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t`A ` Approved For Release 19/09/16 : CIA-RDP62-00647A0001001W69-8 COCOH DOCUMENT 3530 COPY NO: 70 CO-ORDINATING COLLITTIE, SUB-COMMITTEE ON EXPORT CONTROLS YUGOSLrJ DOCUMENTATION MEMOP.i,NDUNI BY THE UNITED KINGDOM DELEGn`TION In connexion with item 3(c) of the Draft .hgenda for the Meeting of the Sub-Committee on Export Controls which meets in Rome on the 19th May, 1959 (annex to COCOK Doc.34861) the United Kingdom Delegation submit the following examination of recent experience of Yugoslav documentation. The United Kingdom Delegation would welcome information on similar lines from other Delegations, 1. The United Kingdom Delegation understands that the main features of Yugoslav import and export control are:- (a) When the controlled articles are exported from the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia the Federal Chamber of Trade grants the necessary approval to the Yugoslav exporters after they have presented the required documents. One of these documents must be the official Import Certificate of the country importing the goods. (b) When controlled articles are imported the Foderal Chamber of Foreign Trade issues End-Use Certificates (E. U. C. ) upon the request of the importers and on the ground of information and documents indicating the final use of goods. (c) after a transaction has been completed the Federal Chamber of Foreign Trade checks the pertinent Customs and other documents. (d) The importer holding an Import Certificate must import the goods into Yugoslavia. In case he wishes to change the destination of goods, he is under obligation to procure an official Import Certificate of the country for which the goods are intended. It will be apparent that the Yugoslav system of control, if it is based on the foregoing, leaves much to be desired. It is understood, however, that assurances have been given by the Yugoslav Government that no action would be taken in regard to strategic exports contrary to the "merican Battle Act. 2. In March 1959 the United Kingdom Government received from the British Embassy in Bel rade a specimen of the "new Yugoslav End-Use Certificate." (E.U.C.) This latest specimen document is exactly the same as the previous specimen issued by the Yugoslav Federal Chamber of Foreign Trade in 1957; it perpetuates the unsatisfactory assurance which reads This material will be used/consumed in Yugoslavia and will not be re-exported without End--Use-Certificate." End-Use-Certificates provided by the Yugoslav Federal Chamber of Foreign Trade in connexion with applications for the export of /strategic Approved For Release 1999/09/16: CIA-RDP62-00647A000100180069-8 Approved For Release 14W/09/16: CIA-RDP62-00647A00010014&69-8 CCIqFI j)-11T`U I. L strategic goods from the United Kingdom to Yugoslavia are signed ( not always by the s me >>erson) . They bear revenue stamps, to the value of 900 dinars, Which are cancelled by a rubber stamp of the Chamber. 3. Yugoslav hind--'Use--Certificate furnished in respect of direct exports from the United Kingdom to Yugoslavia are printed on watermarked paper. Certificates provided in connexion with triangular transactions cwhere, say, ,,ustria is the merchanting country) are printed on upwatertzarked paper. ~. The Yugoslav Federal Chamber of Foreign Trade do not send copies of L.U.C.'s issued in respect of imports from the United Kingdom, __s this is unsatisfactory the United Kingdom :delegation would be glad to know whether other Delegations receive copies of Yugoslav D.U.C.'s direct from the Federal Chamber of Foreign Trade. 5. 00001 doe. No. 3260 (para. 6) states that Yugoslavia does not co-operate in the D.V.C. or the T.L,. C. Schemes, In the experience of the United Kingdom ?Delegation, Yugoslavia does co-operate to the extent of providing D.V.C. s, on request. Yugoslav D.V.C.'s, unlike their K.U,C.'s, leave nothing to be desired. 6. Member countries may wish to have the following note of a case which the United Kingdom Delegation considers to have unsatisfactory features:- In June 1958 a United Kingdom firm received an order for 2 tons of thorium nitrate from a Yugoslav authorised agency. The United Kingdom firm's application for an export licence was supported by an K. U. C. provided by the Chamber of Commerce RIJLMi,, Yugoslavia, This certificate bore revenue stamps to the value of 75 dinars. t,s the : .C7.C. was not issued by the Yugoslav Federal Chamber of Foreign Trade the United Kingdom firm was informed that the application would be considered but only on production of an :d.U.C. issued by the Federal Chamber, after much unsatisfactory correspondence with the would-be importer (the authorised agency) the United Kingdom firm (5 months later) requested the Federal Chamber to provide a certificate. This direct approach by the United Kingdom firm was resented (with some acrimony) by the Yugoslav importer. No official K.U.C. was provided but the original unacceptable L.U.C. was re-submitted and was again rejected. No licence was issued. In connexion with this case the following points occur to the United Kingdom Delegation. (a) why did the Yugoslav importer react so unpleasantly to the United Kingdom exporter when the latter approached the Yugoslav Federal Chamber of Foreign Trade for an official and use certificate - was it because (i) the Yugoslav firm realised they were in the wrong in not asking the Federal Body for a certificate? (ii) was it on the grounds of expense a local Chamber of Commerce Certificate (which is unacceptable to COC011 Licensing authorities) costs 75 dinars as against the Federal Certificate which bears revenue stamps to the value of 900 dinars or (iii) did the Yugoslav firm want to import thorium nitrate into Yugoslavia without the knowledge of their Government authorities. (b) the Yugoslav importing firm did not got the 2 tons of thorium nitrate which they ordered in June 1958 CON IDLI`d'1'I~,L /from Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP62-00647A000100180069-8 Approved For Release 1 x%09/16: CIA-RDP62-00647A00010018GO69-8 C OINTt'I DEUTI L from tho United Kingdom. .'yid they get it from some other possibly Non-COOOM country? Lad, if so, what kind of documentation was provided? 7. The chief danger ,:;.hick could be said to exist in the foregoing lies in the possibility that an unscrupulous Yugoslav importer could, without strict control by Licensing ~uthorities, obtain strategic goods for re-export to the Bloc without the knowledge, approval or control of the Yugoslav Government. 8. The United Kingdom Delegation would be glad to know whether other participating countries have had similar experiences. United lingdom Delegation, Paris. Nay 14, 1959. CON_l,'I )Vi~Trl'I: Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP62-00647A000100180069-8

Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP62-00647A000200030022 CONFIDENTIAL February 11, 1960 C000M Document 3877 000RDINATING COMMITTEE MEMORANDUM FAOM THE UNITED STATES DEILGATION ON YUGOSLAV TRADE CONTROLS AND DOCUMENTATION SUBr O ITTEF ON EXPORT CONTROLS 54 1. At the conclusion of the discussion on Yugoslav Trade Controls and ' Documentation in the Subcommittee on ]xport Controls during the May 19-22, 1959, meeting (paras. 40 to 4 inclusive., COCON Doc. Sub-C (59) 2), the Subcommittee chairman noted that there still existed some confusion regarding this matter and requested, on behalf of the Suocommittee, that the United States delegation endeavor to obtain a clarification. The following report is submitted for the Committee's information in this connection. 2. Following indications of diversion or re-export to the Soviet bloc late in 1957 of two shipments of US-origin borax intended for Yugoslavia, the United States Embassy in Belgrade began a series of discussions on trade control prob- lems with the Yugoslavs with a view to bringing about more positive safeguards of US shipments of strategic materials to that country. The United States sought to obtain assurances from the Yugoslavs that US goods would not be re-exported contrary to US regulations, and that action would be taken to eliminate the irregularities in the Yugcslav end use certificate and make it a more meaningful document. The United States sought agreement from Yugoslavia to make available duplicate copies of end-u4e certificates with a view to reducing the possibility of forgery and also to provide delivery verifications upon request as evidence that the goods were received in Yugoslavia and were made subject to Yugoslav export regulations. The United States also discussed the desirability of closer cooperation by the Yugoslavs with US Embassy personnel in conducting end-use and post--shipment checks. 3. After discussions on the above matters extending over a number of months, the Yugoslav officials informed the US Embassy that they did not believe that duplicate copies of end-use certificates were necessary since they were issued by the Chamber of Foreign Commerce on special water-marked paper which was be- lieved to be difficult to duplicate or alter. They stated that they would stiffen their procedures in the issuance of end use certificates. However, they were not willing to issue duplicate end-use certificates. The Yugoslavs agreed to use in their enduse certificates prepared in the English language the more precise guarantee against re-export previously used in the German language version. The Yugoslavs stated that they had, however, always exercised equally strict controls regardless of language-of the German, French-or English versions of this cortifi cate. The certificate, as presently printed, states "This material will be used or consumed in Yugoslavia and will not be reexported without end-use certificate". After some discussion it was agreed that the words "without end-use certificate" would be deleted arz the deletion initialed by the issuing official. In the next reprinting of enduse certificate forms this phrase would be deleted. It was also understood that each application for an end-use certificate would be per- sonally scrutinized by Barbalic, the responsible official in the Chamber of Foreign Commerce, and., where the type of goods is such as to arouse his suspicions, he would question the end-user directly. 4. The Yugoslavs confirmed that there would be no re-exports of US-origin goods without prior approval from the US Department of 0ananeroe. 5. The Yugoslavs have agreed that physical end-use checks will be made by the Chamber of Foreign Commerce when requested, CONFIDENTIAL p mued Fnr Release IaaainQIII - rim-Rr1Pr%7_MAd7A00090003007d_7 Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP62-00647A000200030024-2 OONFID']TTIAL COCOM Document 3877 -2- 6. The Yugoslavs are willing to issue delivery verifications on request on a selective basis. US authorities have taken advantage of the availability of such documents and require delivery verifications for all shipments of IL I its to Yugoslavia and for certain significant shipments of a non IL I charac- ter, The U. S. also plans to have physical end use checks made on a highly selective basis, when the shipment is significant by virtue of either the quan- tity, value or strategic importance. 7. There have been no known diversions of US shipments from Yugoslavia0ne since the Yugoslav procedures were revised last stumer as described above. instance had been reported of an apparent forgery of an end-use certificate for 10,000 tons of Turkish boracite, and the Yugoslavs indicated to a Turkish repre- sentative that they were referring this case to the International Police in Paris. 8. United States authorities have not had sufficient experience under the new procedures to conclude whether the Yugoslav documents and procedures provide the desired security. The US authorities, 'however, consider it important to request the available Yu,,oslav documents as a prerequisite in the licensing of strategic corr_lodities to that country. In addition to the prescribed documents, United States authorities base favorable action on a careful scrutiny of each license application to assure that there is no question concerning the integrity and reliability of the consignee and that the quantities of goods to be exported are considered to be reasonable for the known or estimated needs of the Yugoslav economy. This practice serves to identify cases which are questionable from the standpoint of consignee and/or of quantity and which call for inquiry to the Yugoslav Goverment via the US Embassy. In this manner the legitimacy of sus- pect transactions can be fully verified or the suspicions further substantiated. 9. The nano and address of the office in the Yugoslav Government authorized to issue end use certificates and deliveryverification certificates is, the Yugoslav Federal Chamber of Foreign Commerce, Mose Pijade 12, Belgrade, Yugoslavia. The names of the officials, only five, authorized by the Yugoslav Government to certify these documents are the following: No Barbalic, Secretary General of the Chamber of Foreign Commerce; Milcrad Konjevic, Secretary of the Chamber of Foreign Commerce; Milan Aleksic, - Secretary of the Chamber of Foreign Commerce; Svetomir Tomic, Secretary of the Chamber of Foreign Commerce; Dusan Marie, General Clerk of the Chamber of Foreign Commerce. Facsimile signatures of the above Yugoslav officials have been de- posited in the 000OM Secretariat. 10. A set of sample copies of Yugoslav end-use certificates in English, French and German (the three languages used by the Yugoslavs on end use certifi- cates) have been deposited in the COCOM Secretariat. The delivery verification certificate, as described by the Chamber of Foreign Commerce is simply a letter set up on Chamber stationery which carries a duty stamp. The form of the letter, according to the Chamber, is generally the following: "Based on Documents su1m.itteu by (name of enterprise) regarding (commodity identification and value) we are satisfied that the above (commodity) were received by..." CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP62-00647A000200030024-2

