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This monograph presents, assesses, and improves a conceptual model dealing with public support of insurgency and terrorism. It builds on an earlier RAND study that reviewed social science for counterterrorism and introduced conceptual factor tree models to integrate knowledge, improve coherence of discussion, and take a modest step toward relatively general theory. The present study extends the scope to insurgency and incorporates insights stimulated by social movement theory, which add a dynamic dimension relating to the purposeful methods, i.e., stratagems, by which insurgents stimulate and maintain support. Much of the monograph describes lessons learned from assessing the validity of early versions of our model against empirical information from Afghanistan, Turkey, Nepal, and the cross-national aspects of al-Qaida. Broad features of the initial model held up well, but the empirical work motivated refinements. As expected, the salience of the conceptual model s various factors varied markedly with case. That is, the conceptual model is intended to be rather general, identifying possible specific factors for and causal pathways to public support. In applications to a particular context, such as our cases, the conceptual model is merely a starting point indicating what to look for. Only some of the general factors will be salient, which allows useful narrowing albeit with recognition that which factors are important may change with time as the result of insurgent and counterinsurgent strategy, as well as changes of circumstances. The last part of our study uses a generic model of persuasive communication, based on a rich scholarly literature, to relate our conceptual model of public support for insurgency and terrorism to broad suggestions about strategy in overlapping domains referred to variously as public diplomacy, strategic communication, and influence operations.

This monograph presents, assesses, and improves a conceptual model dealing with public support of insurgency and terrorism. It builds on an earlier RAND study that reviewed social science for counterterrorism and introduced conceptual factor tree models to integrate knowledge, improve coherence of discussion, and take a modest step toward relatively general theory. The present study extends the scope to insurgency and incorporates insights stimulated by social movement theory, which add a dynamic dimension relating to the purposeful methods, i.e., stratagems, by which insurgents stimulate and maintain support. Much of the monograph describes lessons learned from assessing the validity of early versions of our model against empirical information from Afghanistan, Turkey, Nepal, and the cross-national aspects of al-Qaida. Broad features of the initial model held up well, but the empirical work motivated refinements. As expected, the salience of the conceptual model s various factors varied markedly with case. That is, the conceptual model is intended to be rather general, identifying possible specific factors for and causal pathways to public support. In applications to a particular context, such as our cases, the conceptual model is merely a starting point indicating what to look for. Only some of the general factors will be salient, which allows useful narrowing albeit with recognition that which factors are important may change with time as the result of insurgent and counterinsurgent strategy, as well as changes of circumstances. The last part of our study uses a generic model of persuasive communication, based on a rich scholarly literature, to relate our conceptual model of public support for insurgency and terrorism to broad suggestions about strategy in overlapping domains referred to variously as public diplomacy, strategic communication, and influence operations.

This monograph presents, assesses, and improves a conceptual model dealing with public support of insurgency and terrorism. It builds on an earlier RAND study that reviewed social science for counterterrorism and introduced conceptual factor tree models to integrate knowledge, improve coherence of discussion, and take a modest step toward relatively general theory. The present study extends the scope to insurgency and incorporates insights stimulated by social movement theory, which add a dynamic dimension relating to the purposeful methods, i.e., stratagems, by which insurgents stimulate and maintain support. Much of the monograph describes lessons learned from assessing the validity of early versions of our model against empirical information from Afghanistan, Turkey, Nepal, and the cross-national aspects of al-Qaida. Broad features of the initial model held up well, but the empirical work motivated refinements. As expected, the salience of the conceptual model s various factors varied markedly with case. That is, the conceptual model is intended to be rather general, identifying possible specific factors for and causal pathways to public support. In applications to a particular context, such as our cases, the conceptual model is merely a starting point indicating what to look for. Only some of the general factors will be salient, which allows useful narrowing albeit with recognition that which factors are important may change with time as the result of insurgent and counterinsurgent strategy, as well as changes of circumstances. The last part of our study uses a generic model of persuasive communication, based on a rich scholarly literature, to relate our conceptual model of public support for insurgency and terrorism to broad suggestions about strategy in overlapping domains referred to variously as public diplomacy, strategic communication, and influence operations.

