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Input/Output is the mechanisms through which embedded systems interact and control the outside world. Particularly when employed in mission critical systems, the I/O of embedded systems has to be both reliable and secure. Embedded system’s I/O is controlled by a pin based approach. In this work, we investigate the security implications of embedded system’s pin control. In particular, we show how an attacker can tamper with the integrity and availability of an embedded system’s I/O by exploiting cerain pin control operations and the lack of hardware interrupts associated to them.

Input/Output is the mechanisms through which embedded systems interact and control the outside world. Particularly when employed in mission critical systems, the I/O of embedded systems has to be both reliable and secure. Embedded system’s I/O is controlled by a pin based approach. In this work, we investigate the security implications of embedded system’s pin control. In particular, we show how an attacker can tamper with the integrity and availability of an embedded system’s I/O by exploiting cerain pin control operations and the lack of hardware interrupts associated to them.

Input/Output is the mechanisms through which embedded systems interact and control the outside world. Particularly when employed in mission critical systems, the I/O of embedded systems has to be both reliable and secure. Embedded system’s I/O is controlled by a pin based approach. In this work, we investigate the security implications of embedded system’s pin control. In particular, we show how an attacker can tamper with the integrity and availability of an embedded system’s I/O by exploiting cerain pin control operations and the lack of hardware interrupts associated to them.

Input/Output is the mechanisms through which embedded systems interact and control the outside world. Particularly when employed in mission critical systems, the I/O of embedded systems has to be both reliable and secure. Embedded system’s I/O is controlled by a pin based approach. In this work, we investigate the security implications of embedded system’s pin control. In particular, we show how an attacker can tamper with the integrity and availability of an embedded system’s I/O by exploiting cerain pin control operations and the lack of hardware interrupts associated to them.

Input/Output is the mechanisms through which embedded systems interact and control the outside world. Particularly when employed in mission critical systems, the I/O of embedded systems has to be both reliable and secure. Embedded system’s I/O is controlled by a pin based approach. In this work, we investigate the security implications of embedded system’s pin control. In particular, we show how an attacker can tamper with the integrity and availability of an embedded system’s I/O by exploiting cerain pin control operations and the lack of hardware interrupts associated to them.

Input/Output is the mechanisms through which embedded systems interact and control the outside world. Particularly when employed in mission critical systems, the I/O of embedded systems has to be both reliable and secure. Embedded system’s I/O is controlled by a pin based approach. In this work, we investigate the security implications of embedded system’s pin control. In particular, we show how an attacker can tamper with the integrity and availability of an embedded system’s I/O by exploiting cerain pin control operations and the lack of hardware interrupts associated to them.

Input/Output is the mechanisms through which embedded systems interact and control the outside world. Particularly when employed in mission critical systems, the I/O of embedded systems has to be both reliable and secure. Embedded system’s I/O is controlled by a pin based approach. In this work, we investigate the security implications of embedded system’s pin control. In particular, we show how an attacker can tamper with the integrity and availability of an embedded system’s I/O by exploiting cerain pin control operations and the lack of hardware interrupts associated to them.

Input/Output is the mechanisms through which embedded systems interact and control the outside world. Particularly when employed in mission critical systems, the I/O of embedded systems has to be both reliable and secure. Embedded system’s I/O is controlled by a pin based approach. In this work, we investigate the security implications of embedded system’s pin control. In particular, we show how an attacker can tamper with the integrity and availability of an embedded system’s I/O by exploiting cerain pin control operations and the lack of hardware interrupts associated to them.

