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Perma.cc archive of https://ils.unc.edu/courses/2013_spring/inls285_001/materials/Allison.1971.Essence_of_Decision.pdf created on 2022-10-03 04:50:55.018029+00:00.

The decision to militarily intervene in an international crisis is one fraught with complexity and uncertainty, and may ultimately lead a state to war. This research provides an analytical approach based on the work of Graham Allison in Essence of Decision to help understand why states (specifically superpowers) choose to militarily intervene in certain international crises and not others. The modified Allisonian construct presented in this study synthesizes national, organizational and individual level factors into one integrated framework. That framework is then used to comparatively analyze two important Cold War era superpower interventions the U.S.-led intervention at the Bay of Pigs and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

On July 28 1986, during a major foreign policy speech in the Soviet Far Eastern city of Vladivostok, Mikhail Gorbachev announced that six Soviet regiments would be pulled out of Afghanistan. This was Gorbachev's first public move in the long and contentious struggle to leave Afghanistan. In October of 1986, amid considerable fanfare, the six regiments were indeed withdrawn. The problem, however, was that the only militarily-significant elements had been introduced into the country shortly after Gorbachev's speech, without any serious efforts to camouflage their arrival. Western governments immediately denounced the sham withdrawal and the Soviets gained nothing from the maneuver. In fact, Gorbachev's credibility in the West suffered considerably from the episode. The timing was particularly damaging because it occurred on the eve of the Reykjavik Summit when Gorbachev was preparing to unveil a radical proposal for unprecedented cuts in nuclear arms. In retrospect, the incident is even harder to explain, since it turned out to be the first step in the genuine Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Western analysts who have studied the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan have been at a loss to explain this sham withdrawal. Indeed, if we simply use Graham Allison's rational actor model, the episode is inexplicable. If, however, we combine it with Allison's other two models of government politics and organizational process we can construct a number of possible scenarios that could have created the sham. As Allison points out, we know far too little about the inner workings of the Soviet system to pursue any of these models seriously. This paper is merely a preliminary attempt to explore the issues, personalities and bureaucratic institutions and procedures that could have combined to produce this bizarre episode.

On July 28 1986, during a major foreign policy speech in the Soviet Far Eastern city of Vladivostok, Mikhail Gorbachev announced that six Soviet regiments would be pulled out of Afghanistan. This was Gorbachev's first public move in the long and contentious struggle to leave Afghanistan. In October of 1986, amid considerable fanfare, the six regiments were indeed withdrawn. The problem, however, was that the only militarily-significant elements had been introduced into the country shortly after Gorbachev's speech, without any serious efforts to camouflage their arrival. Western governments immediately denounced the sham withdrawal and the Soviets gained nothing from the maneuver. In fact, Gorbachev's credibility in the West suffered considerably from the episode. The timing was particularly damaging because it occurred on the eve of the Reykjavik Summit when Gorbachev was preparing to unveil a radical proposal for unprecedented cuts in nuclear arms. In retrospect, the incident is even harder to explain, since it turned out to be the first step in the genuine Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Western analysts who have studied the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan have been at a loss to explain this sham withdrawal. Indeed, if we simply use Graham Allison's rational actor model, the episode is inexplicable. If, however, we combine it with Allison's other two models of government politics and organizational process we can construct a number of possible scenarios that could have created the sham. As Allison points out, we know far too little about the inner workings of the Soviet system to pursue any of these models seriously. This paper is merely a preliminary attempt to explore the issues, personalities and bureaucratic institutions and procedures that could have combined to produce this bizarre episode.

