, muting the decision), and suppressing self-referent upward counterfactual thinking concerning what they could have done to receive a superior outcome. Thus, when individuals choose and self-justify their action or inaction decision, they should report the same level of regret for an inaction that caused a negative outcome as they would for an action that resulted in that same negative outcome. In the second paper we juxtapose the effect of action/personal agency versus assigned agency on disappointment (comparison with inaction decision is exploratory). We argue that when individuals are responsible for choosing a course of action, they will maintain positive beliefs about the course of the action and suppress non-referent upward counterfactual thinking when the negative outcome is interim. As a result, self-choosers should feel less disappointment from receiving an interim negative outcome compared to the disappointment felt by individuals when they are assigned the same course of action.

When people receive a negative outcome such as a loss from their stock investment, or poor pedagogy of a course, the emotions they feel are regret and disappointment. Disappointment is the emotion that is associated with a realization that the received outcome is less favorable than the outcome hoped for. Regret is the emotion that accompanies the thoughts that one could have done something to receive a real or imaginary superior foregone outcome (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). Researchers have conducted many studies to juxtapose the effect of personal agency, (defined as a personal responsibility choosing a course of action), and assigned agency (i.e. being assigned a choice made by someone else) on regret and disappointment (Zeelenberg et al., 2000b). Results of these studies suggested that while personal agency is an antecedent of regret, it is not an antecedent of disappointment. Researchers have also conducted many studies investigating the effect of action (making a choice to switch away to a course resulting in a negative outcome) versus inaction (declining to switch away from the same course resulting in a negative outcome) on regret (Kahneman & Tverskey, 1982). Results of these studies suggested that individuals’ tend to perceive a decision to be worse—and experience more regret—when the outcome results from action as opposed to inaction. Based on the results of the aforementioned studies, it is assumed that an inaction decision is similar to being assigned a course of action, whereas action decision is associated with choosing a course and is similar to personal agency (Zeelenberg et al., 1998a). Therefore, regret and disappointment literature suggests that responsibility for choosing a course of action is associated with greater regret because an individual who is personally responsible for the choice that led to the negative outcome perceives the self as the cause of the outcome (self-blame or self-agency). It is also argued that, decision agency is not an antecedent of disappointment and it is proposed that disappointment is felt when the negative outcome is ascribed to uncontrollable circumstances (random agency) or some other person (other agency) (Zeelenberg et al., 1998b). In this study, we manipulate decision agency at three levels; action/personal agency (i.e. choosing a course), inaction (i.e. choosing not to switch and maintain the current course), and assigned agency (i.e. being assigned a choice made by someone else) to juxtapose its effect on regret and disappointment. We also manipulate outcome reversibility (Interim versus Terminal) and superior outcome of the foregone option (Known versus Unknown) to investigate their moderating role for the effect of decision agency on disappointment and regret. We highlight the findings from the escalation of commitment literature, which documents that upon receiving an interim negative outcome, individuals responsible for choosing a course of action are likely to self-justify their decisions to reduce cognitive dissonance (Staw, 1976). We also point out that upon receiving an interim negative outcome, self-choosers perceive the received outcome as more positive as well as maintain a favorable belief about future outcome of the course of action. Then, we propose conditional effects of decision agency on regret and disappointment to be reported in two papers as follows: In the first paper, in contrast to much of the previous literature on action effect, we argue that inaction also involves choosing one of the available options for a justified reason, and it is similar to personal agency and different from assigned agency (Bobocel & Meyer, 1994). Therefore, we posit that an inaction decision should also, just like an action decision, prevent individuals from thinking about undoing their decision (that is, muting the decision), and suppressing self-referent upward counterfactual thinking concerning what they could have done to receive a superior outcome. Thus, when individuals choose and self-justify their action or inaction decision, they should report the same level of regret for an inaction that caused a negative outcome as they would for an action that resulted in that same negative outcome. In the second paper we juxtapose the effect of action/personal agency versus assigned agency on disappointment (comparison with inaction decision is exploratory). We argue that when individuals are responsible for choosing a course of action, they will maintain positive beliefs about the course of the action and suppress non-referent upward counterfactual thinking when the negative outcome is interim. As a result, self-choosers should feel less disappointment from receiving an interim negative outcome compared to the disappointment felt by individuals when they are assigned the same course of action.