This paper provides both Theory and Practical of Programmable logic controller (PLC) in Automation engineering. According to various manufacturing company, the nature and useful area of PLC may be different and this paper mainly supports step by step approaching methods to be familiar with what is PLC and how PLC work. Automation purpose is the main application of PLC and the programmers or control supervisors will be able to learn easily with the four levels or steps that perform in this paper. Dr. Wai Phyo Aung"Guidelines for Approching Steps of Learning Programmable Logic Controllers in Automation" Published in International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (ijtsrd), ISSN: 2456-6470, Volume-2 | Issue-4 , June 2018, URL: http://www.ijtsrd.com/papers/ijtsrd15743.pdf http://www.ijtsrd.com/engineering/electronics-and-communication-engineering/15743/guidelines-for-approching-steps-of-learning-programmable-logic-controllers-in-automation/dr-wai-phyo-aung

This paper provides both Theory and Practical of Programmable logic controller (PLC) in Automation engineering. According to various manufacturing company, the nature and useful area of PLC may be different and this paper mainly supports step by step approaching methods to be familiar with what is PLC and how PLC work. Automation purpose is the main application of PLC and the programmers or control supervisors will be able to learn easily with the four levels or steps that perform in this paper. Dr. Wai Phyo Aung"Guidelines for Approching Steps of Learning Programmable Logic Controllers in Automation" Published in International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (ijtsrd), ISSN: 2456-6470, Volume-2 | Issue-4 , June 2018, URL: http://www.ijtsrd.com/papers/ijtsrd15743.pdf http://www.ijtsrd.com/engineering/electronics-and-communication-engineering/15743/guidelines-for-approching-steps-of-learning-programmable-logic-controllers-in-automation/dr-wai-phyo-aung

This paper provides both Theory and Practical of Programmable logic controller (PLC) in Automation engineering. According to various manufacturing company, the nature and useful area of PLC may be different and this paper mainly supports step by step approaching methods to be familiar with what is PLC and how PLC work. Automation purpose is the main application of PLC and the programmers or control supervisors will be able to learn easily with the four levels or steps that perform in this paper. Dr. Wai Phyo Aung"Guidelines for Approching Steps of Learning Programmable Logic Controllers in Automation" Published in International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (ijtsrd), ISSN: 2456-6470, Volume-2 | Issue-4 , June 2018, URL: http://www.ijtsrd.com/papers/ijtsrd15743.pdf http://www.ijtsrd.com/engineering/electronics-and-communication-engineering/15743/guidelines-for-approching-steps-of-learning-programmable-logic-controllers-in-automation/dr-wai-phyo-aung

This paper provides both Theory and Practical of Programmable logic controller (PLC) in Automation engineering. According to various manufacturing company, the nature and useful area of PLC may be different and this paper mainly supports step by step approaching methods to be familiar with what is PLC and how PLC work. Automation purpose is the main application of PLC and the programmers or control supervisors will be able to learn easily with the four levels or steps that perform in this paper. Dr. Wai Phyo Aung"Guidelines for Approching Steps of Learning Programmable Logic Controllers in Automation" Published in International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (ijtsrd), ISSN: 2456-6470, Volume-2 | Issue-4 , June 2018, URL: http://www.ijtsrd.com/papers/ijtsrd15743.pdf http://www.ijtsrd.com/engineering/electronics-and-communication-engineering/15743/guidelines-for-approching-steps-of-learning-programmable-logic-controllers-in-automation/dr-wai-phyo-aung

This paper provides both Theory and Practical of Programmable logic controller (PLC) in Automation engineering. According to various manufacturing company, the nature and useful area of PLC may be different and this paper mainly supports step by step approaching methods to be familiar with what is PLC and how PLC work. Automation purpose is the main application of PLC and the programmers or control supervisors will be able to learn easily with the four levels or steps that perform in this paper. Dr. Wai Phyo Aung"Guidelines for Approching Steps of Learning Programmable Logic Controllers in Automation" Published in International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (ijtsrd), ISSN: 2456-6470, Volume-2 | Issue-4 , June 2018, URL: http://www.ijtsrd.com/papers/ijtsrd15743.pdf http://www.ijtsrd.com/engineering/electronics-and-communication-engineering/15743/guidelines-for-approching-steps-of-learning-programmable-logic-controllers-in-automation/dr-wai-phyo-aung