This monograph presents, assesses, and improves a conceptual model dealing with public support of insurgency and terrorism. It builds on an earlier RAND study that reviewed social science for counterterrorism and introduced conceptual factor tree models to integrate knowledge, improve coherence of discussion, and take a modest step toward relatively general theory. The present study extends the scope to insurgency and incorporates insights stimulated by social movement theory, which add a dynamic dimension relating to the purposeful methods, i.e., stratagems, by which insurgents stimulate and maintain support. Much of the monograph describes lessons learned from assessing the validity of early versions of our model against empirical information from Afghanistan, Turkey, Nepal, and the cross-national aspects of al-Qaida. Broad features of the initial model held up well, but the empirical work motivated refinements. As expected, the salience of the conceptual model s various factors varied markedly with case. That is, the conceptual model is intended to be rather general, identifying possible specific factors for and causal pathways to public support. In applications to a particular context, such as our cases, the conceptual model is merely a starting point indicating what to look for. Only some of the general factors will be salient, which allows useful narrowing albeit with recognition that which factors are important may change with time as the result of insurgent and counterinsurgent strategy, as well as changes of circumstances. The last part of our study uses a generic model of persuasive communication, based on a rich scholarly literature, to relate our conceptual model of public support for insurgency and terrorism to broad suggestions about strategy in overlapping domains referred to variously as public diplomacy, strategic communication, and influence operations.

This monograph presents, assesses, and improves a conceptual model dealing with public support of insurgency and terrorism. It builds on an earlier RAND study that reviewed social science for counterterrorism and introduced conceptual factor tree models to integrate knowledge, improve coherence of discussion, and take a modest step toward relatively general theory. The present study extends the scope to insurgency and incorporates insights stimulated by social movement theory, which add a dynamic dimension relating to the purposeful methods, i.e., stratagems, by which insurgents stimulate and maintain support. Much of the monograph describes lessons learned from assessing the validity of early versions of our model against empirical information from Afghanistan, Turkey, Nepal, and the cross-national aspects of al-Qaida. Broad features of the initial model held up well, but the empirical work motivated refinements. As expected, the salience of the conceptual model s various factors varied markedly with case. That is, the conceptual model is intended to be rather general, identifying possible specific factors for and causal pathways to public support. In applications to a particular context, such as our cases, the conceptual model is merely a starting point indicating what to look for. Only some of the general factors will be salient, which allows useful narrowing albeit with recognition that which factors are important may change with time as the result of insurgent and counterinsurgent strategy, as well as changes of circumstances. The last part of our study uses a generic model of persuasive communication, based on a rich scholarly literature, to relate our conceptual model of public support for insurgency and terrorism to broad suggestions about strategy in overlapping domains referred to variously as public diplomacy, strategic communication, and influence operations.

A historic meeting between the IDF Spokesperson, Brig. Gen. Ronen Manelis, and Imam Hassen Chalghoumi. We have a common understanding of terrorism and its dangers https://t.co/NZHOmw1Zsl Source: https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1015157787226144769 Uploader: Israel Defense Forces

Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas Ayers visits JCCC to discuss “Understanding Terrorism: Challenges Facing the United States in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan from a U.S. Military Perspective.” Ayers received his commission as an Armor Officer (tanks) after graduating from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1997. Since then, he has served in a variety of assignments to include several stateside tours and overseas deployments to Germany, Korea, Kosovo (1999-2000), Iraq (2003-2004) and Afghanistan (2011-2012). In addition to operational assignments, Colonel Ayers was an assistant professor at West Point, teaching political science. He is currently an instructor at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. For more information on this and other happenings at the college, visit http://www.jccc.edu.

Lonergan University College announces a Public Lecture: “A Dostoevskian Understanding of Contemporary Terrorism” by Charles Taylor, Professor of Philosophy, McGill University

Lonergan University College announces a Public Lecture: “A Dostoevskian Understanding of Contemporary Terrorism” by Charles Taylor, Professor of Philosophy, McGill University

Lonergan University College announces a Public Lecture: “A Dostoevskian Understanding of Contemporary Terrorism” by Charles Taylor, Professor of Philosophy, McGill University

Ceasefire. Ceasefire. Ceasefire. Lots of people are throwing around this word without fully understanding it’s implications. A ceasefire will only further enable Hamas and will result in more cycles of violence and terrorism. Watch: https://t.co/vlmvq6MTd2

Ceasefire. Ceasefire. Ceasefire. Lots of people are throwing around this word without fully understanding it’s implications. A ceasefire will only further enable Hamas and will result in more cycles of violence and terrorism. Watch: https://t.co/vlmvq6MTd2

