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A considerable amount of research in moral psychology has examined how people resolve moral dilemmas pitting adherence to moral norms against overall consequences for the greater good (e.g., Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004). Within this paradigm, several accounts have been proposed that aim to capture the mental process(es) that (1) cause judgments that adhere to relevant moral norms (i.e., characteristically deontological judgments) and (2) cause judgments that maximize overall consequences in terms of welfare (i.e., characteristically utilitarian judgments). One straightforward possibility is that characteristically deontological judgments are produced by reference to salient moral norms, while characteristically utilitarian judgments are produced by cost-benefit analyses of aggregate well-being. Alternatively, dual-process theory (Greene, 2007) proposes that, while characteristically utilitarian judgments are indeed produced by cost-benefit analyses of aggregate well-being, characteristically deontological judgments are caused by the automatic emotional response to the idea of causing harm. In contrast to these two possibilities, some researchers suggest that both characteristically utilitarian and characteristically deontological judgments may be caused by processes of cost-benefit analyses of aggregate well-being (e.g., Baron & Cohen, 2020; Hennig & Hütter, 2020). Yet, other researchers suggest that both characteristically utilitarian and characteristically deontological judgments may be caused by coherence-based reasoning processes about norms (Holyoak & Powell, 2016). The purpose of the current research is to distinguish between these possibilities by investigating how moral dilemma judgments are associated with conscious reasoning processes. To this end, we will examine associations between factors influencing moral dilemma judgments and the content of conscious reasoning in language. Using the CNI model (Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf, & Hütter, 2017), we will quantify sensitivity to consequences (in a characteristically utilitarian sense), sensitivity to moral norms (in a characteristically deontological sense), and general preference for inaction over action in responses to moral dilemmas. Using Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count 2015 (LIWC2015; Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, & Blackburn, 2015), we will quantify frequency of language related to the cost-benefit analyses of aggregate well-being (consequentialism), adherence to moral norms and rules (deontology), and expressions of morally relevant emotions. If the first possibility is correct, there should be (1) a positive association between sensitivity to consequences in responses to moral dilemmas and reasoning in terms of consequentialist language and (2) a positive association between sensitivity to moral norms in responses to moral dilemmas and reasoning in terms of deontological language. If the second possibility is correct, there should be (1) a positive association between sensitivity to consequences in responses to moral dilemmas and reasoning in terms of consequentialist language and (2) a positive association between sensitivity to moral norms in responses to moral dilemmas and reasoning in terms of emotional language. If the third possibility is correct, there should be (1) a positive association between sensitivity to consequences in responses to moral dilemmas and reasoning in terms of consequentialist language and (2) a positive association between sensitivity to moral norms in responses to moral dilemmas and reasoning in terms of consequentialist language. Finally, if the fourth possibility is correct, there should be (1) a positive association between sensitivity to consequences in responses to moral dilemmas and reasoning in terms of deontological language and (2) a positive association between sensitivity to moral norms in responses to moral dilemmas and reasoning in terms of deontological language.