iv, 164 pages : 28 cm

iv, 164 pages : 28 cm

iv, 164 pages : 28 cm

iv, 164 pages : 28 cm

iv, 164 pages : 28 cm

iv, 164 pages : 28 cm

iv, 164 pages : 28 cm

iv, 164 pages : 28 cm

xii, 164 pages : 28 cm

xii, 164 pages : 28 cm

xii, 164 pages : 28 cm

xii, 164 pages : 28 cm

Much has been made of the capabilities of Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA's) in the hardware implementation of fast digital signal processing functions. Such capability also makes an FPGA a suitable platform for the digital implementation of closed loop controllers. Other researchers have implemented a variety of closed-loop digital controllers on FPGA's. Some of these controllers include the widely used Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID) controller, state space controllers, neural network and fuzzy logic based controllers. There are myriad advantages to utilizing an FPGA for discrete-time control functions which include the capability for reconfiguration when SRAM- based FPGA's are employed, fast parallel implementation of multiple control loops and implementations that can meet space level radiation tolerance requirements in a compact form-factor. Generally, a software implementation on a Digital Signal Processor (DSP) device or microcontroller is used to implement digital controllers. At Marshall Space Flight Center, the Control Electronics Group has been studying adaptive discrete-time control of motor driven actuator systems using DSP devices. While small form factor, commercial DSP devices are now available with event capture, data conversion, Pulse Width Modulated (PWM) outputs and communication peripherals, these devices are not currently available in designs and packages which meet space level radiation requirements. In general, very few DSP devices are produced that are designed to meet any level of radiation tolerance or hardness. An alternative is required for compact implementation of such functionality to withstand the harsh environment encountered on spacemap. The goal of this effort is to create a fully digital, flight ready controller design that utilizes an FPGA for implementation of signal conditioning for control feedback signals, generation of commands to the controlled system, and hardware insertion of adaptive-control algorithm approaches. Radiation tolerant FPGA's are a feasible option for reaching this goal.

Much has been made of the capabilities of FPGA's (Field Programmable Gate Arrays) in the hardware implementation of fast digital signal processing. Such capability also makes an FPGA a suitable platform for the digital implementation of closed loop controllers. Other researchers have implemented a variety of closed-loop digital controllers on FPGA's. Some of these controllers include the widely used proportional-integral-derivative (PID) controller, state space controllers, neural network and fuzzy logic based controllers. There are myriad advantages to utilizing an FPGA for discrete-time control functions which include the capability for reconfiguration when SRAM-based FPGA's are employed, fast parallel implementation of multiple control loops and implementations that can meet space level radiation tolerance requirements in a compact form-factor. Generally, a software implementation on a DSP (Digital Signal Processor) or microcontroller is used to implement digital controllers. At Marshall Space Flight Center, the Control Electronics Group has been studying adaptive discrete-time control of motor driven actuator systems using digital signal processor (DSP) devices. While small form factor, commercial DSP devices are now available with event capture, data conversion, pulse width modulated (PWM) outputs and communication peripherals, these devices are not currently available in designs and packages which meet space level radiation requirements. In general, very few DSP devices are produced that are designed to meet any level of radiation tolerance or hardness. The goal of this effort is to create a fully digital, flight ready controller design that utilizes an FPGA for implementation of signal conditioning for control feedback signals, generation of commands to the controlled system, and hardware insertion of adaptive control algorithm approaches. An alternative is required for compact implementation of such functionality to withstand the harsh environment encountered on spacecraft. Radiation tolerant FPGA's are a feasible option for reaching this goal.

/redirect?v=QYNNzxdko6I&event=video_description&q=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.ccc.de%2Fv%2F33c3-7853-do_as_i_say_not_as_i_do_stealth_modification_of_programmable_logic_controllers_i_o_by_pin_control_attack&redir_token=aVTMDo6vPogX1Z8rAgzOJuh1xxl8MTUwOTgyMzgxOUAxNTA5NzM3NDE5 Input/Output is the mechanisms through which embedded systems interact and control the outside world. Particularly when employed in mission critical systems, the I/O of embedded systems has to be both reliable and secure. Embedded system’s I/O is controlled by a pin based approach. In this work, we investigate the security implications of embedded system’s pin control. In particular, we show how an attacker can tamper with the integrity and availability of an embedded system’s I/O by exploiting cerain pin control operations and the lack of hardware interrupts associated to them. Ali Abbasi Majid Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QYNNzxdko6I Uploader: media.ccc.de

