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The aim of the present study is the systematic evaluation of the effect of different demonstrator responses in the observer when the demonstrator is exposed to interoceptive threat as well as the effect on the observer’s future fear learning. For this goal to be met, the following hypotheses and exploratory questions are stated to guide analyses.

In the field of Information Security, the terms vulnerability, threat, and risk have specific meanings and are often misapplied and misidentified in projects. This presentation will explain threat modeling as it applies to information and application security projects, utilizing the shared memory of the Death Star trench run as an analogy to better understand these concepts. You will learn how to define risks, threats, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures; how to integrate threat modeling into a software development lifecycle; examine example threat modeling methodologies; and hear real-world anecdotes of threat modeling successes and failures.

By Stéphane Adamiste (video in French) Threat modelling is about using models to find security problems. In other words, it provides a methodical approach to performing a security evaluation. Some of the existing models such as Adam Shostack's STRIDE have become popular within the software development industry. Thus, threat modelling is today considered as a key activitty within secure software development methodologies. In this presentation, we propose to provide return on experiencce about how threat modelling can be leveraged in organisations to perform risk assessments and improve security management. Available methodologic variants, expected benefits of threat modelling, approach limitations and possible issues, existing tools, we will try to draw an accurate picture of where threat modelling currently stands. The presentation will be illustrated by concrete examples. As a second step we will explore possibilities to industrialise threat modelling, integrate it into a global risk management framework and make it an efficient process in the corporate environment for the sake of information security. Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k4TnzTfOWXU Uploader: BlackAlps CyberSecurityConference

by Brook Schoenfield, Principal Architect Product Security at McAfee Abstract: What wisdom percolates from building threat modeling practices across 4 organizations? This presentation is drawn from hundreds of students, years of coaching, 100 formal trainings, and 1000’s of threat models. This presentation draws upon experience gained in the trenches of the battle to reduce design errors that is often fought through threat modeling. Conclusions may overturn cherished beliefs. Brook S.E. Schoenfield is the Author of Securing Systems: Applied Security Architecture and Threat Models (CRC Press, 2015). He is the Principal Architect for product security at Intel Security Group. He provides strategic technical leadership, training and mentoring for 75 security architects. He is a founding member of IEEE’s Center for Secure Design and is a featured security architect at the Bletchley Park Museum of Computing. He is the originator of Baseline Application Vulnerability Assessment (BAVA), Just Good Enough Risk Rating (JGERR), Architecture, Threats, Attack Surfaces, and Mitigations (ATASM) and developer-centric security. He contributed to Core Software Security (CRC Press, 2014), and co-authored “Avoiding the Top 10 Security Design Flaws” (IEEE, 2014). Abstract: What wisdom percolates from building threat modeling practices across 4 organizations? This presentation is drawn from hundreds of students, years of coaching, 100 formal trainings, and 1000’s of threat models. This presentation draws upon experience gained in the trenches of the battle to reduce design errors that is often fought through threat modeling. Conclusions may overturn cherished beliefs. Managed by the official OWASP Media Project https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Media_Project Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DEVt1Adybvs Uploader: OWASP

If you have questions at the intersection of Cybersecurity and AI, you need to know Donato at WithSecure! Donato has been threat modeling AI applications and seriously applying those models in his day-to-day work. He joins us in this episode to discuss his LLM application security canvas, prompt injections, alignment, and more.Join the discussionChangelog++ members save 9 minutes on this episode because they made the ads disappear. Join today!Sponsors:Assembly AI - Turn voice data into summaries with AssemblyAI's leading Speech AI models. Built by AI experts, their Speech AI models include accurate speech-to-text for voice data (such as calls, virtual meetings, and podcasts), speaker detection, sentiment analysis, chapter detection, PII redaction, and more.Porkbun - Go to porkbun.com to get .app, .dev, or .foo domain names at Porkbun for only $1 for the first year!Changelog News - A podcast+newsletter combo that's brief, entertaining & always on-point. Subscribe today.Featuring:Donato Capitella – WebsiteDaniel Whitenack – Website, GitHub, XShow Notes:The Security Canvas for LLM ApplicationsLLM Security Chronicles Playlist on YouTubeShould you let ChatGPT control your browser?When your AI assistant has an evil twinPliny the Liberator - jailbreak guruSomething missing or broken? PRs welcome!