Although Islamist lone wolf terrorism seems to be defined by its very randomness, the actors themselves can be predictable. This thesis examines four case studies of seemingly disparate terrorist attacks conducted by Islamist lone wolf actors and identifies seven specific commonalities that contribute to an increased potential for self-radicalization. Furthermore, it examines stochastic violence in the context of 21st century jihad. Today the lone wolf is the weapon of the stochastic terrorist. The four case studies are 1) Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida, 2016; 2) Soldier Readiness Processing Center, Fort Hood, Texas, 2009; 3) Bastille Day, Nice, France, 2016; and 4) San Bernardino, California, 2015. The seven commonalities are 1) engrossment in radical messaging/propaganda on the internet; 2) first- or second-generation immigrant; 3) reduction of personal effects/finances; 4) affinity with extremist group(s); 5) rapid shift in beliefs or mosque attendance; 6) withdrawal from, or absence of, family/friends/romantic relationships; and 7) sexuality (repression or guilt).

This research investigated two questions: How effective is the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) when compared to its predecessor, the Homeland Security Advisory System? And, does NTAS provide sufficient decision advantage for the nation it serves? The research methodology/design used a comparative analysis of results observed for each system as it addressed the problem set presented in a case study. The research found that NTAS is effective but continued improvement is needed. These improvements include: the formal establishment of a DHS Office of Counterterrorism Coordination; the renewal of the DHS Counterterrorism Advisory Board Charter or other appropriate governance documents to ensure sustainment of necessary decision making and execution authority for NTAS; refine the NTAS Concept of Operations to better demonstrate the system’s scalable outcomes other than an NTAS-generated alert, such as Joint Intelligence Bulletins, Joint Threat Assessments, etc.; NTAS-related outreach and education efforts with the homeland security enterprise and the public; and the improvement of communication aspects of NTAS integrating with other warning systems, such as the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System. These improvements are critical in sustaining the current effectiveness of the system and ensuring its future success.

Terrorism, like other forms of political violence, has an organizational context. Few studies, however, have considered the influence of organizational life upon the outward behavior of the terrorist group. This thesis explores the possibility that terrorism, in addition to its political context, reflects the internal dynamics of the terrorist group. Assuming that action is what binds the terrorist group together, the use of violence may oftentimes be dictated more by the need to satisfy the internal goal of group survival than to directly further the group's external political agenda. Focusing upon internal cohesion as the critical mediating variable for group survival, this paper examines how the terrorist group's efforts to maintain itself drives violent behavior that transcends political considerations and operational prudence. When external and internal requirements become contradictory, the terrorist group faces a dilemma. Caught in a vicious cycle of reacting to strategic failure with more violent action in order to maintain itself, the terrorist group generates a negative dynamic of violence that not only undermines its chances of achieving stated long-term goals but also accelerates its decline.

Terrorism, like other forms of political violence, has an organizational context. Few studies, however, have considered the influence of organizational life upon the outward behavior of the terrorist group. This thesis explores the possibility that terrorism, in addition to its political context, reflects the internal dynamics of the terrorist group. Assuming that action is what binds the terrorist group together, the use of violence may oftentimes be dictated more by the need to satisfy the internal goal of group survival than to directly further the group's external political agenda. Focusing upon internal cohesion as the critical mediating variable for group survival, this paper examines how the terrorist group's efforts to maintain itself drives violent behavior that transcends political considerations and operational prudence. When external and internal requirements become contradictory, the terrorist group faces a dilemma. Caught in a vicious cycle of reacting to strategic failure with more violent action in order to maintain itself, the terrorist group generates a negative dynamic of violence that not only undermines its chances of achieving stated long-term goals but also accelerates its decline.

Terrorism, like other forms of political violence, has an organizational context. Few studies, however, have considered the influence of organizational life upon the outward behavior of the terrorist group. This thesis explores the possibility that terrorism, in addition to its political context, reflects the internal dynamics of the terrorist group. Assuming that action is what binds the terrorist group together, the use of violence may oftentimes be dictated more by the need to satisfy the internal goal of group survival than to directly further the group's external political agenda. Focusing upon internal cohesion as the critical mediating variable for group survival, this paper examines how the terrorist group's efforts to maintain itself drives violent behavior that transcends political considerations and operational prudence. When external and internal requirements become contradictory, the terrorist group faces a dilemma. Caught in a vicious cycle of reacting to strategic failure with more violent action in order to maintain itself, the terrorist group generates a negative dynamic of violence that not only undermines its chances of achieving stated long-term goals but also accelerates its decline.