When people receive a negative outcome such as a loss from their stock investment, or poor pedagogy of a course, the emotions they feel are regret and disappointment. Disappointment is the emotion that is associated with a realization that the received outcome is less favorable than the outcome hoped for. Regret is the emotion that accompanies the thoughts that one could have done something to receive a real or imaginary superior foregone outcome (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). Researchers have conducted many studies to juxtapose the effect of personal agency, (defined as a personal responsibility choosing a course of action), and assigned agency (i.e. being assigned a choice made by someone else) on regret and disappointment (Zeelenberg et al., 2000b). Results of these studies suggested that while personal agency is an antecedent of regret, it is not an antecedent of disappointment. Researchers have also conducted many studies investigating the effect of action (making a choice to switch away to a course resulting in a negative outcome) versus inaction (declining to switch away from the same course resulting in a negative outcome) on regret (Kahneman & Tverskey, 1982). Results of these studies suggested that individuals’ tend to perceive a decision to be worse—and experience more regret—when the outcome results from action as opposed to inaction. Based on the results of the aforementioned studies, it is assumed that an inaction decision is similar to being assigned a course of action, whereas action decision is associated with choosing a course and is similar to personal agency (Zeelenberg et al., 1998a). Therefore, regret and disappointment literature suggests that responsibility for choosing a course of action is associated with greater regret because an individual who is personally responsible for the choice that led to the negative outcome perceives the self as the cause of the outcome (self-blame or self-agency). It is also argued that, decision agency is not an antecedent of disappointment and it is proposed that disappointment is felt when the negative outcome is ascribed to uncontrollable circumstances (random agency) or some other person (other agency) (Zeelenberg et al., 1998b). In this study, we manipulate decision agency at three levels; action/personal agency (i.e. choosing a course), inaction (i.e. choosing not to switch and maintain the current course), and assigned agency (i.e. being assigned a choice made by someone else) to juxtapose its effect on regret and disappointment. We also manipulate outcome reversibility (Interim versus Terminal) and superior outcome of the foregone option (Known versus Unknown) to investigate their moderating role for the effect of decision agency on disappointment and regret. We highlight the findings from the escalation of commitment literature, which documents that upon receiving an interim negative outcome, individuals responsible for choosing a course of action are likely to self-justify their decisions to reduce cognitive dissonance (Staw, 1976). We also point out that upon receiving an interim negative outcome, self-choosers perceive the received outcome as more positive as well as maintain a favorable belief about future outcome of the course of action. Then, we propose conditional effects of decision agency on regret and disappointment to be reported in two papers as follows: In the first paper, in contrast to much of the previous literature on action effect, we argue that inaction also involves choosing one of the available options for a justified reason, and it is similar to personal agency and different from assigned agency (Bobocel & Meyer, 1994). Therefore, we posit that an inaction decision should also, just like an action decision, prevent individuals from thinking about undoing their decision (that is, muting the decision), and suppressing self-referent upward counterfactual thinking concerning what they could have done to receive a superior outcome. Thus, when individuals choose and self-justify their action or inaction decision, they should report the same level of regret for an inaction that caused a negative outcome as they would for an action that resulted in that same negative outcome. In the second paper we juxtapose the effect of action/personal agency versus assigned agency on disappointment (comparison with inaction decision is exploratory). We argue that when individuals are responsible for choosing a course of action, they will maintain positive beliefs about the course of the action and suppress non-referent upward counterfactual thinking when the negative outcome is interim. As a result, self-choosers should feel less disappointment from receiving an interim negative outcome compared to the disappointment felt by individuals when they are assigned the same course of action.

Paper discusses and analyzes the correlation between action theory and the notion of human agency in a life career development context. Theoretical and research background of the two perspectives are discussed. Connections between the two perspectives are identified. Career counseling implications that enhance integration of individuals' action orientation and agentic functioning in their life career development are proposed. (JDM)

Paper discusses and analyzes the correlation between action theory and the notion of human agency in a life career development context. Theoretical and research background of the two perspectives are discussed. Connections between the two perspectives are identified. Career counseling implications that enhance integration of individuals' action orientation and agentic functioning in their life career development are proposed. (JDM)

Tracing the nature of critical engagement and agency among youth in a participatory action research (PAR) collective, the study attends to the manner in which critical engagement and agency developed over time for the youth researchers. The focus of the project was to conduct a survey among ninth grade students concerning their early high school experience, using participatory methods in data collection, analysis, and reporting back. Data collection included participant observation and review of footage of project activities, field notes, and the youth researchers' auto-ethnographic texts and creative products. Access to the ninth grade students was clearly achieved, and they were informed first among many stakeholders about the results of the survey; however, the classroom setting proved challenging in terms of facilitating critical engagement, compromising youth researchers' sense of agency. The university setting served as a site conducive to inquiry and agency for the youth.

