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C T h " L . u s ! " f r. Ll Approved For Release : CIA 78-01 I A000200400004-8 CO ALA :v ember 1948 ,TrE46 s in the Soviet Union. Euro and, Ntnohur.U summYl The 1948 breadgrain (wheat and ryu) harvest in the soviet Te ion and in the Eastern European Area under soviet domination is eet tnated at 720l million metric tonst or an increase of 11.4 million tons (19 percent) above the 60,7 million tons produced in 1947, but Baas only 85 Tee-cent of average production during the pre r period 1935-1939, Bre&.dJ a, production in Western Continental Europe (w-03.u ng Spain and ?ortugl) during 1948 is est ted at 25.5 million metric tons,, or an increase of 8,4 million tons (49 percent) above the 17,1 million tons pro uced in 1947, a was 93 percent of average production during the 1935-39 pre. war period. The relatively larger increase in production during 194 in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe was attributable in part to more favOra . a weather conditions in the West, I World tweaadgrain production in 1949 is eeti. ted at 213.0 million metric tone which is about 11 percent mater than the 1947 production of 191-4 million metric tons and, about 3 percent greater than average prey duo tion of 206.3 million tons during 3-9.15-09. The world exportable surplus of breadins in 19449 is expected to equal approx3ately 194748 mcporta of 26?6 mMion metric tons which com- pares with 21.0 million tons in 19,46-47 and an average of 15.9 million tons in prewar years, Continuing high import , requirements are needed in rduw areas to increase broad rations to improve: the c;,u3. ,tSr of bread,, and to provide for building up seriously depleted st

C T h " L . u s ! " f r. Ll Approved For Release : CIA 78-01 I A000200400004-8 CO ALA :v ember 1948 ,TrE46 s in the Soviet Union. Euro and, Ntnohur.U summYl The 1948 breadgrain (wheat and ryu) harvest in the soviet Te ion and in the Eastern European Area under soviet domination is eet tnated at 720l million metric tonst or an increase of 11.4 million tons (19 percent) above the 60,7 million tons produced in 1947, but Baas only 85 Tee-cent of average production during the pre r period 1935-1939, Bre&.dJ a, production in Western Continental Europe (w-03.u ng Spain and ?ortugl) during 1948 is est ted at 25.5 million metric tons,, or an increase of 8,4 million tons (49 percent) above the 17,1 million tons pro uced in 1947, a was 93 percent of average production during the 1935-39 pre. war period. The relatively larger increase in production during 194 in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe was attributable in part to more favOra . a weather conditions in the West, I World tweaadgrain production in 1949 is eeti. ted at 213.0 million metric tone which is about 11 percent mater than the 1947 production of 191-4 million metric tons and, about 3 percent greater than average prey duo tion of 206.3 million tons during 3-9.15-09. The world exportable surplus of breadins in 19449 is expected to equal approx3ately 194748 mcporta of 26?6 mMion metric tons which com- pares with 21.0 million tons in 19,46-47 and an average of 15.9 million tons in prewar years, Continuing high import , requirements are needed in rduw areas to increase broad rations to improve: the c;,u3. ,tSr of bread,, and to provide for building up seriously depleted st