In this project a system was built aimed at mitigating insider attacks centered around a high-dimensional search engine for correlating the large number of monitoring streams necessary for detecting insider attacks. Further accomplishments in this project include an insider attack modeling and analysis tool called MAPIT, developed by SUNY Buffalo, and a novel sketch-based anomaly detection sensor developed by Rutgers University, which can be used for detecting anomalies in IP source/destination addresses, as well as for defining small-space user profiles, e.g., file accesses.

Adam Shostack of Shostack & Associates and author of Threat Modeling: Designing for Security discussed different approaches to threat modeling, the multiple benefits it can provide, and how it can be added to an organization's existing software process. Host Justin Beyer spoke with Shostack about the steps associated with threat modeling and the different approaches [...]

Adam Shostack, President, Shostack & Associates Attacks always get better, so your threat modeling needs to evolve. Learn what's new and important in threat modeling in 2019. Computers that are things are subject to different threats, and systems face new threats from voice cloning and computational propaganda and the growing importance of threats “at the human layer.” Take home actionable ways to ensure your security engineering is up to date.Learning Objectives:1: Use provided models to make sense of a fast changing world.2: Understand how threat modeling fits into the agile world we all live in.3: Learn about new and emergent threats that engineers must start to address.Pre-Requisites:Some exposure to threat modeling will be helpful. Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZoxHIpzaZ6U Uploader: RSA Conference

Developers needs prescriptive guidance on preemptive design and coding techniques. This can be done blindly or in alignment to both application use cases and the context of abuse cases or threats. This talk will speak to case studies in risk centric threat modeling using the PASTA (Process for Attack Simulation & Threat Analysis) methodology and provide 3 use cases of IoT, E-Commerce, and Mobile Applications. This talk will assume that a basic understanding of data flow diagramming, pen testing, security architecture, and threat analytics is understood by the audience. This talk also centers around the idea of modeling threats for applications based upon a higher propensity of threat intelligence, how to harvest and correlate threat patterns to your threat model and also how to correlate a threat model to defining preemptive controls and countermeasures to include in the overall design. - Managed by the official OWASP Media Project https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Media_Project Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hHIgW8ZUi4A Uploader: OWASP

From AppSecEU 2016 in Rome https://2016.appsec.eu/ - Managed by the official OWASP Media Project https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Media_Project Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C5IPkuDnOGs Uploader: OWASP

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Research on Internet censorship is hampered by poor models of censor behavior. Censor models guide the development of circumvention systems, so it is important to get them right. A censor model should be understood not just as a set of capabilities—such as the ability to monitor network traffic—but as a set of priorities constrained by resource limitations. My research addresses the twin themes of modeling and circumvention. With a grounding in empirical research, I build up an abstract model of the circumvention problem and examine how to adapt it to concrete censorship challenges. I describe the results of experiments on censors that probe their strengths and weaknesses; specifically, on the subject of active probing to discover proxy servers, and on delays in their reaction to changes in circumvention. I present two circumvention designs: domain fronting, which derives its resistance to blocking from the censor’s reluctance to block other useful services; and Snowflake, based on quickly changing peer-to-peer proxy servers. I hope to change the perception that the circumvention problem is a cat-and-mouse game that affords only incremental and temporary advancements. Rather, let us state the assumptions about censor behavior atop which we build circumvention designs, and let those assumptions be based on an informed understanding of censor behavior.