Hundreds of community crime prevention programs are currently operating at the national, state and local levels. Many of these are staffed by citizens and local civic-action groups. Others are operated by government agencies. This directory of national and state community crime prevention programs includes organization name and title, address and telephone number, sponsoring agency, goals and objectives, and a list of services, resources and publications. Appendices include a glossary of terms, an annotated bibliography, and an overview of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration's role in community crime prevention. (Author/BMW)

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When people receive a negative outcome such as a loss from their stock investment, or poor pedagogy of a course, one of the emotions they feel is regret. Regret is the emotion that accompanies the thoughts that one could have done something to receive a real or imaginary superior foregone outcome (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). Researchers have conducted many studies to juxtapose the effect of personal responsibility choosing a course of action (personal agency) on regret from receiving a negative outcome with the regret experienced after being assigned the same choice that was made by someone else (assigned agency) and receiving the same outcome (Zeelenberg et al., 2000). Results of these studies suggested that personal agency is an antecedent of regret. Prior research suggests that when individuals report their perceptions of a protagonist’s regret for receiving a negative outcome, personal agency triggers more self-blame and more regret compared to the self-blame and regret experienced from receiving the same negative outcome from the same option that was chosen by someone else for the individual (referred to as assigned agency hereafter) (Zeelenberg et al., 2000). Researchers have also conducted many studies investigating the effect of action (making a choice to switch away to a course resulting in a negative outcome) versus inaction (declining to switch away from the same course resulting in a negative outcome) on regret (Kahneman & Tverskey, 1982). Results of these studies suggested that individuals’ tend to perceive a decision to be worse—and experience more regret—when the outcome results from action as opposed to inaction. Based on the results of the aforementioned studies, it is suggested that action decision is associated with choosing a course and is similar to personal agency (Zeelenberg et al., 1998b). Therefore, regret literature suggests that responsibility for choosing a course of action is associated with greater regret because an individual who is personally responsible for the choice that led to the negative outcome perceives the self as the cause of the outcome (self-blame or self-agency). In this study, we manipulate decision agency at three levels; action (i.e. switching a course), inaction (i.e. choosing not to switch and maintain the current course), and assigned agency (i.e. being assigned a choice made by someone else) to juxtapose its effect on regret. We also manipulate superior outcome of the foregone option (Known versus Unknown) to investigate their effect of decision agency on regret when explicit counterfactual information is available. We highlight the findings from the escalation of commitment literature, which documents that upon receiving an interim negative outcome, individuals responsible for choosing a course of action are likely to self-justify their decisions to reduce cognitive dissonance (Staw, 1976). We also point out that upon receiving an interim negative outcome, self-choosers perceive the received outcome as more positive as well as maintain a favorable belief about future outcome of the course of action. Then, in contrast to much of the previous literature on regret, we argue that action and inaction decisions involves choosing one of the available options for a justified reason, and each is different from assigned agency (Bobocel & Meyer, 1994). We also posit that action and inaction decisions should also prevent individuals from thinking about undoing their decision (that is, muting the decision), and suppressing self-referent upward counterfactual thinking concerning what they could have done to receive a superior outcome. Furthermore, we highlight self-serving bias literature (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Weiner, 1985) to suggest that when individuals self-report their emotions, they are more likely to attribute positive outcome to themselves and less likely to self-blame for causing a negative outcome. Therefore, self-agency may not be the prime antecedent of individual’s self-reported regret. Instead, we argue that self-justification should reduce regret whereas counterfactual thinking should amplify the emotion and explain higher portion of variance of regret. Thus, when individuals choose and self-justify their action or inaction decision and suppress counterfactual thinking, they should report less regret than regret triggered from assigned agency.

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Redwood Community Action Agency (RCAA) hosted a seminar on Identity Theft, Scams, and Fraud. Panelists include Brenda Harper of Area 1 Agency on Aging (A1AA), Dana Do of Umpqua Bank, Suzie Owsley of Eureka Police Department (EPD), and Derek Daily of North Coast Legal Support

During a 13-year period starting in 2008, the Accrediting Commission of Career Schools and Colleges (ACCSC) raised concerns more than 30 times that colleges affiliated with the Center for Excellence in Higher Education (CEHE) were potentially failing to meet standards for quality, honesty, and other attributes crucial to students and taxpayers alike. And yet, CEHE never fixed the vast majority of these problems. This issue brief looks at the rules guiding accrediting agencies and details the long list of actions to examine how an accreditor could ostensibly follow all its rules in overseeing an obviously troubled chain of schools without putting a stop to the company's waste and abuse until far too late. Moving forward, Congress and the Biden-Harris administration should seek to strengthen the rules for accrediting agencies, take aggressive action to ensure that the colleges causing serious concerns are not allowed to continue collecting taxpayer money and enrolling students, and, above all, make sure that students enrolled in CEHE--and the many colleges like it--are entitled to relief.

Experiment 4

In this study we investigate the influence of the spatial congruency of (anticipated and observed) actions and their proximal and distal effects on recognition memory, response retrieval, sense of agency and affect in comparison to their (partial) incongruency. We are particularly interested in how these constructs are affected by the degree of overlap between anticipated and observed action and effect features.