C T h " L . u s ! " f r. Ll Approved For Release : CIA 78-01 I A000200400004-8 CO ALA :v ember 1948 ,TrE46 s in the Soviet Union. Euro and, Ntnohur.U summYl The 1948 breadgrain (wheat and ryu) harvest in the soviet Te ion and in the Eastern European Area under soviet domination is eet tnated at 720l million metric tonst or an increase of 11.4 million tons (19 percent) above the 60,7 million tons produced in 1947, but Baas only 85 Tee-cent of average production during the pre r period 1935-1939, Bre&.dJ a, production in Western Continental Europe (w-03.u ng Spain and ?ortugl) during 1948 is est ted at 25.5 million metric tons,, or an increase of 8,4 million tons (49 percent) above the 17,1 million tons pro uced in 1947, a was 93 percent of average production during the 1935-39 pre. war period. The relatively larger increase in production during 194 in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe was attributable in part to more favOra . a weather conditions in the West, I World tweaadgrain production in 1949 is eeti. ted at 213.0 million metric tone which is about 11 percent mater than the 1947 production of 191-4 million metric tons and, about 3 percent greater than average prey duo tion of 206.3 million tons during 3-9.15-09. The world exportable surplus of breadins in 19449 is expected to equal approx3ately 194748 mcporta of 26?6 mMion metric tons which com- pares with 21.0 million tons in 19,46-47 and an average of 15.9 million tons in prewar years, Continuing high import , requirements are needed in rduw areas to increase broad rations to improve: the c;,u3. ,tSr of bread,, and to provide for building up seriously depleted st

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/18: CIA-RDP88B00527R000100030004-4 24 January 1985 OLL 85-0120/1 SUBJECT: Briefing for House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 0 1. On 24 January 1985 at 1000 hours in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East was briefed on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Security was present and a transcript was taken. The briefing was Lee H. Hamilton (D., IN), Chairman Larry Smith (D., FL) Harry M. Reid (D., NV) Ed Zschau (R., CA) Michael Van Dusen, Staff Director Christopher Kojm Everett Bierman, Minority Staff Director Richard Garron Douglas MacEachin Director, Office of Soviet Analysis/DI Chief, East European Division, Office of European Analysis/DI Chief, Policy Analysis Division, Office of Soviet Analysis/DI Chief, Soviet Economy Division Office of Soviet Analysis Deputy Chief, Liaison Division, OLL 5. Mr. MacEachin and presented overviews of their respective areas, text attached. Each Member was also given a package of graphics to accompany the briefing, copies attached. The atmosphere was cordial and the Members were attentive and actively engaged in questioning. The briefing lasted about two hours, with the question answer period consuming well over hal Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/18: CIA-RDP88B00527R000100030004-4 C Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/18: CIA-RDP88B00527R000100030004-4 9. There is no follow-up from the briefing. Mr. Van Dusen, the Subcommittee Staff Director, subsequently informed me that Chairman Hamilton had commented that he found the briefing unusually useful. He said, "Lee really learned a lot." I note that such a comment from staff is highly unusual Deputy Chief, Liaison Division Chief, Liaison Division Distribution: Orig - OLL Record (w/att) 1 - OLL Chrono (wo/att) 1 - D/SOVA/DI (wo/att) 1 - C/EE/OEA/DI (wo/att) 1 - DDI (wo/att) 1 - A/DDI /att) OLL/LD (25 Jan 85) SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/18: CIA-RDP88B00527R000100030004-4

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/18: CIA-RDP88B00527R000100030004-4 24 January 1985 OLL 85-0120/1 SUBJECT: Briefing for House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 0 1. On 24 January 1985 at 1000 hours in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East was briefed on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Security was present and a transcript was taken. The briefing was Lee H. Hamilton (D., IN), Chairman Larry Smith (D., FL) Harry M. Reid (D., NV) Ed Zschau (R., CA) Michael Van Dusen, Staff Director Christopher Kojm Everett Bierman, Minority Staff Director Richard Garron Douglas MacEachin Director, Office of Soviet Analysis/DI Chief, East European Division, Office of European Analysis/DI Chief, Policy Analysis Division, Office of Soviet Analysis/DI Chief, Soviet Economy Division Office of Soviet Analysis Deputy Chief, Liaison Division, OLL 5. Mr. MacEachin and presented overviews of their respective areas, text attached. Each Member was also given a package of graphics to accompany the briefing, copies attached. The atmosphere was cordial and the Members were attentive and actively engaged in questioning. The briefing lasted about two hours, with the question answer period consuming well over hal Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/18: CIA-RDP88B00527R000100030004-4 C Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/18: CIA-RDP88B00527R000100030004-4 9. There is no follow-up from the briefing. Mr. Van Dusen, the Subcommittee Staff Director, subsequently informed me that Chairman Hamilton had commented that he found the briefing unusually useful. He said, "Lee really learned a lot." I note that such a comment from staff is highly unusual Deputy Chief, Liaison Division Chief, Liaison Division Distribution: Orig - OLL Record (w/att) 1 - OLL Chrono (wo/att) 1 - D/SOVA/DI (wo/att) 1 - C/EE/OEA/DI (wo/att) 1 - DDI (wo/att) 1 - A/DDI /att) OLL/LD (25 Jan 85) SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/18: CIA-RDP88B00527R000100030004-4