Recorded at AppSecUSA 2016 in Washington, DC https://2016.appsecusa.org/ Threat Modeling with Architectural Risk Patterns Current approaches to Threat Modeling emphasise manual analysis typically performed by developers together with a security specialist. This has a high initial cost, both in terms of time and the skills required to perform it. Both of those constraints are under pressure as organisations increase the speed and volume of software development. In enterprise environments there is the additional challenge of scaling this activity across thousands of products with a limited number of software security specialists to guide the process. Lack of necessary security skills is also a reason that many smaller companies never attempt threat modeling in the first place. This talk will present a software-centric method of threat modeling that uses risk patterns to increase the speed of creating a threat model and that also introduces a degree of consistency into the process. We’ll present a series of incremental improvements to the use of risk patterns from a simple checklist based approach to the use of a flexible rules engine. This method could be implemented by tooling to automatically generate a threat model based on architectural decisions. The technique employs principals from Object Oriented software design such as inheritance and method overloading so that the contents of the patterns can be practically maintained and extended without unnecessary repetition. Organisations can use this method to extract the expertise from their software security experts so that threat modeling knowledge is retained and can be re-used within the organisation. Stephen de Vries Founder, CEO, Continuum Security SL Stephen is the founder of Continuum Security and focussed on building AppSec tools to support security in the SDLC, including the IriusRisk threat modeling tool and BDD-Security open source security testing framework. | | His background is in software development and security testing of web and mobile applications. - Managed by the official OWASP Media Project https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Media_Project Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-LL4IE663ng Uploader: OWASP

Are the threat modeling myths keeping you from initiating this key secure design activity? Join us to get the facts; find out how easy it is to get started. We will attempt to debunk 6 recurring myths. Hopefully you will agree with us once you have a few of the facts? We aim to place participants onto a path to successful threat modeling. Please join Jim DelGrosso and Brook Schoenfield as we squash misunderstandings and industry accepted disinformation. Jim DelGrosso Cigital, Inc. Senior Principal Consultant Jim DelGrosso, Principal Consultant, has been with Cigital since 2006. In addition to his overarching knowledge of software security, he specializes in Architecture Analysis, Threat Modeling and Secure Design. In fact, he was a catalyst for creating Cigital’s current Architecture Analysis practice. Jim is also the Executive Director for IEEE Computer Society Center for Secure Design (CSD). Are the threat modeling myths keeping you from initiating this key secure design activity? Join us to get the facts; find out how easy it is to get started. We will attempt to debunk 6 recurring myths. Hopefully you will agree with us once you have a few of the facts? We aim to place participants onto a path to successful threat modeling. Please join Jim DelGrosso and Brook Schoenfield as we squash misunderstandings and industry accepted disinformation. Brook Schoenfield Intel Security - Managed by the official OWASP Media Project https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Media_Project Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yBDNiBE3Xho Uploader: OWASP

The relationship between terrorism, drug trafficking, and policymaking is examined through the development, implementation, and use of a series of systems dynamics-based models. These activities are intended to provide the basis for future development of a decision aid to support policymakers in combating the narco-terror threat. The models developed for this purpose are: a narcotics, counter-narcotics, and trafficker double agent model; a policy cycle model to manage the trafficker double agent conversion policies; a prototype societal deprivation, affection, disaffection, and advanced terrorist recruitment, training, and narco-terrorist support model; entity security and terrorist activity models; a violence generation model; and policy cycle models to represent the management of social violence and entity security policies. These models illustrate the relationships between deprivation of key resources to individuals and disaffection and ultimate terrorist activity; attack of notional targets by teams of terrorists; deprivation of individuals leading to violence, which can lead to an increase in the level of perceived deprivation; dynamics of policymaking in response to perceived needs; and the impact of corruption on policymaking. The U.S. Federal Government has well documented the strong ties between terrorist organizations and drug-trafficking organizations. A number of indictments are further proof of this relationship. In some cases, both organizations need the same facilitators: improve financial gains, expand geographical domains, provide common personnel protection, and utilize common logistical support. The U.S. administration has released two important national strategies to counter each of these threats separately, although their linkage is recognized.