These materials were developed for a seven-unit secondary or postsecondary education course on programmable logic controllers (PLCs) that treats most of the skills needed to work effectively with PLCs as programming skills. The seven units of the course cover the following topics: fundamentals of programmable logic controllers; contracts, timers, and counters; sequencers and registers; editing and programming functions; installation and troubleshooting; types of PLCs and programming; and industrial program applications. The first section of the manual is designed to show teachers how to use the materials and includes an explanation of instructional elements; an instructional task analysis for each unit; a list of tools, equipment, and materials; and a list of 14 references. Each instructional unit includes some or all of these basic components: performance objectives; suggested activities; information sheets; transparency masters; assignment sheets; job sheets; tests; and test answers. Some elements, such as the information sheets, include photographs, diagrams, and line drawings. (CML)

Daily operations of U.S. Navy afloat and ashore systems are heavily reliant on industrial control systems (ICSs) to manage critical infrastructure services. Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are vital components in these cyber-physical systems. The industrial network protocols used to communicate between nodes in a control network are complex and vulnerable to a myriad of cyber attacks, as reported by Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team. This thesis utilizes protocol fuzz testing techniques to investigate potential vulnerabilities in the Allen-Bradley/Rockwell Automation (AB/RA) MicroLogix 1100 PLC through its implementation of EtherNet/IP, Common Industrial Protocol (CIP), and Programmable Controller Communication Commands (PCCC) communication protocols. This research also examines whether cross-generational vulnerabilities exist in the more advanced AB/RA ControlLogix 1756-L71 PLC. Our results discover several deviations from the EtherNet/IP and PCCC specifications in the MicroLogix 1100 implementation of these protocols. Additionally, we find that a recently disclosed denial-of-service vulnerability that renders the MicroLogix 1100 inoperable does not trigger a similar fault condition in the ControlLogix PLC.

Daily operations of U.S. Navy afloat and ashore systems are heavily reliant on industrial control systems (ICSs) to manage critical infrastructure services. Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are vital components in these cyber-physical systems. The industrial network protocols used to communicate between nodes in a control network are complex and vulnerable to a myriad of cyber attacks, as reported by Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team. This thesis utilizes protocol fuzz testing techniques to investigate potential vulnerabilities in the Allen-Bradley/Rockwell Automation (AB/RA) MicroLogix 1100 PLC through its implementation of EtherNet/IP, Common Industrial Protocol (CIP), and Programmable Controller Communication Commands (PCCC) communication protocols. This research also examines whether cross-generational vulnerabilities exist in the more advanced AB/RA ControlLogix 1756-L71 PLC. Our results discover several deviations from the EtherNet/IP and PCCC specifications in the MicroLogix 1100 implementation of these protocols. Additionally, we find that a recently disclosed denial-of-service vulnerability that renders the MicroLogix 1100 inoperable does not trigger a similar fault condition in the ControlLogix PLC.

Daily operations of U.S. Navy afloat and ashore systems are heavily reliant on industrial control systems (ICSs) to manage critical infrastructure services. Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are vital components in these cyber-physical systems. The industrial network protocols used to communicate between nodes in a control network are complex and vulnerable to a myriad of cyber attacks, as reported by Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team. This thesis utilizes protocol fuzz testing techniques to investigate potential vulnerabilities in the Allen-Bradley/Rockwell Automation (AB/RA) MicroLogix 1100 PLC through its implementation of EtherNet/IP, Common Industrial Protocol (CIP), and Programmable Controller Communication Commands (PCCC) communication protocols. This research also examines whether cross-generational vulnerabilities exist in the more advanced AB/RA ControlLogix 1756-L71 PLC. Our results discover several deviations from the EtherNet/IP and PCCC specifications in the MicroLogix 1100 implementation of these protocols. Additionally, we find that a recently disclosed denial-of-service vulnerability that renders the MicroLogix 1100 inoperable does not trigger a similar fault condition in the ControlLogix PLC.