When people receive a negative outcome such as a loss from their stock investment, or poor pedagogy of a course, or failure of the purchased product, one of the emotions they feel is regret. Regret is the emotion that accompanies self-referent counterfactual thoughts that one could have done something to receive a real or imaginary superior foregone outcome (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). Researchers have conducted many studies investigating the effect of action (making a choice to switch away to a course resulting in a negative outcome) versus inaction (declining to switch away from the same course resulting in a negative outcome) on regret (Kahneman & Tverskey, 1982). Results of these studies suggested that individuals’ tend to perceive a decision to be worse—and experience more regret—when the outcome results from action as opposed to inaction. Based on the results of the aforementioned studies, it is suggested that action decision is associated with choosing a course and is similar to personal agency, whereas inaction decision is not (Zeelenberg et al., 1998b, page 268). Regret literature also suggests that responsibility for choosing a course of action is associated with greater regret because an individual who is personally responsible for choosing the course of action that led to the negative outcome perceives the self as the cause of the outcome (self-blame or self-agency) and generates more self-referent counterfactual thinking. In this study, we manipulate decision agency at two levels; action (i.e. switching a course), and inaction (i.e. choosing not to switch and maintain the current course) to juxtapose the effects of justification of the decision, self-referent counterfactual thinking and self-agency on regret. We also manipulate information about foregone option (Known versus Unknown) to investigate its effect on regret as well as the effects of action versus inaction decisions on regret when explicit counterfactual information is available versus not available. We highlight the findings from the escalation of commitment literature, which documents that upon receiving an interim negative outcome, individuals responsible for choosing an option either from action or inaction are likely to justify their decisions to reduce cognitive dissonance (Staw, 1976). Furthermore, we highlight self-serving bias literature (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Weiner, 1985) to suggest that when individuals self-report their emotions, they are more likely to attribute positive outcome to themselves and less likely to attribute negative outcome to themselves to self-blame for causing the outcome. Therefore, self-agency may not be the prime antecedent of individual’s regret. Instead, we argue that justification of the decision should reduce regret whereas self-referent counterfactual thinking should amplify the emotion and explain higher portion of variance of regret.

When people receive a negative outcome such as a loss from their stock investment, or poor pedagogy of a course, or failure of the purchased product, one of the emotions they feel is regret. Regret is the emotion that accompanies self-referent counterfactual thoughts that one could have done something to receive a real or imaginary superior foregone outcome (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). Researchers have conducted many studies investigating the effect of action (making a choice to switch away to a course resulting in a negative outcome) versus inaction (declining to switch away from the same course resulting in a negative outcome) on regret (Kahneman & Tverskey, 1982). Results of these studies suggested that individuals’ tend to perceive a decision to be worse—and experience more regret—when the outcome results from action as opposed to inaction. Based on the results of the aforementioned studies, it is suggested that action decision is associated with choosing a course and is similar to personal agency, whereas inaction decision is not (Zeelenberg et al., 1998b, page 268). Regret literature also suggests that responsibility for choosing a course of action is associated with greater regret because an individual who is personally responsible for choosing the course of action that led to the negative outcome perceives the self as the cause of the outcome (self-blame or self-agency) and generates more self-referent counterfactual thinking. In this study, we manipulate decision agency at two levels; action (i.e. switching a course), and inaction (i.e. choosing not to switch and maintain the current course) to juxtapose the effects of justification of the decision, self-referent counterfactual thinking and self-agency on regret. We also manipulate information about foregone option (Known versus Unknown) to investigate its effect on regret as well as the effects of action versus inaction decisions on regret when explicit counterfactual information is available versus not available. We highlight the findings from the escalation of commitment literature, which documents that upon receiving an interim negative outcome, individuals responsible for choosing an option either from action or inaction are likely to justify their decisions to reduce cognitive dissonance (Staw, 1976). Furthermore, we highlight self-serving bias literature (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Weiner, 1985) to suggest that when individuals self-report their emotions, they are more likely to attribute positive outcome to themselves and less likely to attribute negative outcome to themselves to self-blame for causing the outcome. Therefore, self-agency may not be the prime antecedent of individual’s regret. Instead, we argue that justification of the decision should reduce regret whereas self-referent counterfactual thinking should amplify the emotion and explain higher portion of variance of regret.