Value Driven Threat Modeling What if we could get developers to apply threat modeling techniques, and embed secure design right in the product from the beginning? Threat Modeling is a great method to identify potential security weaknesses, and can enable architects and developers to efficiently prioritize their security investment, thus mitigating and preventing those vulnerabilities that would most likely cause the most damage. Unfortunately, though threat modeling provides a far greater return than most any other security technique in a development process, it is apparently “common knowledge” that threat modeling is supposed to be heavily resource intensive, require a full team of expensive security professionals, take up far too much developer time, and does not scale at all. But the common knowledge is wrong! In fact, using a lightweight, value-driven approach, skilled development teams can very efficiently ensure that the features they build can protect themselves, the application, and the business value that the features are intended to generate. Value Driven Threat Modeling offers an alternative to top-heavy, big-model-up-front threat modeling, in favor of agility, speed, and integration with the existing development cycle to not just to minimize risk, but to lower security costs. This talk will describe Value Driven Threat Modeling, and show how to incorporate it into your existing agile methodologies. We will discuss how developers can efficiently threat model their application to improve development, and walkthrough some example scenarios. And of course, we will see how security can participate productively in the agile development process, leveraging developers own habits to their benefit. Speaker Avi Douglen Software Security Consultant, Bounce Security AviD is a high-end, independent security architect and developer, and has been designing, developing and testing secure applications, and leading development teams in building secure products, for around 20 years. - Managed by the official OWASP Media Project https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Media_Project Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Fl_7FrM_gI Uploader: OWASP

For the last 20 years, assessment of the security of proposed systems has been a standard. Indeed, NIST-14 (1996) states, "Security requirements should be developed at the same time system planners define the requirements of the system.” Yet, threat modeling remains something of a “black art”, understood solely by the innercognoscenti, “security architects”. Indeed, at most companies, threat models are regarded as highly classified, need-to-know materials. This secretive approach hasn’t served the industry, nor the 10’s of thousands of “systems” that get developed each year. Join author and Distinguished Engineer, Brook Schoenfield, for a participatory session unlocking the shrouded mysteries of threat modeling, revealing the inner secrets, initiating participants into the society of practitioners. We will grapple with thorny issues like assessing risk, decomposition of the architecture, and appropriate architectural views. Brook Schoenfield Intel Security - Managed by the official OWASP Media Project https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Media_Project Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J_ksjjUz73s Uploader: OWASP

The Insider Threat Study, conducted by the U.S. Secret Service and Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineering Institute CERT Program, analyzed insider cyber crimes across U.S. critical infrastructure sectors. The study indicates that management decisions related to organizational and employee performance sometimes yield unintended consequences magnifying risk of insider attack. Lack of tools for understanding insider threat, analyzing risk mitigation alternatives, and communicating results exacerbates the problem. The goal of Carnegie Mellon University's MERIT (Management and Education of the Risk of Insider Threat) project is to develop such tools.4 MERIT uses system dynamics to model and analyze insider threats and produce interactive learning environments. These tools can be used by policy makers, security officers, information technology, human resources, and management to understand the problem and assess risk from insiders based on simulations of policies, cultural, technical, and procedural factors. This paper describes the MERIT insider threat model and simulation results.

Computer network defense systems should be sufficiently integrated to pull data from any information source, model an expert cyber analyst’s decision process, continuously adapt to an evolving cyber threat environment, and amalgamate with industry standard network hardware. Unfortunately, cyber defense systems are generally stovepipe solutions that do not natively integrate disparate network systems. Correlation engines are generally limited in capability, extensibility, and do not evolve with a dynamic cyber threatscape. Current network defense systems mitigate known vulnerabilities, but effective methods of traffic analysis capable of detecting unknown exploits and identifying advanced persistent threats have yet to be developed. Expert analysts can isolate threats by manually aggregating data sources and distinguishing patterns that indicate a compromise, but there are insufficient skilled analysts available to combat the problem. This work demonstrates a process control configuration that can emulate the investigative process of a human cyber security expert into a pseudo cognitive apparatus capable of accessing several network available data sources, determining a network threat, and terminating a connection, in minutes. The investigative process to detect a PHPMyAdmin attack and issue a response was entirely configured in a vector relational data modeling environment. The configuration could detect and respond to multi-part threat specifications.

As integrated circuits become more complex, it becomes easier to hide malicious logic constructs within a design. Security-conscious hardware designers require a way to detect such logic embedded in Third Party IP blocks used by their designs. The aim of this project was to develop a systematic way to detect attacks implemented in a design. Using the Java programming language, a tool capable of producing an attacker-centric threat model was developed. The tool uses a library of predefined malicious patterns to detect and categorize attacks in a system. Upon completion, the tool was tested on a small RISC microprocessor containing denial of service and data tampering attacks. Once given the appropriate library pattern, the tool was able to detect both threats in the design.