Daily operations of U.S. Navy afloat and ashore systems are heavily reliant on industrial control systems (ICSs) to manage critical infrastructure services. Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are vital components in these cyber-physical systems. The industrial network protocols used to communicate between nodes in a control network are complex and vulnerable to a myriad of cyber attacks, as reported by Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team. This thesis utilizes protocol fuzz testing techniques to investigate potential vulnerabilities in the Allen-Bradley/Rockwell Automation (AB/RA) MicroLogix 1100 PLC through its implementation of EtherNet/IP, Common Industrial Protocol (CIP), and Programmable Controller Communication Commands (PCCC) communication protocols. This research also examines whether cross-generational vulnerabilities exist in the more advanced AB/RA ControlLogix 1756-L71 PLC. Our results discover several deviations from the EtherNet/IP and PCCC specifications in the MicroLogix 1100 implementation of these protocols. Additionally, we find that a recently disclosed denial-of-service vulnerability that renders the MicroLogix 1100 inoperable does not trigger a similar fault condition in the ControlLogix PLC.

Daily operations of U.S. Navy afloat and ashore systems are heavily reliant on industrial control systems (ICSs) to manage critical infrastructure services. Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are vital components in these cyber-physical systems. The industrial network protocols used to communicate between nodes in a control network are complex and vulnerable to a myriad of cyber attacks, as reported by Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team. This thesis utilizes protocol fuzz testing techniques to investigate potential vulnerabilities in the Allen-Bradley/Rockwell Automation (AB/RA) MicroLogix 1100 PLC through its implementation of EtherNet/IP, Common Industrial Protocol (CIP), and Programmable Controller Communication Commands (PCCC) communication protocols. This research also examines whether cross-generational vulnerabilities exist in the more advanced AB/RA ControlLogix 1756-L71 PLC. Our results discover several deviations from the EtherNet/IP and PCCC specifications in the MicroLogix 1100 implementation of these protocols. Additionally, we find that a recently disclosed denial-of-service vulnerability that renders the MicroLogix 1100 inoperable does not trigger a similar fault condition in the ControlLogix PLC.

Daily operations of U.S. Navy afloat and ashore systems are heavily reliant on industrial control systems (ICSs) to manage critical infrastructure services. Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are vital components in these cyber-physical systems. The industrial network protocols used to communicate between nodes in a control network are complex and vulnerable to a myriad of cyber attacks, as reported by Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team. This thesis utilizes protocol fuzz testing techniques to investigate potential vulnerabilities in the Allen-Bradley/Rockwell Automation (AB/RA) MicroLogix 1100 PLC through its implementation of EtherNet/IP, Common Industrial Protocol (CIP), and Programmable Controller Communication Commands (PCCC) communication protocols. This research also examines whether cross-generational vulnerabilities exist in the more advanced AB/RA ControlLogix 1756-L71 PLC. Our results discover several deviations from the EtherNet/IP and PCCC specifications in the MicroLogix 1100 implementation of these protocols. Additionally, we find that a recently disclosed denial-of-service vulnerability that renders the MicroLogix 1100 inoperable does not trigger a similar fault condition in the ControlLogix PLC.

Daily operations of U.S. Navy afloat and ashore systems are heavily reliant on industrial control systems (ICSs) to manage critical infrastructure services. Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are vital components in these cyber-physical systems. The industrial network protocols used to communicate between nodes in a control network are complex and vulnerable to a myriad of cyber attacks, as reported by Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team. This thesis utilizes protocol fuzz testing techniques to investigate potential vulnerabilities in the Allen-Bradley/Rockwell Automation (AB/RA) MicroLogix 1100 PLC through its implementation of EtherNet/IP, Common Industrial Protocol (CIP), and Programmable Controller Communication Commands (PCCC) communication protocols. This research also examines whether cross-generational vulnerabilities exist in the more advanced AB/RA ControlLogix 1756-L71 PLC. Our results discover several deviations from the EtherNet/IP and PCCC specifications in the MicroLogix 1100 implementation of these protocols. Additionally, we find that a recently disclosed denial-of-service vulnerability that renders the MicroLogix 1100 inoperable does not trigger a similar fault condition in the ControlLogix PLC.