This report explores the roots of Turkey's eastern orientation and the prospects for Turkish relations with the Middle East and former Soviet Union. The study finds that although Turkey has for years been at the geopolitical tail-end of Europe, it is now in the center of a newly emerging world. New relations to the south, east, and north are becoming increasingly vital to Ankara's interests. The study also finds that because U.S. interests in the region are less important with the end of the Cold War, U.S. influence over Turkey will probably be less. Still, the study recommends that because of the constructive role Turkey can play in the region, Turkey should be tied closely to the European Community and that effort should be taken to prevent a wall from emerging between Christian Europe and a Muslim Middle East--a wall that could intensify a North-South struggle in the decades ahead.

This report explores the roots of Turkey's eastern orientation and the prospects for Turkish relations with the Middle East and former Soviet Union. The study finds that although Turkey has for years been at the geopolitical tail-end of Europe, it is now in the center of a newly emerging world. New relations to the south, east, and north are becoming increasingly vital to Ankara's interests. The study also finds that because U.S. interests in the region are less important with the end of the Cold War, U.S. influence over Turkey will probably be less. Still, the study recommends that because of the constructive role Turkey can play in the region, Turkey should be tied closely to the European Community and that effort should be taken to prevent a wall from emerging between Christian Europe and a Muslim Middle East--a wall that could intensify a North-South struggle in the decades ahead.

This report explores the roots of Turkey's eastern orientation and the prospects for Turkish relations with the Middle East and former Soviet Union. The study finds that although Turkey has for years been at the geopolitical tail-end of Europe, it is now in the center of a newly emerging world. New relations to the south, east, and north are becoming increasingly vital to Ankara's interests. The study also finds that because U.S. interests in the region are less important with the end of the Cold War, U.S. influence over Turkey will probably be less. Still, the study recommends that because of the constructive role Turkey can play in the region, Turkey should be tied closely to the European Community and that effort should be taken to prevent a wall from emerging between Christian Europe and a Muslim Middle East--a wall that could intensify a North-South struggle in the decades ahead.

This report explores the roots of Turkey's eastern orientation and the prospects for Turkish relations with the Middle East and former Soviet Union. The study finds that although Turkey has for years been at the geopolitical tail-end of Europe, it is now in the center of a newly emerging world. New relations to the south, east, and north are becoming increasingly vital to Ankara's interests. The study also finds that because U.S. interests in the region are less important with the end of the Cold War, U.S. influence over Turkey will probably be less. Still, the study recommends that because of the constructive role Turkey can play in the region, Turkey should be tied closely to the European Community and that effort should be taken to prevent a wall from emerging between Christian Europe and a Muslim Middle East--a wall that could intensify a North-South struggle in the decades ahead.

This report explores the roots of Turkey's eastern orientation and the prospects for Turkish relations with the Middle East and former Soviet Union. The study finds that although Turkey has for years been at the geopolitical tail-end of Europe, it is now in the center of a newly emerging world. New relations to the south, east, and north are becoming increasingly vital to Ankara's interests. The study also finds that because U.S. interests in the region are less important with the end of the Cold War, U.S. influence over Turkey will probably be less. Still, the study recommends that because of the constructive role Turkey can play in the region, Turkey should be tied closely to the European Community and that effort should be taken to prevent a wall from emerging between Christian Europe and a Muslim Middle East--a wall that could intensify a North-South struggle in the decades ahead.

