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Recent work demonstrates that older adults make fewer utilitarian decisions during moral dilemmas than younger adults, and that this behavior is partially accounted for by older adults’ experience of increased negative emotion during the dilemmas, as well as, higher report of moral idealism (McNair et al., 2019). According to the dual process theory of moral decision-making, endorsing the utilitarian option during moral dilemmas involves cognitive control processes associated with the lateral prefrontal cortices that allow the individual to override their initial emotional response elicited by the dilemmas (Greene, 2007; Greene et al., 2008). As advancing age is associated with increased atrophy of lateral prefrontal cortices (Raz, 1997) and decreases in cognitive control (Hartshorne & Germine, 2015; Park, 2000), it is possible that the observed age differences in moral decision-making may reflect older adult inability to override their initial emotional response due to declines in cognitive control ability. However, it is also possible that motivation and associated emotion regulation also play a part in older adult moral decision-making. By recognizing their time to live as more limited than younger adults, older adults experience a motivational shift to focus on emotional goals, and specifically maximize positive experiences (Lang & Carstensen, 2002). This can lead to attempts to maximize social cohesion during conflict (Luong et al., 2011), and consistently engaged emotion regulation strategies are thought to account for positivity biases in attention and memory in older adults (Lang & Carstensen). In parallel to these age-related shifts in motivation, mortality salience (Tremoliere et al., 2012) and positive mood inductions (Strohminger et al., 2011; but see: Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006) are both demonstrated as shifting younger adult responses away from the utilitarian option. In this case, it is possible that motivational shifts as demarcated by a limited temporal horizon and emotion regulation strategy use, may account for age differences in moral decision-making rather than older adult declines in cognitive control. It is also possible that either age-related changes in cognitive control and/or motivation could shift moral acceptability ratings of proposed interventions during moral dilemmas. Also, to our knowledge no study has examined subjective effort when making decisions on these types of dilemmas in older and younger adults. Similar to decisions, as well as, moral acceptability ratings, age-related declines in cognitive control or motivational changes could make responses to these dilemmas more effortful for older adults compared to younger adults. Here we sought to first replicate previous work (McNair et al., 2019) demonstrating that compared to younger adults, older adults endorse fewer utilitarian decisions and generally rate the utilitarian option as less morally acceptable. We also sought to examine the relationship between advancing age and responses to moral dilemmas, moral acceptability of proposed interventions, and subjective effort during dilemmas. Next we sought to determine whether age-related declines in working memory performance or age-related shifts in motivation mediate the relationship between age on moral decision-making, moral acceptability ratings of proposed interventions, and subjective effort during the task.

Recent work demonstrates that older adults make fewer utilitarian decisions during moral dilemmas than younger adults, and that this behavior is partially accounted for by older adults’ experience of increased negative emotion during the dilemmas, as well as, higher report of moral idealism (McNair et al., 2019). According to the dual process theory of moral decision-making, endorsing the utilitarian option during moral dilemmas involves cognitive control processes associated with the lateral prefrontal cortices that allow the individual to override their initial emotional response elicited by the dilemmas (Greene, 2007; Greene et al., 2008). As advancing age is associated with increased atrophy of lateral prefrontal cortices (Raz, 1997) and decreases in cognitive control (Hartshorne & Germine, 2015; Park, 2000), it is possible that the observed age differences in moral decision-making may reflect older adult inability to override their initial emotional response due to declines in cognitive control ability. However, it is also possible that motivation and associated emotion regulation also play a part in older adult moral decision-making. By recognizing their time to live as more limited than younger adults, older adults experience a motivational shift to focus on emotional goals, and specifically maximize positive experiences (Lang & Carstensen, 2002). This can lead to attempts to maximize social cohesion during conflict (Luong et al., 2011), and consistently engaged emotion regulation strategies are thought to account for positivity biases in attention and memory in older adults (Lang & Carstensen). In parallel to these age-related shifts in motivation, mortality salience (Tremoliere et al., 2012) and positive mood inductions (Strohminger et al., 2011; but see: Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006) are both demonstrated as shifting younger adult responses away from the utilitarian option. In this case, it is possible that motivational shifts as demarcated by a limited temporal horizon and emotion regulation strategy use, may account for age differences in moral decision-making rather than older adult declines in cognitive control. It is also possible that either age-related changes in cognitive control and/or motivation could shift moral acceptability ratings of proposed interventions during moral dilemmas. Also, to our knowledge no study has examined subjective effort when making decisions on these types of dilemmas in older and younger adults. Similar to decisions, as well as, moral acceptability ratings, age-related declines in cognitive control or motivational changes could make responses to these dilemmas more effortful for older adults compared to younger adults. Here we sought to first replicate previous work (McNair et al., 2019) demonstrating that compared to younger adults, older adults endorse fewer utilitarian decisions and generally rate the utilitarian option as less morally acceptable. We also sought to examine the relationship between advancing age and responses to moral dilemmas, moral acceptability of proposed interventions, and subjective effort during dilemmas. Next we sought to determine whether age-related declines in working memory performance or age-related shifts in motivation mediate the relationship between age on moral decision-making, moral acceptability ratings of proposed interventions, and subjective effort during the task.