Digital forensics research collection

Recorded at AppSecUSA 2014 in Denver http://2014.appsecusa.org/ Friday, September 19 • 10:30am - 11:15am Threat Modeling Made Interactive! Threat modeling is an important part of any secure development process. By identifying potential threats early in the development, you can build effective mitigations into your system, rather than relying on costly patches and bug fixes. Existing techniques for modeling threats involve a whiteboard or some form of diagramming, with a few specialized tools capable of generating a list of threats that may be applicable to your system. These tools are indispensable, but provide a limited form of feedback and interaction. You can't, for example, state a security policy that you care about and check whether it can be violated by an attacker's actions; specify a concrete design decision (allocation of functionality, component deployment, etc.,) and assess its security impact; or strengthen the system with a mitigation and observe how the attacker reformulates its strategy. In this talk, I will present a demo of Poirot, a tool designed to assist developers in modeling and analyzing the security of their system during the design phase. With Poirot, you can specify your system and desired security policies, and perform an automatic analysis to generate attacks that may lead to the violation of a policy. The process is interactive; as you learn more about the system and its environment, you can modify the system model in Poirot and re-run the analysis to assess the impact of changes. Unlike existing modeling tools, where threats are treated as static entities, every threat in Poirot is represented by a dynamic agent that can actively perform actions and adapt to changes in a system. In addition, Poirot comes with a built-in, extensible database of threats that can be instantiated against a particular system, freeing you from the tedious task of enumerating a threat list. Finally, Poirot leverages recent progress in software verification to perform an exhaustive analysis that achieves a much stronger coverage than traditional testing. During this talk, I will demonstrate the application of Poirot to several web applications, and highlight the tool's strengths as well as limitations. Speaker Eunsuk Kang MIT I am a PhD candidate and a member of the Software Design Group in the Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL) at MIT. My research projects have focused on developing tools and techniques for software modeling and verification, with applications to security and safety-critical systems. - Managed by the official OWASP Media Project https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Media_Project Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZtSrcq7gscE Uploader: OWASP

From AppSecEU 2014 in Cambridge https://2014.appsec.eu/ Threat Modeling is a software design analysis method that looks for security weaknesses by juxtaposing software design views against a set of attackers. Software engineers and security practitioners at Intuit have been practicing Threat Modeling in various ways for years. Intuit has used a Threat Model methodology based on STRIDE. The approach had many advantages, but also some drawbacks. Some of the drawbacks included amount of time required to translate the information from development (generating the Data Flow Diagrams) and difficulty in modeling different threat agents. Intuit and Cigital unified their two Threat Modeling methodologies to produce an approach that satisfies various stakeholders at Intuit. The result was what is called Unified Threat Modeling, an approach that consists of identifying assets and attacker profiles, and documenting and suggesting a list of controls. It works for software architecture and system deployments (using System Threat Modeling approach) as well as for interaction between different software and system components (via Protocol Threat Modeling approach). Speakers Scott Matsumoto Principal Consultant, Cigital, Inc. Scott Matsumoto is a Principal Consultant with Cigital. At Cigital, he is responsible for the mobile security practice within the company. He consults for many of Cigital's clients on security architecture topics such as mobile security, Cloud Computing Security, as well as SOA Security and Governance. His prior experience encompasses development of component-based middleware, performance management systems, graphical UIs, language compilers, database management systems and operating system... Tin Zaw Staff Software Engineer, Intuit Tin Zaw is a Staff Software Engineer at Intuit making secure products that help simplify financial lives of consumers and small businesses. He has over 18 years of experience in software development and information security at various capacities. He holds an MS in Computer Science and an MBA from University of Southern California. He is a former president of OWASP Los Angeles chapter. - Managed by the official OWASP Media Project https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Media_Project Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1o99-cU70Vw Uploader: OWASP