Daily operations of U.S. Navy afloat and ashore systems are heavily reliant on industrial control systems (ICSs) to manage critical infrastructure services. Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are vital components in these cyber-physical systems. The industrial network protocols used to communicate between nodes in a control network are complex and vulnerable to a myriad of cyber attacks, as reported by Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team. This thesis utilizes protocol fuzz testing techniques to investigate potential vulnerabilities in the Allen-Bradley/Rockwell Automation (AB/RA) MicroLogix 1100 PLC through its implementation of EtherNet/IP, Common Industrial Protocol (CIP), and Programmable Controller Communication Commands (PCCC) communication protocols. This research also examines whether cross-generational vulnerabilities exist in the more advanced AB/RA ControlLogix 1756-L71 PLC. Our results discover several deviations from the EtherNet/IP and PCCC specifications in the MicroLogix 1100 implementation of these protocols. Additionally, we find that a recently disclosed denial-of-service vulnerability that renders the MicroLogix 1100 inoperable does not trigger a similar fault condition in the ControlLogix PLC.

Daily operations of U.S. Navy afloat and ashore systems are heavily reliant on industrial control systems (ICSs) to manage critical infrastructure services. Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are vital components in these cyber-physical systems. The industrial network protocols used to communicate between nodes in a control network are complex and vulnerable to a myriad of cyber attacks, as reported by Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team. This thesis utilizes protocol fuzz testing techniques to investigate potential vulnerabilities in the Allen-Bradley/Rockwell Automation (AB/RA) MicroLogix 1100 PLC through its implementation of EtherNet/IP, Common Industrial Protocol (CIP), and Programmable Controller Communication Commands (PCCC) communication protocols. This research also examines whether cross-generational vulnerabilities exist in the more advanced AB/RA ControlLogix 1756-L71 PLC. Our results discover several deviations from the EtherNet/IP and PCCC specifications in the MicroLogix 1100 implementation of these protocols. Additionally, we find that a recently disclosed denial-of-service vulnerability that renders the MicroLogix 1100 inoperable does not trigger a similar fault condition in the ControlLogix PLC.

Daily operations of U.S. Navy afloat and ashore systems are heavily reliant on industrial control systems (ICSs) to manage critical infrastructure services. Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are vital components in these cyber-physical systems. The industrial network protocols used to communicate between nodes in a control network are complex and vulnerable to a myriad of cyber attacks, as reported by Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team. This thesis utilizes protocol fuzz testing techniques to investigate potential vulnerabilities in the Allen-Bradley/Rockwell Automation (AB/RA) MicroLogix 1100 PLC through its implementation of EtherNet/IP, Common Industrial Protocol (CIP), and Programmable Controller Communication Commands (PCCC) communication protocols. This research also examines whether cross-generational vulnerabilities exist in the more advanced AB/RA ControlLogix 1756-L71 PLC. Our results discover several deviations from the EtherNet/IP and PCCC specifications in the MicroLogix 1100 implementation of these protocols. Additionally, we find that a recently disclosed denial-of-service vulnerability that renders the MicroLogix 1100 inoperable does not trigger a similar fault condition in the ControlLogix PLC.

Daily operations of U.S. Navy afloat and ashore systems are heavily reliant on industrial control systems (ICSs) to manage critical infrastructure services. Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are vital components in these cyber-physical systems. The industrial network protocols used to communicate between nodes in a control network are complex and vulnerable to a myriad of cyber attacks, as reported by Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team. This thesis utilizes protocol fuzz testing techniques to investigate potential vulnerabilities in the Allen-Bradley/Rockwell Automation (AB/RA) MicroLogix 1100 PLC through its implementation of EtherNet/IP, Common Industrial Protocol (CIP), and Programmable Controller Communication Commands (PCCC) communication protocols. This research also examines whether cross-generational vulnerabilities exist in the more advanced AB/RA ControlLogix 1756-L71 PLC. Our results discover several deviations from the EtherNet/IP and PCCC specifications in the MicroLogix 1100 implementation of these protocols. Additionally, we find that a recently disclosed denial-of-service vulnerability that renders the MicroLogix 1100 inoperable does not trigger a similar fault condition in the ControlLogix PLC.