Recent work demonstrates that older adults make fewer utilitarian decisions during moral dilemmas than younger adults, and that this behavior is partially accounted for by older adults’ experience of increased negative emotion during the dilemmas, as well as, higher report of moral idealism (McNair et al., 2019). According to the dual process theory of moral decision-making, endorsing the utilitarian option during moral dilemmas involves cognitive control processes associated with the lateral prefrontal cortices that allow the individual to override their initial emotional response elicited by the dilemmas (Greene, 2007; Greene et al., 2008). As advancing age is associated with increased atrophy of lateral prefrontal cortices (Raz, 1997) and decreases in cognitive control (Hartshorne & Germine, 2015; Park, 2000), it is possible that the observed age differences in moral decision-making may reflect older adult inability to override their initial emotional response due to declines in cognitive control ability. However, it is also possible that motivation and associated emotion regulation also play a part in older adult moral decision-making. By recognizing their time to live as more limited than younger adults, older adults experience a motivational shift to focus on emotional goals, and specifically maximize positive experiences (Lang & Carstensen, 2002). This can lead to attempts to maximize social cohesion during conflict (Luong et al., 2011), and consistently engaged emotion regulation strategies are thought to account for positivity biases in attention and memory in older adults (Lang & Carstensen). In parallel to these age-related shifts in motivation, mortality salience (Tremoliere et al., 2012) and positive mood inductions (Strohminger et al., 2011; but see: Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006) are both demonstrated as shifting younger adult responses away from the utilitarian option. In this case, it is possible that motivational shifts as demarcated by a limited temporal horizon and emotion regulation strategy use, may account for age differences in moral decision-making rather than older adult declines in cognitive control. It is also possible that either age-related changes in cognitive control and/or motivation could shift moral acceptability ratings of proposed interventions during moral dilemmas. Also, to our knowledge no study has examined subjective effort when making decisions on these types of dilemmas in older and younger adults. Similar to decisions, as well as, moral acceptability ratings, age-related declines in cognitive control or motivational changes could make responses to these dilemmas more effortful for older adults compared to younger adults. Here we sought to first replicate previous work (McNair et al., 2019) demonstrating that compared to younger adults, older adults endorse fewer utilitarian decisions and generally rate the utilitarian option as less morally acceptable. We also sought to examine the relationship between advancing age and responses to moral dilemmas, moral acceptability of proposed interventions, and subjective effort during dilemmas. Next we sought to determine whether age-related declines in working memory performance or age-related shifts in motivation mediate the relationship between age on moral decision-making, moral acceptability ratings of proposed interventions, and subjective effort during the task.

This article is from Frontiers in Human Neuroscience , volume 7 . Abstract Emotion-cognition and motivation-cognition relationships and related brain mechanisms are receiving increasing attention in the clinical research literature as a means of understanding diverse types of psychopathology and improving biological and psychological treatments. This paper reviews and integrates some of the growing evidence for cognitive biases and deficits in depression and anxiety, how these disruptions interact with emotional and motivational processes, and what brain mechanisms appear to be involved. This integration sets the stage for understanding the role of neuroplasticity in implementing change in cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes in psychopathology as a function of intervention.