This report explores the roots of Turkey's eastern orientation and the prospects for Turkish relations with the Middle East and former Soviet Union. The study finds that although Turkey has for years been at the geopolitical tail-end of Europe, it is now in the center of a newly emerging world. New relations to the south, east, and north are becoming increasingly vital to Ankara's interests. The study also finds that because U.S. interests in the region are less important with the end of the Cold War, U.S. influence over Turkey will probably be less. Still, the study recommends that because of the constructive role Turkey can play in the region, Turkey should be tied closely to the European Community and that effort should be taken to prevent a wall from emerging between Christian Europe and a Muslim Middle East--a wall that could intensify a North-South struggle in the decades ahead.

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/24: CIA-RDP87M01152R000500620025-7 gFA C. 24 January 1985 SUBJECT: Briefing for House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 1. On 24 January 1985 at 1000 hours in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East was briefed on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Security was present and a transcript was taken. The briefing was 2. Present from the Subcommittee were: Lee H. Hamilton (D., IN), Chairman Larry Smith (D., FL) Harry M. Reid (D., NV) Ed Zschau (R., CA) 3. Present from the Subcommittee staff were: Michael Van Dusen, Staff Director Christopher Kojm Everett Bierman, Minority Staff Director Richard Garron Director, Office of Soviet Analysis/DI Chief, East European Division, Office of European Analysis/DI Chief, Policy Analysis Division, Office of Soviet Analysis/DI Chief, Soviet Economy Division Office of Soviet Analysis Deputy Chief, Liaison Division, OLL 5. Mr. MacEachin an presented overviews of their respective areas, text attached. Each Member was also given a package of graphics to accompany the briefing, copies attached. The atmosphere was cordial and the Members were attentive and actively engaged in questioning. The briefing lasted about two hours, with the question and answer period consuming well over half of the time. SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/24: CIA-RDP87M01152R000500620025-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/24: CIA-RDP87MO1152R000500620025-7 SECRET 9. There is no follow-up from the briefing. Mr. Van Dusen, the Subcommittee Staff Director, subsequently informed me that Chairman Hamilton had commented that he found the briefing unusually useful. He said, "Lee really d a lot." T nn1-c that ciir.h A r-nmmant from --taff i.-- highly unusual Dep Chief, Liaison Division SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/24: CIA-RDP87MO1152R000500620025-7

STANDARD FORM NO. 84 ` t l Sanitized - Ap~,ved For Releas e ? A-RDP78-~617A O~ce Meynorandu7n UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Assistant Director, ORE DATE: ~-~'~' December 19+8 FROM Acting Chief, Economics Group, ORE SUBJECT: Breadgra.ins in the Soviet Union, Europe, Middle East, and r~_anchuria 1, Attached is a proposed intelligence memorandum which gives a preliminary appr~~.isal of the 19~F8-~~ breadgrain situation in the Savict tTnion, Europe, diddle East, and ~'~anchuria indicating the compe.rative sup~leT position of the area under Soviet domination in comparison with Western Europe and the Diddle East. 'Ihe Ig~+~-~ situation is also compered with that of 19+7-~5 and'nrewar yes.rs. 2, The data for 1~~+8-~q are based on eerly estim=~:.tes of the 1g~FS breadgrain ha.rvevt a.nd twill be subject to same revision as more recent information becar~es available. It is planned to revise these estimates a,t a later date and expand the statement to inclu~.e-tarn, "barley and oats at which time the complete analysis will be submitted as an ORE report. j, Even though the 1g~S-~~ estim..ates are preliminary, they are timely and have significance in assessing the strate?ric food position in the above areas. It is suggested that copies of this memorandum be distributed to the ,unit ions I3o~>,rd, Department of the Army (G-2) , Department of State (OIR) and the following Regional Branches within ORE: Eastern Europe, ~rTestern Europe, Far ;fast, and Near East-Africa. 25X1A9a I~ncl: Breadgrain intelligence memo, Sanitized -Approved For Release :CIA-RDP78-01617A000200400009-3