When people receive a negative outcome such as a loss from their stock investment, or poor pedagogy of a course, or failure of the purchased product, one of the emotions they feel is regret. Regret is the emotion that accompanies self-referent counterfactual thoughts that one could have done something to receive a real or imaginary superior foregone outcome (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). Researchers have conducted many studies investigating the effect of action (making a choice to switch away to a course resulting in a negative outcome) versus inaction (declining to switch away from the same course resulting in a negative outcome) on regret (Kahneman & Tverskey, 1982). Results of these studies suggested that individuals’ tend to perceive a decision to be worse—and experience more regret—when the outcome results from action as opposed to inaction. Based on the results of the aforementioned studies, it is suggested that action decision is associated with choosing a course and is similar to personal agency, whereas inaction decision is not (Zeelenberg et al., 1998b, page 268). Regret literature also suggests that responsibility for choosing a course of action is associated with greater regret because an individual who is personally responsible for choosing the course of action that led to the negative outcome perceives the self as the cause of the outcome (self-blame or self-agency) and generates more self-referent counterfactual thinking. In this study, we manipulate decision agency at two levels; action (i.e. switching a course), and inaction (i.e. choosing not to switch and maintain the current course) to juxtapose the effects of justification of the decision, self-referent counterfactual thinking and self-agency on regret. We also manipulate information about foregone option (Known versus Unknown) to investigate its effect on regret as well as the effects of action versus inaction decisions on regret when explicit counterfactual information is available versus not available. We highlight the findings from the escalation of commitment literature, which documents that upon receiving an interim negative outcome, individuals responsible for choosing an option either from action or inaction are likely to justify their decisions to reduce cognitive dissonance (Staw, 1976). Furthermore, we highlight self-serving bias literature (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Weiner, 1985) to suggest that when individuals self-report their emotions, they are more likely to attribute positive outcome to themselves and less likely to attribute negative outcome to themselves to self-blame for causing the outcome. Therefore, self-agency may not be the prime antecedent of individual’s regret. Instead, we argue that justification of the decision should reduce regret whereas self-referent counterfactual thinking should amplify the emotion and explain higher portion of variance of regret.

Joint action can be defined as “any form of social interaction whereby two or more individuals coordinate their actions in space and time to bring about a change in the environment” (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006, p. 70). Research suggests that joint action can foster trust, a sense of unity, and the perception of a shared goal (Michael et al., 2016). One possible explanation for this effect is that, during joint action, individuals mentally represent their group members’ upcoming actions in a manner similar to their own (Sebanz & Knoblich, 2021). Recent work has proposed that this phenomenon may be leveraged to enhance engagement with sustainability through group norms (Sarabi et al., in process). Initial studies provide empirical support for the proposed link (Holmström, 2024; Taberyova, 2024). Further studies indicate that outside observers utilize this effect when assessing group structure based on movement coordination. When a group exhibits higher coordination, observers attribute greater entitativity, rapport (Lakens & Steel, 2011), and commitment (Michael et al., 2016) to the group. The present study has two primary objectives. First, it examines how observers perceive a group's agency and commitment to sustainability when watching a group perform a high-coordination versus a low-coordination joint action task. Second, it investigates whether observing high- versus low-coordination joint action influences the observer’s own sense of agency and commitment to sustainability.

Experiment 1

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Existing data will be used to explore how individuals' commitment to Life Projects (LPs) - long-term, meaningful goals that shape daily choices and provide a sense of purpose - is influenced by agency, the motivational component of hope. The present study examines whether agency moderates the relationship between LP identification and LP involvement and if this moderation effect differs by age and culture (Brazil and Portugal).