Moderated by: Haral Tsitsivas, Software Sr Principal Engineer, Dell EMC Speakers: Jonathan Marcil, Application Security Engineer at Twitch Brook Schoenfield, Principal Architect Product Security at McAfee Adam Shostack, Consultant Izar Tarandach, Lead Product Security Architect at Autodesk Inc. Jonathan Marcil is the former chapter leader of OWASP Montreal and is now based in beautiful Irvine, California. Jonathan has been involved with OWASP for many years and is behind the official OWASP YouTube channel. He was also part of NorthSec CTF as a challenge designer special specialized in Web and imaginative contraptions. He is passionate about Application Security and enjoys architecture analysis, code review, threat modeling and debunking security tools. He holds a bachelor's degree in Software Engineering from ETS Montreal and has more than 15 years of experience in Information Technology and Security. Brook S.E. Schoenfield is the Author of Securing Systems: Applied Security Architecture and Threat Models (CRC Press, 2015). He is the Principal Architect for product security at Intel Security Group. He provides strategic technical leadership, training and mentoring for 75 security architects. He is a founding member of IEEE’s Center for Secure Design and is a featured security architect at the Bletchley Park Museum of Computing. He is the originator of Baseline Application Vulnerability Assessment (BAVA), Just Good Enough Risk Rating (JGERR), Architecture, Threats, Attack Surfaces, and Mitigations (ATASM) and developer-centric security. He contributed to Core Software Security (CRC Press, 2014), and co-authored “Avoiding the Top 10 Security Design Flaws” (IEEE, 2014). Adam is a consultant, entrepreneur, technologist, author and game designer. He's a member of the BlackHat Review Board, and helped found the CVE and many other things. He's currently helping a variety of organizations improve their security, and advising and mentoring startup as a Mach37 Star Mentor. While at Microsoft, he drove the Autorun fix into Windows Update, was the lead designer of the SDL Threat Modeling Tool v3 and created the "Elevation of Privilege" game. Adam is the author of Threat Modeling: Designing for Security, and the co-author of The New School of Information Security. Izar Tarandach is Lead Product Security Architect at Autodesk inc.. Prior, he was the Security Architect for Enterprise Hybrid Cloud at Dell EMC, for long before a Security Consultant at the EMC Product Security Office. With more years than he's willing to admit to in the information security arena, he is a core contributor to the SAFECode training effort and a founding contributor to the IEEE Center for Security Design. He holds a masters degree in Computer Science/Security from Boston University and has served as an instructor in Digital Forensics at Boston University and in Secure Development at the University of Oregon. Managed by the official OWASP Media Project https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Media_Project Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X6j1nIO1F2o Uploader: OWASP

by Jonathan Marcil, Application Security Engineer at Twitch Abstract: Threat Modeling is a great way to analyze security early in software development by structuring possible attacks, bad actors and countermeasures over a broad view of the targeted system. This talk will describe basic components of a threat model and how to use them effectively. Modeling concepts will be demonstrated using a cryptocurrency ecosystem as example. by Jonathan Marcil, Application Security Engineer of Twitch Website - https://twitter.com/jonathanmarcil Jonathan Marcil is the former chapter leader of OWASP Montreal and is now based in beautiful Irvine, California. Jonathan has been involved with OWASP for many years and is behind the official OWASP YouTube channel. He was also part of NorthSec CTF as a challenge designer specialized in Web and imaginative contraptions. He is passionate about Application Security and enjoys architecture analysis, code review, threat modeling and debunking security tools. He holds a bachelor's degree in Software Engineering from ETS Montreal and has more than 15 years of experience in Information Technology and Security. Managed by the official OWASP Media Project https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Media_Project Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KGy_KCRUGd4 Uploader: OWASP

If I could save a company a million dollars on their security budget every year, this is how I'd do it! While most people don't think of threat modeling as the sexiest exercise, it can actually be pretty exciting. Trust me when I say this, I wish I had learned how to do threat modeling much earlier when I was first starting out in consulting and bug hunting. It would have saved a lot of time, and made my clients happier too! Now, if you want to learn how to make one yourself to save you time, a headache, and money; then that's what we're going to get into today. * OWASP Threat Modeling Process - https://owasp.org/www-community/Threat_Modeling_Process * Completed AI application threat model - https://aivillage.org/large%20language%20models/threat-modeling-llm/ * Draw.io Desktop - https://github.com/jgraph/drawio-desktop * Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC) - https://www.synotive.com/blog/software-development-client-questionnaire #threatmodeling #ethicalhacking #infosec #cybersecurity #redteam #webapp

Journalism is a high risk profession, security wise. Attackers want to obtain confidential material, expose sources, or stop stories. Unfortunately, you can get your colleagues into trouble even if you yourself are not a target. This presentation covers both the security basics that every journalist should know, and the security planning needed to do a specific high-risk story. We use the framework of threat modeling to think about security: what are you protecting, who is your adversary, and what can they do?