Daily operations of U.S. Navy afloat and ashore systems are heavily reliant on industrial control systems (ICSs) to manage critical infrastructure services. Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are vital components in these cyber-physical systems. The industrial network protocols used to communicate between nodes in a control network are complex and vulnerable to a myriad of cyber attacks, as reported by Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team. This thesis utilizes protocol fuzz testing techniques to investigate potential vulnerabilities in the Allen-Bradley/Rockwell Automation (AB/RA) MicroLogix 1100 PLC through its implementation of EtherNet/IP, Common Industrial Protocol (CIP), and Programmable Controller Communication Commands (PCCC) communication protocols. This research also examines whether cross-generational vulnerabilities exist in the more advanced AB/RA ControlLogix 1756-L71 PLC. Our results discover several deviations from the EtherNet/IP and PCCC specifications in the MicroLogix 1100 implementation of these protocols. Additionally, we find that a recently disclosed denial-of-service vulnerability that renders the MicroLogix 1100 inoperable does not trigger a similar fault condition in the ControlLogix PLC.

Daily operations of U.S. Navy afloat and ashore systems are heavily reliant on industrial control systems (ICSs) to manage critical infrastructure services. Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are vital components in these cyber-physical systems. The industrial network protocols used to communicate between nodes in a control network are complex and vulnerable to a myriad of cyber attacks, as reported by Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team. This thesis utilizes protocol fuzz testing techniques to investigate potential vulnerabilities in the Allen-Bradley/Rockwell Automation (AB/RA) MicroLogix 1100 PLC through its implementation of EtherNet/IP, Common Industrial Protocol (CIP), and Programmable Controller Communication Commands (PCCC) communication protocols. This research also examines whether cross-generational vulnerabilities exist in the more advanced AB/RA ControlLogix 1756-L71 PLC. Our results discover several deviations from the EtherNet/IP and PCCC specifications in the MicroLogix 1100 implementation of these protocols. Additionally, we find that a recently disclosed denial-of-service vulnerability that renders the MicroLogix 1100 inoperable does not trigger a similar fault condition in the ControlLogix PLC.

/redirect?redir_token=V3nmTajsJ4o7zrboEGyw25qJq_98MTUwOTgyNTc0NEAxNTA5NzM5MzQ0&q=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.ccc.de%2Fv%2F33c3-7853-do_as_i_say_not_as_i_do_stealth_modification_of_programmable_logic_controllers_i_o_by_pin_control_attack&v=d3akQKVDLR8&event=video_description Input/Output is the mechanisms through which embedded systems interact and control the outside world. Particularly when employed in mission critical systems, the I/O of embedded systems has to be both reliable and secure. Embedded system’s I/O is controlled by a pin based approach. In this work, we investigate the security implications of embedded system’s pin control. In particular, we show how an attacker can tamper with the integrity and availability of an embedded system’s I/O by exploiting cerain pin control operations and the lack of hardware interrupts associated to them. Ali Abbasi Majid Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d3akQKVDLR8 Uploader: media.ccc.de

/redirect?redir_token=V3nmTajsJ4o7zrboEGyw25qJq_98MTUwOTgyNTc0NEAxNTA5NzM5MzQ0&q=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.ccc.de%2Fv%2F33c3-7853-do_as_i_say_not_as_i_do_stealth_modification_of_programmable_logic_controllers_i_o_by_pin_control_attack&v=d3akQKVDLR8&event=video_description Input/Output is the mechanisms through which embedded systems interact and control the outside world. Particularly when employed in mission critical systems, the I/O of embedded systems has to be both reliable and secure. Embedded system’s I/O is controlled by a pin based approach. In this work, we investigate the security implications of embedded system’s pin control. In particular, we show how an attacker can tamper with the integrity and availability of an embedded system’s I/O by exploiting cerain pin control operations and the lack of hardware interrupts associated to them. Ali Abbasi Majid Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d3akQKVDLR8 Uploader: media.ccc.de