https://archive.org/details/injected-covid-vaccines-now-start-to-show-their-ugly-head https://archive.org/details/so-called-vaccines-are-really-dangerous-experimental-gene-therapy_202105 https://archive.org/details/pfizer-chief-scientist-michael-yeadon_202105 https://archive.org/details/vaccines-will-start-killing-people https://archive.org/details/extra-parliamentary-inquiry-committee https://archive.org/details/no-chance-of-survival-for-vaccine-takers https://archive.org/details/vaccine-is-creating-the-variants https://archive.org/details/global-covid-inoculation-program https://archive.org/details/gene-theraphy https://archive.org/details/trustworthy-vaccine

https://archive.org/details/injected-covid-vaccines-now-start-to-show-their-ugly-head https://archive.org/details/so-called-vaccines-are-really-dangerous-experimental-gene-therapy_202105 https://archive.org/details/pfizer-chief-scientist-michael-yeadon_202105 https://archive.org/details/vaccines-will-start-killing-people https://archive.org/details/extra-parliamentary-inquiry-committee https://archive.org/details/no-chance-of-survival-for-vaccine-takers https://archive.org/details/vaccine-is-creating-the-variants https://archive.org/details/global-covid-inoculation-program https://archive.org/details/gene-theraphy https://archive.org/details/trustworthy-vaccine

https://archive.org/details/injected-covid-vaccines-now-start-to-show-their-ugly-head https://archive.org/details/so-called-vaccines-are-really-dangerous-experimental-gene-therapy_202105 https://archive.org/details/pfizer-chief-scientist-michael-yeadon_202105 https://archive.org/details/vaccines-will-start-killing-people https://archive.org/details/extra-parliamentary-inquiry-committee https://archive.org/details/no-chance-of-survival-for-vaccine-takers https://archive.org/details/vaccine-is-creating-the-variants https://archive.org/details/global-covid-inoculation-program https://archive.org/details/gene-theraphy https://archive.org/details/trustworthy-vaccine

Countries sponsoring and supporting terrorism impede the efforts of the United States and the international community to fight terrorism. Until states that support terrorism cease such sponsorship, they remain a critical foundation for terrorist groups and their operations. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the U.S. military's role in coercing states to cease their sponsorship of terrorism. Using game theory, this thesis analyzes the utility of military force against state-sponsored terrorism. It explains why past military responses did not pose a credible threat and were thus, an ineffective instrument of national power. It then examines how military force is employed in the current war on terrorism. The findings of this thesis suggest that the limited military strikes employed against states for their role in terrorist attacks prior to September 11, 2001, preconditioned the leaders of supportive states to believe U.S. leadership lacked commitment in its strategy to end statesponsored terrorism. The findings also suggest the dramatic change in the United States' method of employing its military forces against state sponsors of terrorism after September 11, 2001, created the credible, coercive military threat required to accomplish the U.S. national objective of ending state-sponsored terrorism.

Countries sponsoring and supporting terrorism impede the efforts of the United States and the international community to fight terrorism. Until states that support terrorism cease such sponsorship, they remain a critical foundation for terrorist groups and their operations. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the U.S. military's role in coercing states to cease their sponsorship of terrorism. Using game theory, this thesis analyzes the utility of military force against state-sponsored terrorism. It explains why past military responses did not pose a credible threat and were thus, an ineffective instrument of national power. It then examines how military force is employed in the current war on terrorism. The findings of this thesis suggest that the limited military strikes employed against states for their role in terrorist attacks prior to September 11, 2001, preconditioned the leaders of supportive states to believe U.S. leadership lacked commitment in its strategy to end statesponsored terrorism. The findings also suggest the dramatic change in the United States' method of employing its military forces against state sponsors of terrorism after September 11, 2001, created the credible, coercive military threat required to accomplish the U.S. national objective of ending state-sponsored terrorism.