This Technical Memorandum, which is the first full case-study in a series of eight, examines how Canada dealt with the Cuban Missile Crisis. The case will focus on accounting for why the Diefenbaker government, in the context of a grave threat to North American security and defence, delayed increasing the readiness level for the CF as requested by Washington, and the role played by the mechanics of Canadian Government decision-making at the time. By reconstructing the events and decision-making processes that existed in the political, bureaucratic and military domains, the case begins to build the 'story' of the Canada-US strategic defence relationship. In doing so, it recounts a sad story of leaders, both political and military, too readily accepting reasons to justify inaction in the face of a clear and present danger. Thus, while having a more streamlined national security structure cannot always negate the effect of personality on decision-making, what this case-study demonstrates is that the national security structure in place during the crisis allowed military civilian leadership to get away far too easily with finding reasons for inaction. While it is accepted that personality always makes itself felt, the lack of rigour in the system did nothing to soften its sharp edges since it did not force realistic and timely assessments of the nation's geostrategic imperatives, or of the developing threat from Soviet missiles in Cuba. Indeed, this case-study has shown that a degree of strategic laziness, enhanced by a slow move away from a mobilisation paradigm to one with large forces in-being, had crept into the nation's strategic planning and understanding of the likely nature of the next conflict.

This Technical Memorandum, which is the first full case-study in a series of eight, examines how Canada dealt with the Cuban Missile Crisis. The case will focus on accounting for why the Diefenbaker government, in the context of a grave threat to North American security and defence, delayed increasing the readiness level for the CF as requested by Washington, and the role played by the mechanics of Canadian Government decision-making at the time. By reconstructing the events and decision-making processes that existed in the political, bureaucratic and military domains, the case begins to build the 'story' of the Canada-US strategic defence relationship. In doing so, it recounts a sad story of leaders, both political and military, too readily accepting reasons to justify inaction in the face of a clear and present danger. Thus, while having a more streamlined national security structure cannot always negate the effect of personality on decision-making, what this case-study demonstrates is that the national security structure in place during the crisis allowed military civilian leadership to get away far too easily with finding reasons for inaction. While it is accepted that personality always makes itself felt, the lack of rigour in the system did nothing to soften its sharp edges since it did not force realistic and timely assessments of the nation's geostrategic imperatives, or of the developing threat from Soviet missiles in Cuba. Indeed, this case-study has shown that a degree of strategic laziness, enhanced by a slow move away from a mobilisation paradigm to one with large forces in-being, had crept into the nation's strategic planning and understanding of the likely nature of the next conflict.

This Technical Memorandum, which is the first full case-study in a series of eight, examines how Canada dealt with the Cuban Missile Crisis. The case will focus on accounting for why the Diefenbaker government, in the context of a grave threat to North American security and defence, delayed increasing the readiness level for the CF as requested by Washington, and the role played by the mechanics of Canadian Government decision-making at the time. By reconstructing the events and decision-making processes that existed in the political, bureaucratic and military domains, the case begins to build the 'story' of the Canada-US strategic defence relationship. In doing so, it recounts a sad story of leaders, both political and military, too readily accepting reasons to justify inaction in the face of a clear and present danger. Thus, while having a more streamlined national security structure cannot always negate the effect of personality on decision-making, what this case-study demonstrates is that the national security structure in place during the crisis allowed military civilian leadership to get away far too easily with finding reasons for inaction. While it is accepted that personality always makes itself felt, the lack of rigour in the system did nothing to soften its sharp edges since it did not force realistic and timely assessments of the nation's geostrategic imperatives, or of the developing threat from Soviet missiles in Cuba. Indeed, this case-study has shown that a degree of strategic laziness, enhanced by a slow move away from a mobilisation paradigm to one with large forces in-being, had crept into the nation's strategic planning and understanding of the likely nature of the next conflict.

1American Robinson Crusoe

By Samuel B. Allison

An American Robinson Crusoe is a short version of the original story. An indolent, rebellious teen goes on a marine voyage against his parents' wishes. The ship (and all of its crew) is lost in a storm, but Robinson makes it to a deserted island. He has no tools, no weapons, but he lives for over 28 years on the island. He befriends many animals on the island and after over 20 years living solo, he is joined by a young "savage" who becomes his constant companion. The transformation from the young, lazy teen to a self-sustaining, incredibly knowledgeable adult is one of the major themes in the story. (Summary by: Allyson Hester)