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When people receive a negative outcome from their stock investment, or when students experience a poor pedagogy of a course, they often feel regret, the emotion that accompanies the thoughts that one could have done something to receive a real or imaginary superior foregone outcome (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982). Regret is the second most frequently felt of all the emotions (Shimanaoff, 1984). Research suggests that people feel regret due to self-blame for choosing a course of action (referred to as decision agency) and receiving a negative outcome. However, it also suggests that individuals could feel regret even when they were not responsible for initiating a course of action associated with the outcome (Ordóñez & Connolly, 2000 page 140; Zeelenberg et al., 2000, page 152), which implies that self-blame may not be a necessary condition for experiencing regret. Research also suggests that when people make a choice to switch away that results in a negative outcome, they experience more regret than would a person who received an identical result after declining to switch away from the same option. In other words, individuals’ tend to perceive a decision to be worse—and experience more regret—when the outcome results from action as opposed to inaction. This phenomenon is known in the literature as the action effect (Kahneman & Tverskey, 1982; Landman, 1987), or emotional amplification (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). The most famous of the studies documenting the action effect was Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982, p. 173) where, using a within-subjects design, they presented the following vignette describing the investment patterns of two protagonists, Paul and George, to a group of participants. - Paul owns shares in company A. During the past year he considered switching to stocks in company B, but he decided against it. He now finds out that he would have been better off by $1,200 if he had switched to the stock of company B. George owned shares in company B. During the past year he switched to stock in company A. He now finds out that he would have been better off by $1,200 if he had kept his stock in Company B. Who feels more regret? All else equal, the participants' perceptions of Paul’s and George’s regret should be the same; intuitively, participants should perceive that both protagonists would experience the same level of regret after experiencing identical negative outcomes. However, 92% (n = 138) of the participants reported that George (took action) would experience more regret than Paul (took no action). What Kahneman and Tverskey (1982) seemed to find is that how an outcome is achieved is an antecedent of regret. Therefore, Kahneman and Tverskey’s results has led to a burgeoning interest in better understanding action effect. Researchers have conducted various studies following Kahneman and Tverskey’s methodology with different scenarios, altered inputs manipulating positive and negative outcomes, changes in the availability of foregone outcome information, and varying prior decisions’ outcomes (Baron & Ritov, 1994; Gilovich & Medvec, 1994, 1995; Kahneman & Tverskey, 1982; Landman 1987; N’gbala & Branscombe, 1997; Ritov & Baron, 1995; Zeelenberg, Van den Bos, Van Dijk, & Pieters, 2002). Results from Li and Liang (2007) suggested that action effect intensifies when a received outcome is closer to the desired outcome. However, many of these studies share several methodological assumptions with Kahneman and Tverskey (1982) that may have affected their results. For example, most of these studies have adopted a design where participants compare their perception of protagonists’ regret using a scale that does not include a neutral point to indicate that both protagonists would have felt the same level of regret. Moreover, in most studies a foregone option and its outcome are reported along with the negative outcome, even though sometimes individuals may not have considered a foregone option, or they may not be aware of its outcomes when they receive a negative outcome (Ritov & Baron, 1995). Also, it is proposed that individuals experience regret due to responsibility for causing a negative outcome, (also referred to as self-agency appraisal as well as self-blame in the literature), despite self-serving bias literature suggesting that individuals are more likely to attribute a positive outcome to themselves and less likely to self-blame for causing a negative outcome (Duval and Silvia 2002, Miller and Ross 1975). Finally, none of the studies to date have juxtaposed the effects of self-blame, justification of the decision, and counterfactual thinking on regret to investigate the process that triggers regret and causes the action effect. In this research, we investigate action effect to identify its boundary conditions to explicate the psychology of regret. In contrast to much of the previous literature, we argue that both action and inaction entail decision agency, a form of agency that involves choosing one of the available options for a justified reason, in contrast to being assigned a choice on your behalf by someone else (referred to as assigned agency hereafter) (Bobocel & Meyer, 1994). We highlight the findings from the escalation of commitment literature, which documents that upon receiving a negative outcome, individuals engaging in decision agency are likely to justify their decisions to reduce cognitive dissonance (Staw, 1976). This should prevent individuals from thinking about undoing their decision (that is, muting the decision) and suppressing counterfactual thinking despite experiencing a negative outcome. Thus, when individuals choose and justify their action or inaction decision, they should report the same level of regret for an action that caused a negative outcome as they would for inaction that resulted in that same negative outcome.

National Community Development Week, April 21-25, 2025 For more information, visit: www.cityoffrederickmd.gov/CDBG

National Community Development Week, April 21-25, 2025 For more information, visit: www.cityoffrederickmd.gov/CDBG

National Community Development Week, April 21-25, 2025 For more information, visit: www.cityoffrederickmd.gov/CDBG

Sense of agency (SoA) is the control that people feel about their actions and their respective effects. Literature has found that the fluency of action selection manipulated through subliminal priming influences the SoA. Also, the number of action steps affects the explicit sense of agency and sensory attenuation. To our knowledge, no study to date has tested the effects of both variables on the SoA within the same experiment. We aim to examine how the number of action steps and the fluency of action selection influence the SoA in an adaptation of the Tetris gamewith 42 participants, in which actions will be subliminally primed with arrows and participants may choose between different numbers of action steps. The dependent variables are explicit SoA and sensory attenuation.

Sense of agency (SoA) is thought to arise from the integration of predicted and observed sensorimotor outcomes of intentional action. Yet, recent models have proposed a further role for interoceptive signals in the generation, control and self-attribution of motor acts, including SoA itself (Marshall et al., 2018; Seth et al., 2012). While voluntary action initiation has been found to be coupled with cardiorespiratory fluctuations, whether and how this coupling between voluntary action and cardiorespiratory signals influences SoA is still unclear. Our aim is to investigate the interplay between cardiorespiratory signaling, voluntary action initiation and SoA. Participants will complete an intentional binding task, along with continuous cardiac and respiratory recordings. Specifically, we will investigate 1) whether the coupling of voluntary actions and their sensory outcomes with specific cardio-respiratory phases modulates intentional binding, as a marker of SoA, and 2) whether the synchronized phase-locking of these two signals to action initiation and/or outcome delivery is associated with SoA.

