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46 p. 24 cm

46 p. 24 cm

Tom Wolfe is widely regarded as the leading theorist and practitioner of New Journalism, the journalistic genre that combines the stylistic features of fiction and the reportorial obligations of journalism to produce a "novelistic sounding" but nonetheless factual literature. The saliency of Wolfe's stylistic boldness has prompted many to conclude that the absorbing, convincing quality of Wolfe's work is owed primarily to his unique and innovative stylistic techniques. But Wolfe is more than just a clever stylist; his essays reveal a carefully crafted argument through which he constructs an appealing rhetorical reality wherein there are simple, absolute, almost hilariously obvious explanations for everything. The rhetorical vision is architecturally achieved by Wolfe's reliance on (1) analogy and metaphor, (2) single causality, and (3) hyperbolic "put-on." (The major portions of the paper analyzes Wolfe's usage of these three devices in terms of its persuasive impact, philosophical dimensions, and journalistic implications.) (Author/GW)

Tom Wolfe is widely regarded as the leading theorist and practitioner of New Journalism, the journalistic genre that combines the stylistic features of fiction and the reportorial obligations of journalism to produce a "novelistic sounding" but nonetheless factual literature. The saliency of Wolfe's stylistic boldness has prompted many to conclude that the absorbing, convincing quality of Wolfe's work is owed primarily to his unique and innovative stylistic techniques. But Wolfe is more than just a clever stylist; his essays reveal a carefully crafted argument through which he constructs an appealing rhetorical reality wherein there are simple, absolute, almost hilariously obvious explanations for everything. The rhetorical vision is architecturally achieved by Wolfe's reliance on (1) analogy and metaphor, (2) single causality, and (3) hyperbolic "put-on." (The major portions of the paper analyzes Wolfe's usage of these three devices in terms of its persuasive impact, philosophical dimensions, and journalistic implications.) (Author/GW)

Introduction 1 I. Fields of Argument and Modals 11 The Phases of an Argument 15 Impossibilities and Improprieties 21 Force and Criteria 28 The Field-Dependence of Our Standards 33 Questions for the Agenda 36 II. Probability 41 I Know, I Promise, Probably 44 ‘Improbable But True’ 49 Improper Claims and Mistaken Claims 53 The Labyrinth of Probability 57 Probability and Expectation 61 Probability-Relations and Probabilification 66 Is the Word ‘Probability’ Ambiguous? 69 Probability-Theory and Psychology 77 The Development of Our Probability-Concepts 82 III. The Layout of Arguments 87 The Pattern of an Argument: Data and Warrants 89 The Pattern of an Argument: Backing Our Warrants 95 Ambiguities in the Syllogism 100 The Notion of ‘Universal Premisses’ 105 The Notion of Formal Validity 110 and more

Introduction 1 I. Fields of Argument and Modals 11 The Phases of an Argument 15 Impossibilities and Improprieties 21 Force and Criteria 28 The Field-Dependence of Our Standards 33 Questions for the Agenda 36 II. Probability 41 I Know, I Promise, Probably 44 ‘Improbable But True’ 49 Improper Claims and Mistaken Claims 53 The Labyrinth of Probability 57 Probability and Expectation 61 Probability-Relations and Probabilification 66 Is the Word ‘Probability’ Ambiguous? 69 Probability-Theory and Psychology 77 The Development of Our Probability-Concepts 82 III. The Layout of Arguments 87 The Pattern of an Argument: Data and Warrants 89 The Pattern of an Argument: Backing Our Warrants 95 Ambiguities in the Syllogism 100 The Notion of ‘Universal Premisses’ 105 The Notion of Formal Validity 110 and more

Introduction 1 I. Fields of Argument and Modals 11 The Phases of an Argument 15 Impossibilities and Improprieties 21 Force and Criteria 28 The Field-Dependence of Our Standards 33 Questions for the Agenda 36 II. Probability 41 I Know, I Promise, Probably 44 ‘Improbable But True’ 49 Improper Claims and Mistaken Claims 53 The Labyrinth of Probability 57 Probability and Expectation 61 Probability-Relations and Probabilification 66 Is the Word ‘Probability’ Ambiguous? 69 Probability-Theory and Psychology 77 The Development of Our Probability-Concepts 82 III. The Layout of Arguments 87 The Pattern of an Argument: Data and Warrants 89 The Pattern of an Argument: Backing Our Warrants 95 Ambiguities in the Syllogism 100 The Notion of ‘Universal Premisses’ 105 The Notion of Formal Validity 110 and more

Introduction 1 I. Fields of Argument and Modals 11 The Phases of an Argument 15 Impossibilities and Improprieties 21 Force and Criteria 28 The Field-Dependence of Our Standards 33 Questions for the Agenda 36 II. Probability 41 I Know, I Promise, Probably 44 ‘Improbable But True’ 49 Improper Claims and Mistaken Claims 53 The Labyrinth of Probability 57 Probability and Expectation 61 Probability-Relations and Probabilification 66 Is the Word ‘Probability’ Ambiguous? 69 Probability-Theory and Psychology 77 The Development of Our Probability-Concepts 82 III. The Layout of Arguments 87 The Pattern of an Argument: Data and Warrants 89 The Pattern of an Argument: Backing Our Warrants 95 Ambiguities in the Syllogism 100 The Notion of ‘Universal Premisses’ 105 The Notion of Formal Validity 110 and more

Stephen Toulmin once observed that `it has never been customary for philosophers to pay much attention to the rhetoric of mathematical debate'. Might the application of Toulmin's layout of arguments to mathematics remedy this oversight? Toulmin's critics fault the layout as requiring so much abstraction as to permit incompatible reconstructions. Mathematical proofs may indeed be represented by fundamentally distinct layouts. However, cases of genuine conflict characteristically reflect an underlying disagreement about the nature of the proof in question.

Book digitized by Google from the library of Harvard University and uploaded to the Internet Archive by user tpb.