Trade documentation assumes a basic part in global exchange, guaranteeing consistent correspondence among parties and working with the development of importers goods across borders. In India, as a rapidly growing economy with a significant presence in global trade, the accuracy and compliance of trade documentation are of paramount importance.  In the context of India,  importers often encounter challenges related to trade documentation errors and liabilities. “Overcoming Trade Documentation Errors & Liabilities of Importers in India” aims to address these pressing concerns.

The term "export" is commonly used to describe the process of sending products and services abroad in exchange for foreign currency. Foreign trade is governed by a variety of rules and regulations that vary from country to country. A business that exports must keep and submit various documents to satisfy the laws and regulations of each country it ships to. The paperwork process differs for each product, manufacturing method, industry, and export destination. Maximizing the contribution of trade and other economic policies to development requires that these policies be coherent and consistent with one another. Thus, it is vital to move much beyond the current practise of enunciating a yearly EXIM Policy and take an integrated approach to the developmental needs of India's Foreign trade. Every five years, the Export-Import Policy is released by the Government of India's Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The goals of EXIM policy are to increase export capacity, boost export performance, promote international trade, and improve the country's overall balance of payments. Industrial training introduces students to both the company and the field in which it operates. The goal of this work is to learn all there is to know about export paperwork and clearance. The first part of the essay is an introductory paragraph. The logistics sector that the company operates in is introduced here.

'Simplification of Pre-Shipment Export Documentation System (13-Sep-1991)' from the Parliament Digital Library

1 volume (various pagings) : 28 cm

1 volume (various pagings) : 28 cm