Countries sponsoring and supporting terrorism impede the efforts of the United States and the international community to fight terrorism. Until states that support terrorism cease such sponsorship, they remain a critical foundation for terrorist groups and their operations. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the U.S. military's role in coercing states to cease their sponsorship of terrorism. Using game theory, this thesis analyzes the utility of military force against state-sponsored terrorism. It explains why past military responses did not pose a credible threat and were thus, an ineffective instrument of national power. It then examines how military force is employed in the current war on terrorism. The findings of this thesis suggest that the limited military strikes employed against states for their role in terrorist attacks prior to September 11, 2001, preconditioned the leaders of supportive states to believe U.S. leadership lacked commitment in its strategy to end statesponsored terrorism. The findings also suggest the dramatic change in the United States' method of employing its military forces against state sponsors of terrorism after September 11, 2001, created the credible, coercive military threat required to accomplish the U.S. national objective of ending state-sponsored terrorism.

Countries sponsoring and supporting terrorism impede the efforts of the United States and the international community to fight terrorism. Until states that support terrorism cease such sponsorship, they remain a critical foundation for terrorist groups and their operations. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the U.S. military's role in coercing states to cease their sponsorship of terrorism. Using game theory, this thesis analyzes the utility of military force against state-sponsored terrorism. It explains why past military responses did not pose a credible threat and were thus, an ineffective instrument of national power. It then examines how military force is employed in the current war on terrorism. The findings of this thesis suggest that the limited military strikes employed against states for their role in terrorist attacks prior to September 11, 2001, preconditioned the leaders of supportive states to believe U.S. leadership lacked commitment in its strategy to end statesponsored terrorism. The findings also suggest the dramatic change in the United States' method of employing its military forces against state sponsors of terrorism after September 11, 2001, created the credible, coercive military threat required to accomplish the U.S. national objective of ending state-sponsored terrorism.

Ceasefire. Ceasefire. Ceasefire. Lots of people are throwing around this word without fully understanding its implications. A ceasefire will only further enable Hamas and will result in more cycles of violence and terrorism. Watch: https://t.co/5LGMq4Yau6

Understanding Islamist Radical Terrorism (Wibawanto Nugroho, September 21, 2017) Transcript available below Watch his speaker playlist About the speaker Indonesia contains the world’s largest Muslim population. Yet insufficient attention has been paid to how it sees the threat of radical Islam, a subject that  Wibawanto Nugroho  has studied deeply. He has served in the Indonesian government in several capacities. Presently, he is a PhD candidate at the University of Exeter, with a dissertation on the subject of Understanding Islamist Radical Terrorism. He is supervised by Dr. Omar Ashour and Dr. Jonathan Githens-Mazer of the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies at the University of Exeter. His research included directly interviewing some 40 terrorists, as well as relevant policy makers. He has worked as the Expert Staff, Strategist and Senior Policy Analyst with the Indonesian Army; Ministry of Defense; the Chairman of the Defense, Foreign Affairs, Intelligence and Information Committee of Indonesian Parliament; and the Indonesian Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs. From 2013 – 2014 he also worked as a Senior Adviser for Sanitas International, a global political consulting firm. While working on his PhD (2014 – 2017) with the University of Exeter, he was also designated as an alumni fellow/SME with NDU. He holds degrees from the University of Bradford, the U.S. National Defense University (NDU), and the George Mason University School of Public and Government. He has just been invited to give a speech at Capstone Course of the Indonesian National Resilience Agency (Lemhanas RI), on the topic of national ideology, strategy, and development, this November. His thesis at National Defense University, titled “Indonesian Armed Forces’ Roles, Strategies and Capabilities in Countering Terrorism within a Changing National Security: Looking Ahead 2007 – 2017” earned an Honors award from the university. He was also a principal speaker representing the Republic of Indonesia at the 2008 U.S. Army TRADOC-hosted global symposium on the Future Joint Operating Environment toward 2025. In 2011 he also appeared as a principal speaker along with the head of Indonesian BNPT (National Counter Terrorism Agency) in the BNPT-hosted international symposium on deradicalization in Makassar, Indonesia. Wibawanto Nugroho is a Fulbright scholar and the recipient of Phi Beta Delta Honor Society for International Scholars. For more on Indonesia, see James Clad’s Westminster talk,  The Islamic State Attacks Indonesia – And its ‘Middle Way’ , Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo’s Westminster talk,  How to Support Democracy: The Case of Indonesia , and Jeff Moore’s Westminster talk, the  Evolution in Islamic Insurgency in Asia .