Approved For Fse 2005/11 /SECIR.EJ P74B00535 0100190005-9 DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Procurement Division, OL SUBJECT : Initial Instructions for Submission of RD&E Contracts and Requests for Procurement Action to the, Agency Contract Review Board REFERENCE : CIA Contract Review Board (Responsibilities and Authorities), Approved 28 June 1967 1. The Agency Contract Review Board has authorized the issuance of the following initial instructions for submission of proposed contract actions and requests for procurement (contract) action for review and recommendations. These instructions are effective as of 1 September 1067 and until superseded by subsequently issued Rules and Procedures. Under the Board's statement of "Responsibilities and Authorities, " the Board considers that it is to review research, development, and engineering (RD&E) procurement programs funded from Agency appropriations at two points in time - initially, it shall consider requests for procurement (contract) action, if in excess of $150, 000, at the time the Directorate issues same to the cognizant Con- tracting Officer, and secondly, to review the resulting contracts or amend- ments prior to the Contracting Officer's signature. 2. Contract Actions Requiring Board Review: a. Proposed contracts or amendments for RD&E services, or for proto- types or first follow-on production units of previously developed equipment Declassification Review by NGA Approved For ReleaSE4R/?1 : 11? 435R000100190005-9 Approved For ?ase 2005//12c: TRDP74B0053500100190005-9 DRAFT SUBJECT: Initial Instructions for Submission of RD&E Contracts and Requests for Procurement Action to the Agency Contract Review Board (Itom l1 e being procurreditssole source developer thereof, which individually exceed $150, 000, shall be presented to the Board for review prior to the Contracting Officer's signature. Likewise, overrun funding amendments, if overrun funding exceeds $22, 500 and also exceeds 15 percent of original cost estimate, shall be presented to the Board. The Board may, from time- to-time, waive prior review of specific contracts or class of contracts. b. Currently, the Board will not require prior review of fiscal year type of service contracts for field engineering or technical representative services, or for the maintenance, repair, or spares provisioning of Agency- owned equipment. c. Proposed RD&E contracts and amendments of any amount or nature, but concerning which the Contracting Officer has professional doubt or 1 uncertainty as to whether the%Government's best interest has been or will likely be served, should also be submitted to the Board for review and advi- sory comment. d. Procedures for Submitting Contract Actions for Board Review. Pro- cedures and practices for submitting. contracts and amendments to the Board for review shall be flexible to permit expeditious submission to and prompt consideration by the Board. As a minimum, such submissions to 2 Approved For Release 2% /R1EtIA-RDP74B00535R000100190005-9 Approved For ease 2005Cf 4[RDP74B0053500100190005-9 SUBJECT: Initial Instructions for Submission of RD&E Contracts and Requests for Procurement Action to the Agency Contract Review Board the Board should be accomplished by routing the Contracting Officer's "procurement justification" memorandum (as normally prepared in accordance with good procurement practices), with official contract file attached, to the Agency Contract Review Board (Attention: Execu- tive Secretary). The cognizant Contracting Officer may, if desired and deemed appropriate for better Board understanding, submit a separate digest of salient and important facts with his suggested interpretations and conclusions. The Executive Secretary will, in writing, "brief" the facts and issues of each case and furnish copies thereof to each Board member and permanent advisor. Following Board consideration, all sub- mitted documents and files will be returned to the _ Contracting Officer with a statement of the Board's recomn ndationsY dJ -Pier m~ v L ~~uJ

Engaging in a country's socio-political life is vital to ensuring citizens’ representation in the social and political domains, challenging the status quo, and achieving positive social and political change, but globally, only a minority of citizens engage in civic action such as voting and collective action (e.g., protests, demonstrations, and sit-ins). However, most existing research comes from stable, Western contexts, overlooking settings like Armenia, where post-conflict insecurity, historical trauma, and political volatility create a complex environment for understanding civic (in)action—gaps this project seeks to address. The project aims to provide an in-depth understanding of the social-psychological processes and factors underlying Armenians’ civic (in)action in the period of post-revolution and (post-)war crisis following the 2nd Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2020 and its continuing reverberations. The study explores the antecedents of perceptions of uncertainty and its role in shaping the predictors of civic (in)action and civic (in)action, hence, presenting an opportunity to delve into perceptions of uncertainty, conflict and peace within the realm of civic (in)action. In specific, we aim to 1) delineate the dominant narratives related to collective identity and agency, citizenship and statehood, the changing perceptions of activism and democracy, the key grievances of the civil society and other contextual characteristics shaping citizens’ subjective reality; 2) explore the identity and meaning-making processes involved in the civic (in)action in current (post-)war and post-revolutionary period, focusing on people’s subjective experiences, 3) Identify the sources of agency (both individual and collective) that are relevant to civic action under extreme uncertainty and insecurity; 4) Determine barriers to civic action and processes encouraging citizens to overcome these barriers. The project is a mixed-method, multi-stage study comprising qualitative (desk review, media analysis, focus-groups (all completed) and in depth interviews) and quantitative (survey, experiment) components, which intend to build on each other through a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches. Capturing the complex picture of civic (in)action in its relation to agentic and identity processes in a context marked by national security issues and high levels of both perceived and objective uncertainty is both of its own value for understanding the country’s struggles at psychological level, and for potential fresh theoretical contributions to the social psychology of collective action.

