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In March 2003, the United States and its coalition partners began Operation Iraqi Freedom. The military campaign leading to the destruction of Saddam Hussein s military, the capture of his seat of power in Baghdad, and many other tasks associated with the invasion phase of the operation were complete by April 30; a mere six weeks after the start of the war. As military history demonstrates, wars rarely end as first planned, for reasons that may not have been considered when crafting war plans. For example, war changes a country s internal political and social dynamics, affecting its internal security, economic development, and governance. In addition, countries and nonstate actors that were not part of the initial conflict may pursue their own interests in ways that bring new challenges to ending a war. Further, the initial political goals may expand in light of changing situations on the ground, causing major shifts in the military campaign. From the beginning to the end of a war, all participants operate under a cloud of uncertainty. Military leaders and national security experts use history as the foundation of their professional knowledge. Military history is primarily concerned with facts, figures, and lessons learned about how to fight and win battles and campaigns. However, the history of war suggests that how a war ends is at least as important as how it is waged in establishing a given postwar environment. Despite this importance, military practitioners, strategists, and historians sometimes pay less attention to understanding how wars end than how they are fought.

Command information, the U.S. Army's internal communications function, is designed to keep soldiers informed and answer their questions about events concerning them. Today's soldiers grew up having access to CNN and other instant information media and expect access to information even in a combat environment. United States citizens generally are taught a Judeo-Christian value system that places great importance on human life. One is taught to love thy neighbor and that killing another human being is morally wrong. When a soldier is asked to kill the enemy, the result is internal conflict between the requested action and his/her beliefs. This phenomenon is referred to as cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance may be reduced if soldiers believe the American public support their efforts on the battlefield. Well-informed soldiers will fight harder if they believe they have a mandate from the people. Thus, command information is a force multiplier. Cognitive dissonance may be reduced further if leaders speak with one clear voice when answering soldiers' questions. It is the commander's responsibility to keep soldiers informed. The Army's professional education system should, therefore, instill the importance of command information in commanders. Moreso than in previous conflicts, soldiers in the Gulf War received information from sources outside command information channels. These included satellite-linked telephone calls home, BBC shortwave radio news, and the CNN soundtrack over Armed Forces Radio. If Commanders are to keep soldiers informed, they must: (1) speak with one clear voice; (2) be sufficiently trained; (3) have adequate command information products; and (4) reduce information lag. These requirements may be thought of as the four critical aspects of command information.

This study analyzes the concepts of dominant maneuver and precision engagement at the operational level of war as defined in Joint Vision 2020. The analysis begins by establishing the relationship between today's geostrategic environment, national security trends, and America's limited wars from 1950-2000. Once that relationship is established, the doctrinal concepts contained in Field Manual 3-0, Operations (DRAG Edition) are shown to be synchronized with the Chairman's, Joint Chiefs of Staff, vision for future warfighting contained in Joint Vision 2020. German historian Hans Delbruck's two strategies of warfare: annihilation and exhaustion, and American military theorist Robert Leonhard's concepts of attrition and maneuver are examined to establish the relationship between theory and doctrine. The concept of dislocation is discussed to demonstrate that an enemy can be defeated decisively through the indirect approach of destroying or neutralizing his critical vulnerability. Then, US military operations from Korea, Vietnam and Kosovo are analyzed to demonstrate that the American way of war in the last 50 years was firepower intensive and attrition oriented. A review of US Army doctrine from 1973-2000 revealed that maneuver and firepower remain complementary combat dynamics. This study then recommends a proposed operational maneuver concept relevant to limited wars in the precision engagement era based on the theories of Hans Delbruck and Robert Leonhard. Finally, this study concludes that precision engagement has not advanced to the point where it will be the dominant concept at the operational level in America's future limited wars. It is the author's opinion that dominant maneuver remains the overarching concept at the operational level and that precision engagement remains an enabler.

The entry of the United States into World War I in April 1917 found the U.S. Army and Signal Corps totally unprepared for operations on the Western Front. This research effort proves conclusively that the U.S. Army Signal Corps overcame this unpreparedness and was ultimately effective in support of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) division and below maneuver units during World War I. This conclusion was validated by studying the organization, doctrine, training, and technology used by Signal Corps division level units prior to the declaration of war through the immediate post-World War I period. The 1st and 2d Infantry Division signal units are studied during the battle of Soissons (July 1918) and the Meuse-Argonne (October 1918) in order to evaluate their effectiveness in support of division maneuver elements. The U.S. Army Signal Corps provided relatively dynamic signal support at division level by the time the Armistice ended hostilities on 11 November 1918. The progression of signal support within the 1st and 2d Infantry Divisions clearly shows the growth and development of signal organization, doctrine, training, and technology as applied to an AEF infantry division.