5_13_2013 Beyond the Headlines Understanding Terrorism, Economic and Cultural news and more More information about this show available at: Seattle Community Media

5_13_2013 Beyond the Headlines Understanding Terrorism, Economic and Cultural news and more More information about this show available at: Seattle Community Media

5_13_2013 Beyond the Headlines Understanding Terrorism, Economic and Cultural news and more More information about this show available at: Seattle Community Media

5_13_2013 Beyond the Headlines Understanding Terrorism, Economic and Cultural news and more More information about this show available at: Seattle Community Media

Perspective realism, particularly as modified into the special case of adversarial perspectivism, and the analogy of reciprocal concave and convex world views, is an important and neglected component in accounting for the widespread discrepancies in the reporting of so-called "terrorist" events. However, the tendencies toward cooperation between and among international journalists are greater than ever before. Elements of bias and ethnocentrism and media reductionism are more widely reported than in previous decades. The overall signs of the melting of rigid world views, photocopied by the mass media, are increasingly positive. Thus a somewhat less superficial caricature of terrorism is being drawn, at least in the more thoughtful sectors of society. (Twenty notes are included.) (RS)

Organized crime is becoming a large-scale business that is conducting global commerce for the trafficking of illegal services and products as well as developing the associated supply chains. Criminal organizations are conducting commerce across traditional nation-state boundaries allowing criminal groups to work in coordination with other like groups; this coordination is called transnational crime. The United Nations (UN), aware of this activity, has stated that the traditional hierarchical forms of organized crime groups have diminished; replaced with loose networks who work together to exploit new markets of opportunity (UNODC 2006d, paragraph 2). These loose networks have many resources available to affiliates that include financial services, global transportation, and the weapons industry. Criminals, organized crime, and terrorist networks have access to these valuable resources via this affiliation. Organized crime, consequently, may be used as a tool of war.

Organized crime is becoming a large-scale business that is conducting global commerce for the trafficking of illegal services and products as well as developing the associated supply chains. Criminal organizations are conducting commerce across traditional nation-state boundaries allowing criminal groups to work in coordination with other like groups; this coordination is called transnational crime. The United Nations (UN), aware of this activity, has stated that the traditional hierarchical forms of organized crime groups have diminished; replaced with loose networks who work together to exploit new markets of opportunity (UNODC 2006d, paragraph 2). These loose networks have many resources available to affiliates that include financial services, global transportation, and the weapons industry. Criminals, organized crime, and terrorist networks have access to these valuable resources via this affiliation. Organized crime, consequently, may be used as a tool of war.

Organized crime is becoming a large-scale business that is conducting global commerce for the trafficking of illegal services and products as well as developing the associated supply chains. Criminal organizations are conducting commerce across traditional nation-state boundaries allowing criminal groups to work in coordination with other like groups; this coordination is called transnational crime. The United Nations (UN), aware of this activity, has stated that the traditional hierarchical forms of organized crime groups have diminished; replaced with loose networks who work together to exploit new markets of opportunity (UNODC 2006d, paragraph 2). These loose networks have many resources available to affiliates that include financial services, global transportation, and the weapons industry. Criminals, organized crime, and terrorist networks have access to these valuable resources via this affiliation. Organized crime, consequently, may be used as a tool of war.

Author / Authors : Shreyasi Ghosh About the author : Shreyasi Ghosh is Research Scholar /Former Student of Presidency University, Kolkata India. About the article : Page no. 89-106 Discipline : Political Science/Polity/ Democratic studies Script/language :  Roman/English Category : Research paper Ghosh Shreyasi (2014). Understanding Terrorism in the context of Global Security . SOCRATES. Edition- II Vol: II Issue-June 2014,89-106 . Find this article on Scholar Abstract: Terrorism being a complex phenomenon, is an alarming kind of violence, threat, a method to combat or a strategy to achieve certain goals aiming to induce a state of fear in the victim, which is ruthless and does not confirm to humanitarian norms where publicity becomes an essential factor in the terrorist strategy indulging killing of innocent and destruction of much valuable property thereby creating wide panic and gripping the remotest part of the world. Thus, the fight against terrorism has not only become a primordial concern for all the nations but also for research study in the context of global security under the impact of globalization. Keywords: Terrorism, Violence, Threat, Global Security, Globalization.