Experiment 3

This article is from Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience , volume 8 . Abstract Anatomical investigations have revealed connections between the intralaminar thalamic nuclei and areas such as the superior colliculus (SC) that receive short latency input from visual and auditory primary sensory areas. The intralaminar nuclei in turn project to the major input nucleus of the basal ganglia, the striatum, providing this nucleus with a source of subcortical excitatory input. Together with a converging input from the cerebral cortex, and a neuromodulatory dopaminergic input from the midbrain, the components previously found necessary for reinforcement learning in the basal ganglia are present. With this intralaminar sensory input, the basal ganglia are thought to play a primary role in determining what aspect of an organism’s own behavior has caused salient environmental changes. Additionally, subcortical loops through thalamic and basal ganglia nuclei are proposed to play a critical role in action selection. In this mini review we will consider the anatomical and physiological evidence underlying the existence of these circuits. We will propose how the circuits interact to modulate basal ganglia output and solve common behavioral learning problems of agency determination and action selection.

How are perceived control and sense of agency associated from low to higher numbers of action choices: Part Two.

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In a former study (Schreiner, Stump, Kunde, & Voss, 2024), we found that congruency between an action and its ensuing effect increases the subjective sense of agency, fluency as well as the probability of judging subsequently presented statements as true. In this study, we investigate the extent to which affective processes form the impact of action-effect congruency on judgments of truth. Congruency is manipulated via box movements: A box moves in either the direction of the participant’s key press (congruent condition) or the other possible direction (incongruent condition). Statements are presented for 2 s as soon as the box stops. The statements are immediately followed by an affect induction in the form of very briefly presented (17 ms) affective facial expressions (positive/neutral/negative), masked by neutral facial expressions (350 ms). After the subliminal affect manipulations, participants are asked to judge the veracity of the previous presented statements as well as their subjective confidence.

The aim of the study is to provide empirical support to the assumption that in times of extreme violent outbreak, exposure to violence, ethos of conflict (EOC), and participation in collective action predict experienced personal resilience, agency and symptoms of depression and PTSD. The study will utilize a longitudinal design comprised of two distinct waves of data collection, with identical measures in both waves. The longitudinal design aims to establish the temporal relations among predictors assessed at wave 1 (exposure to violence, EOC, and participation in collective action) and outcomes assessed at wave 2 (experienced personal resilience, agency and symptoms of depression and PTSD), while also accounting for possible opposite directionality.

Carbon capture and storage: The dreams and setbacks in climate action; The International Energy Agency and the International Panel on Climate Change, along with numerous large and powerful traditional resource producers, say CCS projects are a necessary part of the global strategy

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On the Agency of Water in Volcanic Eruptions; with Some Observations on the Thickness of the Earth's Crust from a Geological Point of View; and on the Primary Cause of Volcanic Action. Prestwich, J Proceedings of the Royal Society of London (1854-1905). 1884-01-01. 38:253–260

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Approved-For Release 2006/09/07: CIA-RDP83M00914R002000120025-4 :d, Vop 27 April 1931 EEO-81-045 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence FROM: Director, Equal Employment Opportunity SUBJECT: Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action Policy and Goals of the Central Intelligence Agency 1. First of all, permit me to commend the success of your initial talk with the Agency and to express my app-reciation for the-boost you have given on subsequent occasions to the causes of equity and the full and effective utilizati-on of the.skills, talents, and potential available to us: 2. I cansi:der~it of importance that we discuss the-philosophy, palicy, and status of the equitable use of human resources. in CIA at your earliest opportunity. I recognize thatI am scheduled for reassignment. However, I will let that fact have no bearing on my determination to do everything possible to secure such forward motion and effectiveness as we have gained and to prevent regression. Ta this end, I commend to your attention the attached summaries of-selected elements of the Agency's Affirmative Action and. Equal Opportunity efforts. Of particular import is the attached list of proposed changes to improve capability, efficiency and effectiveness of the Offi-ce of EEO and of the EEO and Affirmative Action structure of Central Intelligence. Discussion of these proposals should, in my opinion, follow a careful de- termination and prioritization of the human resource management, affirmative action and equal opportunity goals and poli-cies set by you and the DCI. 3. You have, or will soon receive from the Office of the Inspector General, a report of the findings of the first inspection of the Office of EEO, CIA. That report will b-e accompanied by my comments on the draft report which was provided for my review by the IG. Both the IG 'this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED when attachment is removed. Approved For Release 2006/09/07: CIA-RDP83M00914R0020001-20025-4 report and my draft comments contain proposals for the future of both the Office of EEO and for the EEO "system" of CIA. I look forward to the opportunity to discuss these reports with you to perhaps consider them as the basis for additional goal-oriented revisions. Attachment: As stated.