In this episode of the Hack the Planet Podcast: For too long, the confusion caused by the Adam Shostack/MS threat modeling "methodology" has prevented security teams from doing any productive risk analysis.  That ends now.  We clear up the confusion around what a threat model is, what it's for, how best to go about developing one, what is so very very wrong with the Adam Shostack/MS method of threat modeling, and how to achieve better results with less effort and arguing.   Check out the links for useful templates and examples.  And remember: a dataflow diagram is an important piece of design documentation, but it is not and can never be an effective threat model.   Threat Modeling Template Examples from SymbolCrash: https://www.symbolcrash.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Threat-Model-Template-Simple.xlsx https://www.symbolcrash.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Threat-Model-Template-CVSS-3.1.xlsx "How to measure anything in cybersecurity risk" https://www.howtomeasureanything.com/cybersecurity/ CVSS 3.1 Calculator at first.org https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1 Automated Secrets Detection: https://github.com/Yelp/detect-secrets https://github.com/anshumanbh/git-all-secrets https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog Old-School SANS Threat Modeling Template Example: https://www.sans.org/blog/practical-risk-analysis-and-threat-modeling-spreadsheet/ Mentioned Tools: https://github.com/lyft/cartography https://github.com/nccgroup/ScoutSuite C4 model: https://c4model.com/ What is the Actual Financial Impact of a Breach? https://www.nber.org/digest/jun18/economic-and-financial-consequences-corporate-cyberattacks https://www.nber.org/papers/w24409 Threat Modeling Tools that uselessly force everything into a DFD (not recommended): ThreatModeler - https://threatmodeler.com/ Irius Risk - https://iriusrisk.com/ OWASP ThreatDragon - https://owasp.org/www-project-threat-dragon/ MS Threat Modeling Tool - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=49168 Be a guest on the show! We want your hacker rants! Give us a call on the Hacker Helpline: PSTN 206-486-NARC (6272) and leave a message, or send an audio email to [email protected]. Original music produced by Symbol Crash. Warning: Some explicit language and adult themes.

Threat modeling analyzes how an adversary might attack a system by supplying it with malicious data or interacting with it. The analysis uses a Data Flow Diagram (DFD to describe how data moves through a system. Today, DFDs are represented informally, reviewed manually with security domain experts and may not reflect all the entry points in the implementation. We designed an approach to check the conformance of an implementation with its security architecture. We extended Reflexion Models to compare as-built DFD recovered from the implementation and the as-designed DFD, by increasing its automation and thus its adoptability. We also designed an analysis to assist DFD designers validate their initial DFDs and detect common security design flaws in them. An evaluation of the approach on subsystems from production code showed that it can find omitted or outdated information in existing DFDs.

Threat modeling analyzes how an adversary might attack a system by supplying it with malicious data or interacting with it. The analysis uses a Data Flow Diagram (DFD to describe how data moves through a system. Today, DFDs are represented informally, reviewed manually with security domain experts and may not reflect all the entry points in the implementation. We designed an approach to check the conformance of an implementation with its security architecture. We extended Reflexion Models to compare as-built DFD recovered from the implementation and the as-designed DFD, by increasing its automation and thus its adoptability. We also designed an analysis to assist DFD designers validate their initial DFDs and detect common security design flaws in them. An evaluation of the approach on subsystems from production code showed that it can find omitted or outdated information in existing DFDs.