/redirect?redir_token=V3nmTajsJ4o7zrboEGyw25qJq_98MTUwOTgyNTc0NEAxNTA5NzM5MzQ0&q=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.ccc.de%2Fv%2F33c3-7853-do_as_i_say_not_as_i_do_stealth_modification_of_programmable_logic_controllers_i_o_by_pin_control_attack&v=d3akQKVDLR8&event=video_description Input/Output is the mechanisms through which embedded systems interact and control the outside world. Particularly when employed in mission critical systems, the I/O of embedded systems has to be both reliable and secure. Embedded system’s I/O is controlled by a pin based approach. In this work, we investigate the security implications of embedded system’s pin control. In particular, we show how an attacker can tamper with the integrity and availability of an embedded system’s I/O by exploiting cerain pin control operations and the lack of hardware interrupts associated to them. Ali Abbasi Majid Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d3akQKVDLR8 Uploader: media.ccc.de

/redirect?redir_token=V3nmTajsJ4o7zrboEGyw25qJq_98MTUwOTgyNTc0NEAxNTA5NzM5MzQ0&q=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.ccc.de%2Fv%2F33c3-7853-do_as_i_say_not_as_i_do_stealth_modification_of_programmable_logic_controllers_i_o_by_pin_control_attack&v=d3akQKVDLR8&event=video_description Input/Output is the mechanisms through which embedded systems interact and control the outside world. Particularly when employed in mission critical systems, the I/O of embedded systems has to be both reliable and secure. Embedded system’s I/O is controlled by a pin based approach. In this work, we investigate the security implications of embedded system’s pin control. In particular, we show how an attacker can tamper with the integrity and availability of an embedded system’s I/O by exploiting cerain pin control operations and the lack of hardware interrupts associated to them. Ali Abbasi Majid Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d3akQKVDLR8 Uploader: media.ccc.de

/redirect?redir_token=V3nmTajsJ4o7zrboEGyw25qJq_98MTUwOTgyNTc0NEAxNTA5NzM5MzQ0&q=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.ccc.de%2Fv%2F33c3-7853-do_as_i_say_not_as_i_do_stealth_modification_of_programmable_logic_controllers_i_o_by_pin_control_attack&v=d3akQKVDLR8&event=video_description Input/Output is the mechanisms through which embedded systems interact and control the outside world. Particularly when employed in mission critical systems, the I/O of embedded systems has to be both reliable and secure. Embedded system’s I/O is controlled by a pin based approach. In this work, we investigate the security implications of embedded system’s pin control. In particular, we show how an attacker can tamper with the integrity and availability of an embedded system’s I/O by exploiting cerain pin control operations and the lack of hardware interrupts associated to them. Ali Abbasi Majid Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d3akQKVDLR8 Uploader: media.ccc.de

/redirect?redir_token=V3nmTajsJ4o7zrboEGyw25qJq_98MTUwOTgyNTc0NEAxNTA5NzM5MzQ0&q=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.ccc.de%2Fv%2F33c3-7853-do_as_i_say_not_as_i_do_stealth_modification_of_programmable_logic_controllers_i_o_by_pin_control_attack&v=d3akQKVDLR8&event=video_description Input/Output is the mechanisms through which embedded systems interact and control the outside world. Particularly when employed in mission critical systems, the I/O of embedded systems has to be both reliable and secure. Embedded system’s I/O is controlled by a pin based approach. In this work, we investigate the security implications of embedded system’s pin control. In particular, we show how an attacker can tamper with the integrity and availability of an embedded system’s I/O by exploiting cerain pin control operations and the lack of hardware interrupts associated to them. Ali Abbasi Majid Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d3akQKVDLR8 Uploader: media.ccc.de

viii, 105 pages : 28 cm

viii, 105 pages : 28 cm