How successful are terrorist attacks in inflicting economic harm on states? The small body of work that has explored this question finds that while domestic terrorism is generally ineffective, transnational terrorism does reduce economic growth in some regions. Despite being a major center of terrorism, the Near East region has not been empirically tested in this way. This paper investigates the effect of domestic and transnational terrorism on macroeconomic growth for the eighteen countries in the Near East from 1970-2012. The findings indicate that neither form of terrorism has significantly affected economic growth, however, internal conflicts and external wars have both greatly limited growth. These findings have implications for how states allocate their scarce resources to formulate efficient defense strategies. Terrorist groups are not monolithic in nature; while some groups conduct terrorist attacks almost exclusively, others use terrorism as a part of a larger strategy that also incorporates guerilla warfare and sometimes even conventional military operations. More traditional terrorist groups, which often have universal or global objectives, can be effectively targeted using counterterrorism strategies. Groups that are more local in nature, and who use terrorism in conjunction with other tactics, present a much greater threat to a state's economy and political stability. These groups are better targeted using a counterinsurgency framework, which focuses more resources towards resolving the underlying causes of the conflict.

This paper has been prepared by Kings College London under contract to the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). This paper constitutes fulfillment of the IDA task order entitled Understanding Terrorism, sponsored by the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense. The paper addresses lessons learned from British experiences with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Spanish experiences with the Basque terrorist organization Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna (ETA). The paper also identifies applications of these lessons to the current war on terrorism. The paper was based on numerous interviews with persons who have dealt with the IRA and ETA over the years. In order not to jeopardize the security of such persons their names and affiliations are not disclosed.

Countries sponsoring and supporting terrorism impede the efforts of the United States and the international community to fight terrorism. Until states that support terrorism cease such sponsorship, they remain a critical foundation for terrorist groups and their operations. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the U.S. military's role in coercing states to cease their sponsorship of terrorism. Using game theory, this thesis analyzes the utility of military force against state-sponsored terrorism. It explains why past military responses did not pose a credible threat and were thus, an ineffective instrument of national power. It then examines how military force is employed in the current war on terrorism. The findings of this thesis suggest that the limited military strikes employed against states for their role in terrorist attacks prior to September 11, 2001, preconditioned the leaders of supportive states to believe U.S. leadership lacked commitment in its strategy to end state-sponsored terrorism. The findings also suggest the dramatic change in the United Stat method of employing its military forces against state sponsors of terrorism after September 11, 2001, created the credible, coercive military threat required to accomplish the U.S. national objective of ending state-sponsored terrorism.

Includes bibliographical references and index

Includes bibliographical references and index

Includes bibliographical references and index

Includes bibliographical references and index

Includes bibliographical references and index

This research investigated two questions: How effective is the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) when compared to its predecessor, the Homeland Security Advisory System? And, does NTAS provide sufficient decision advantage for the nation it serves? The research methodology/design used a comparative analysis of results observed for each system as it addressed the problem set presented in a case study. The research found that NTAS is effective but continued improvement is needed. These improvements include: the formal establishment of a DHS Office of Counterterrorism Coordination; the renewal of the DHS Counterterrorism Advisory Board Charter or other appropriate governance documents to ensure sustainment of necessary decision making and execution authority for NTAS; refine the NTAS Concept of Operations to better demonstrate the system s scalable outcomes other than an NTAS-generated alert, such as Joint Intelligence Bulletins, Joint Threat Assessments, etc.; NTAS-related outreach and education efforts with the homeland security enterprise and the public; and the improvement of communication aspects of NTAS integrating with other warning systems, such as the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System. These improvements are critical in sustaining the current effectiveness of the system and ensuring its future success.

This research investigated two questions: How effective is the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) when compared to its predecessor, the Homeland Security Advisory System? And, does NTAS provide sufficient decision advantage for the nation it serves? The research methodology/design used a comparative analysis of results observed for each system as it addressed the problem set presented in a case study. The research found that NTAS is effective but continued improvement is needed. These improvements include: the formal establishment of a DHS Office of Counterterrorism Coordination; the renewal of the DHS Counterterrorism Advisory Board Charter or other appropriate governance documents to ensure sustainment of necessary decision making and execution authority for NTAS; refine the NTAS Concept of Operations to better demonstrate the system s scalable outcomes other than an NTAS-generated alert, such as Joint Intelligence Bulletins, Joint Threat Assessments, etc.; NTAS-related outreach and education efforts with the homeland security enterprise and the public; and the improvement of communication aspects of NTAS integrating with other warning systems, such as the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System. These improvements are critical in sustaining the current effectiveness of the system and ensuring its future success.

