Equilibrium refinement in dynamic voting games - Info and Reading Options
By Daron Acemoglu
"Equilibrium refinement in dynamic voting games" was published by Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics in 2009 - Cambridge, MA, it has 26 pages and the language of the book is English.
“Equilibrium refinement in dynamic voting games” Metadata:
- Title: ➤ Equilibrium refinement in dynamic voting games
- Author: Daron Acemoglu
- Language: English
- Number of Pages: 26
- Publisher: ➤ Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics
- Publish Date: 2009
- Publish Location: Cambridge, MA
“Equilibrium refinement in dynamic voting games” Subjects and Themes:
- Subjects: ➤ Political games - Political science - Mathematical models - Voting - Game theory - Power (Social sciences)
Edition Specifications:
- Pagination: 26 leaves :
Edition Identifiers:
- The Open Library ID: OL24869540M - OL15963559W
- Online Computer Library Center (OCLC) ID: 704277894
AI-generated Review of “Equilibrium refinement in dynamic voting games”:
"Equilibrium refinement in dynamic voting games" Description:
The Open Library:
We propose two related equilibrium refinements for voting and agenda-setting games. Sequentially Weakly Undominated Equilibrium (SWUE) and Markov Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium (MTHPE), and show how these equilibrium concepts eliminate non-intuitive equilibria that arise naturally in dynamic voting games and games in which random or deterministic sequences of agenda-setters make offers to several players. We establish existence of these equilibria in finite and infinite (for MTHPE) games, provide a characterization of the structure of equilibria, and clarify the relationship between the two concepts. Finally, we show how these concepts can be applied in a dynamic model of endogenous club formation. Keywords: voting, agenda-setting games, Markov trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. JEL Classifications: D72, C73.
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