Another talk from the Clean Insights Symposium Extraordinaire.... remember, when it comes to implement measurement and analytics YOU ARE THE ADVERSARY! Nathan (n8fr8) talks through all the ways you can fail your users if you instrument their activity too much, or don't take care of the resulting data. Learn more at https://cleaninsights.org/event

Threat modelling is one of the best techniques for achieving security on architectural level. However, introducing it on existing complex projects requires time which developers may not have. This talk introduces a technique for performing threat modelling in ongoing projects without a prohibitive initial time investment. - Managed by the official OWASP Media Project https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Media_Project Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WePVoeYrhpg Uploader: OWASP

The notion of a digital twin, which acts as a simulated counterpart to real-world systems, is revolutionizing secure system design within the automotive sector. As contemporary vehicles become more dependent on interconnected electronic systems, the likelihood of cyber threats is escalating. This comprehensive literature review seeks to analyze existing research on threat modeling and security testing in automotive digital twins, aiming to pinpoint emerging patterns, evaluate current approaches, and identify future research avenues. This review addresses three principal research queries: (1) How can threats to automotive digital twins be identified and evaluated? (2) What methodologies are currently employed for threat modeling regarding vehicle digital twins? and (3) What are the most effective techniques for validating threat models and examining attacks? Utilizing a thorough screening process aligned with the PRISMA framework, 23 highly pertinent studies have been chosen from an initial set of 882 publications, assessing contemporary threat modeling methodologies, validation practices, and security testing strategies for automotive digital twins.The findings expose significant deficiencies in the strength and validation of threat models, highlighting the necessity for innovative security measures.This paper offers foundational perspectives on the protection of digital twin technologies, stressing the significance of more sophisticated threat modeling and validation methods that guarantee the safety and security of connected automobiles.

The mobile-based service complaint application is one way to implement good governance today. Public facilitated to make complaints without going through a complicated process. Security aspects must be considered to protect user privacy. The security design must be considered so that no one is harmed by the application's users damaged in the application's use. This study used threat modeling during the planning stage of developing a citizen service complaint application to obtain information about vulnerabilities. The researcher uses the threat modeling process that the open web application security project (OWASP) organization has formulated as a framework. The researchers took steps to describe application information, determine and rank threats, countermeasures, and mitigation. In the final stage, the spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service and elevation of privilege (STRIDE) threat modeling methodology is used to analyze and assess mitigation actions against threats in the application. The researcher gets a defense strategy to reduce the danger based on the threat analysis results. Threat modeling in the early phase software development life cycle process is constructive in ensuring that software is developed with adequate security based on threat mitigation from the beginning.

The mobile-based service complaint application is one way to implement good governance today. Public facilitated to make complaints without going through a complicated process. Security aspects must be considered to protect user privacy. The security design must be considered so that no one is harmed by the application's users damaged in the application's use. This study used threat modeling during the planning stage of developing a citizen service complaint application to obtain information about vulnerabilities. The researcher uses the threat modeling process that the open web application security project (OWASP) organization has formulated as a framework. The researchers took steps to describe application information, determine and rank threats, countermeasures, and mitigation. In the final stage, the spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service and elevation of privilege (STRIDE) threat modeling methodology is used to analyze and assess mitigation actions against threats in the application. The researcher gets a defense strategy to reduce the danger based on the threat analysis results. Threat modeling in the early phase software development life cycle process is constructive in ensuring that software is developed with adequate security based on threat mitigation from the beginning.

The mobile-based service complaint application is one way to implement good governance today. Public facilitated to make complaints without going through a complicated process. Security aspects must be considered to protect user privacy. The security design must be considered so that no one is harmed by the application's users damaged in the application's use. This study used threat modeling during the planning stage of developing a citizen service complaint application to obtain information about vulnerabilities. The researcher uses the threat modeling process that the open web application security project (OWASP) organization has formulated as a framework. The researchers took steps to describe application information, determine and rank threats, countermeasures, and mitigation. In the final stage, the spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service and elevation of privilege (STRIDE) threat modeling methodology is used to analyze and assess mitigation actions against threats in the application. The researcher gets a defense strategy to reduce the danger based on the threat analysis results. Threat modeling in the early phase software development life cycle process is constructive in ensuring that software is developed with adequate security based on threat mitigation from the beginning.

https://indieweb.org/2024/Berlin/threat-modeling