This research investigated two questions: How effective is the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) when compared to its predecessor, the Homeland Security Advisory System? And, does NTAS provide sufficient decision advantage for the nation it serves? The research methodology/design used a comparative analysis of results observed for each system as it addressed the problem set presented in a case study. The research found that NTAS is effective but continued improvement is needed. These improvements include: the formal establishment of a DHS Office of Counterterrorism Coordination; the renewal of the DHS Counterterrorism Advisory Board Charter or other appropriate governance documents to ensure sustainment of necessary decision making and execution authority for NTAS; refine the NTAS Concept of Operations to better demonstrate the system s scalable outcomes other than an NTAS-generated alert, such as Joint Intelligence Bulletins, Joint Threat Assessments, etc.; NTAS-related outreach and education efforts with the homeland security enterprise and the public; and the improvement of communication aspects of NTAS integrating with other warning systems, such as the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System. These improvements are critical in sustaining the current effectiveness of the system and ensuring its future success.

This research investigated two questions: How effective is the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) when compared to its predecessor, the Homeland Security Advisory System? And, does NTAS provide sufficient decision advantage for the nation it serves? The research methodology/design used a comparative analysis of results observed for each system as it addressed the problem set presented in a case study. The research found that NTAS is effective but continued improvement is needed. These improvements include: the formal establishment of a DHS Office of Counterterrorism Coordination; the renewal of the DHS Counterterrorism Advisory Board Charter or other appropriate governance documents to ensure sustainment of necessary decision making and execution authority for NTAS; refine the NTAS Concept of Operations to better demonstrate the system s scalable outcomes other than an NTAS-generated alert, such as Joint Intelligence Bulletins, Joint Threat Assessments, etc.; NTAS-related outreach and education efforts with the homeland security enterprise and the public; and the improvement of communication aspects of NTAS integrating with other warning systems, such as the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System. These improvements are critical in sustaining the current effectiveness of the system and ensuring its future success.

This research investigated two questions: How effective is the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) when compared to its predecessor, the Homeland Security Advisory System? And, does NTAS provide sufficient decision advantage for the nation it serves? The research methodology/design used a comparative analysis of results observed for each system as it addressed the problem set presented in a case study. The research found that NTAS is effective but continued improvement is needed. These improvements include: the formal establishment of a DHS Office of Counterterrorism Coordination; the renewal of the DHS Counterterrorism Advisory Board Charter or other appropriate governance documents to ensure sustainment of necessary decision making and execution authority for NTAS; refine the NTAS Concept of Operations to better demonstrate the system s scalable outcomes other than an NTAS-generated alert, such as Joint Intelligence Bulletins, Joint Threat Assessments, etc.; NTAS-related outreach and education efforts with the homeland security enterprise and the public; and the improvement of communication aspects of NTAS integrating with other warning systems, such as the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System. These improvements are critical in sustaining the current effectiveness of the system and ensuring its future success.

This research investigated two questions: How effective is the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) when compared to its predecessor, the Homeland Security Advisory System? And, does NTAS provide sufficient decision advantage for the nation it serves? The research methodology/design used a comparative analysis of results observed for each system as it addressed the problem set presented in a case study. The research found that NTAS is effective but continued improvement is needed. These improvements include: the formal establishment of a DHS Office of Counterterrorism Coordination; the renewal of the DHS Counterterrorism Advisory Board Charter or other appropriate governance documents to ensure sustainment of necessary decision making and execution authority for NTAS; refine the NTAS Concept of Operations to better demonstrate the system s scalable outcomes other than an NTAS-generated alert, such as Joint Intelligence Bulletins, Joint Threat Assessments, etc.; NTAS-related outreach and education efforts with the homeland security enterprise and the public; and the improvement of communication aspects of NTAS integrating with other warning systems, such as the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System. These improvements are critical in sustaining the current effectiveness of the system and ensuring its future success.

Ungoverned territories -- failed or failing states or ungoverned areas within otherwise viable states -- generate all manner of security problems and can become terrorist sanctuaries. Using a two-tiered framework area applied to eight case studies from around the globe, the authors seek to understand the conditions that give rise to ungoverned territories and what makes some ungoverned territories more conducive to a terrorist or insurgent presence than others. On the basis of this ground-breaking analytical work, they identify three types of ungoverned territories and their effects on U.S. security interests and develop strategies to improve the U.S. ability to mitigate these effects.