STANDARD FORM NO. 84 ` t l Sanitized - Ap~,ved For Releas e ? A-RDP78-~617A O~ce Meynorandu7n UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Assistant Director, ORE DATE: ~-~'~' December 19+8 FROM Acting Chief, Economics Group, ORE SUBJECT: Breadgra.ins in the Soviet Union, Europe, Middle East, and r~_anchuria 1, Attached is a proposed intelligence memorandum which gives a preliminary appr~~.isal of the 19~F8-~~ breadgrain situation in the Savict tTnion, Europe, diddle East, and ~'~anchuria indicating the compe.rative sup~leT position of the area under Soviet domination in comparison with Western Europe and the Diddle East. 'Ihe Ig~+~-~ situation is also compered with that of 19+7-~5 and'nrewar yes.rs. 2, The data for 1~~+8-~q are based on eerly estim=~:.tes of the 1g~FS breadgrain ha.rvevt a.nd twill be subject to same revision as more recent information becar~es available. It is planned to revise these estimates a,t a later date and expand the statement to inclu~.e-tarn, "barley and oats at which time the complete analysis will be submitted as an ORE report. j, Even though the 1g~S-~~ estim..ates are preliminary, they are timely and have significance in assessing the strate?ric food position in the above areas. It is suggested that copies of this memorandum be distributed to the ,unit ions I3o~>,rd, Department of the Army (G-2) , Department of State (OIR) and the following Regional Branches within ORE: Eastern Europe, ~rTestern Europe, Far ;fast, and Near East-Africa. 25X1A9a I~ncl: Breadgrain intelligence memo, Sanitized -Approved For Release :CIA-RDP78-01617A000200400009-3

STANDARD FORM NO. 84 ` t l Sanitized - Ap~,ved For Releas e ? A-RDP78-~617A O~ce Meynorandu7n UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Assistant Director, ORE DATE: ~-~'~' December 19+8 FROM Acting Chief, Economics Group, ORE SUBJECT: Breadgra.ins in the Soviet Union, Europe, Middle East, and r~_anchuria 1, Attached is a proposed intelligence memorandum which gives a preliminary appr~~.isal of the 19~F8-~~ breadgrain situation in the Savict tTnion, Europe, diddle East, and ~'~anchuria indicating the compe.rative sup~leT position of the area under Soviet domination in comparison with Western Europe and the Diddle East. 'Ihe Ig~+~-~ situation is also compered with that of 19+7-~5 and'nrewar yes.rs. 2, The data for 1~~+8-~q are based on eerly estim=~:.tes of the 1g~FS breadgrain ha.rvevt a.nd twill be subject to same revision as more recent information becar~es available. It is planned to revise these estimates a,t a later date and expand the statement to inclu~.e-tarn, "barley and oats at which time the complete analysis will be submitted as an ORE report. j, Even though the 1g~S-~~ estim..ates are preliminary, they are timely and have significance in assessing the strate?ric food position in the above areas. It is suggested that copies of this memorandum be distributed to the ,unit ions I3o~>,rd, Department of the Army (G-2) , Department of State (OIR) and the following Regional Branches within ORE: Eastern Europe, ~rTestern Europe, Far ;fast, and Near East-Africa. 25X1A9a I~ncl: Breadgrain intelligence memo, Sanitized -Approved For Release :CIA-RDP78-01617A000200400009-3

Document number CIA-RDP87M01152R000500620025-7 declassified and released through the CIA's CREST database. Previously available only on four computers located outside of Washington D.C., the Agency was successfully pressured into putting the files online as a result of a MuckRock lawsuit and the efforts of Emma Best. The metadata was collected by Data.World, and the files are now being archived and made text searchable by the Internet Archive.