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The intention of this thesis is to determine the warning signals and preventive actions to conduct the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process successfully. Although Colombia has experienced multiple DDR processes during its recent history, political violence continues to plague the country. After each process, Colombia notes the mutation of criminal structures, which have deployed their tentacles to other Latin American countries. Understanding the salient issues that led to the success or failure of DDR processes will aid the Government of Colombia (GOC) in continuing to face the process with FARC. The main argument of this thesis is that, in order for DDR to be successful, the GOC must take the ‘best practices’ of the DDR into account, not only in Colombia, but in other countries. Due to similarities with DDR experiences and the Colombian conflict, El Salvador and South Africa are the selected countries This thesis also will cover past Colombian experiences in DDR, beginning with the end of La Violencia and ending with the DDR of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), as well as the individual demobilization programs for insurgents. An analysis of these cases will provide the best approaches for conducting a successful DDR process with FARC.

In a post-conflict situation, a strategy of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) is critical to achieving sustainable peace. There are three main DDR approaches: the cooperative, successful against macroinsecurities; the integrated, emphasizes micro-insecurities; and the coercive, commonly a failure. Today, coercive DDR programs are increasingly common, which creates a need to understand why many think they always fail, and how the programs can be improved. This thesis conducts a comparative study of three coercive DDR programs, comparing within and across the programs to ascertain conditions that lead to both success and failure. Haiti 1994- 2004 is an example of coercive DDR with short-term success but long-term failure. Haiti 2004-2007 is an example of the unique challenges implementers confront when targeting criminal gangs. Albania 1997-1999 is an example of how coercive DDR achieves long-term success by using a community-based approach. The study finds that shortterm success is sustainable when the terms of DDR are acceptable to the target group. Security, economic guarantees, and community involvement are critical to the success of coercive DDR. Contrary to expectations, coercive DDR programs can succeed, but require careful integration of local actors and local situations, a condition that is often absent.

Since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the United States, the United Nations, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have funded and led four different Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs. Despite a significant investment in time and treasure, all of them have failed to significantly reduce the number of insurgents or arbaki (militia). This monograph seeks to answer why these programs failed despite incorporating ideas from the prominent DDR schools of thought. Utilizing Stathis Kalyvas theory of The Logic of Violence in Civil War as a lens, this monograph argues that GIRoA and ISAF did not have sufficient control of territory to entice insurgents or arbaki to reconcile and/or reintegrate with the government. Further, in areas GIRoA nominally controlled in northern and western Afghanistan, regional powerbrokers who actually controlled these areas balked at these programs. Based on this analysis, this monograph recommends that in the future DDR programs should be incorporated into Phase IV planning, and when implemented by international organizations the Department of Defense should fully support them.

Effective Weapons and Ammunition Management: Integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes increasingly take place in environments characterized by well-equipped armed groups and high levels of illicit weapons, ammunition and explosives. Whether operating as part of United Nations peacekeeping operations, special political missions or in non-mission settings, DDR practitioners face rising challenges related to illicit weapons and ammunition flows. The widespread circulation of weapons and ammunition among armed groups and within communities impedes progress towards sustainable peace and development.

In a post-conflict situation, a strategy of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) is critical to achieving sustainable peace. There are three main DDR approaches: the cooperative, successful against macro-insecurities; the integrated, emphasizes micro-insecurities; and the coercive, commonly a failure. Today, coercive DDR programs are increasingly common, which creates a need to understand why many think they always fail, and how the programs can be improved. This thesis conducts a comparative study of three coercive DDR programs, comparing within and across the programs to ascertain conditions that lead to both success and failure. Haiti 1994 2004 is an example of coercive DDR with short-term success but long-term failure. Haiti 2004 2007 is an example of the unique challenges implementers confront when targeting criminal gangs. Albania 1997 1999 is an example of how coercive DDR achieves long-term success by using a community-based approach. The study finds that short-term success is sustainable when the terms of DDR are acceptable to the target group. Security, economic guarantees, and community involvement are critical to the success of coercive DDR. Contrary to expectations, coercive DDR programs can succeed, but require careful integration of local actors and local situations, a condition that is often absent.

The intention of this thesis is to determine the warning signals and preventive actions to conduct the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process successfully. Although Colombia has experienced multiple DDR processes during its recent history, political violence continues to plague the country. After each process, Colombia notes the mutation of criminal structures, which have deployed their tentacles to other Latin American countries. Understanding the salient issues that led to the success or failure of DDR processes will aid the Government of Colombia (GOC) in continuing to face the process with FARC. The main argument of this thesis is that, in order for DDR to be successful, the GOC must take the best practices of the DDR into account, not only in Colombia, but in other countries. Due to similarities with DDR experiences and the Colombian conflict, El Salvador and South Africa are the selected countries. This thesis also will cover past Colombian experiences in DDR, beginning with the end of La Violencia and ending with the DDR of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), as well as the individual demobilization programs for insurgents. An analysis of these cases will provide the best approaches for conducting a successful DDR process with FARC.

Governments attempting to counter insurgent threats often lack the authority, influence, and control to counter these threats, creating what some have described as 'ungoverned' spaces. A number of governments seek alliances with non-state armed groups that emerge from these conflicts. How can governments transition non-state armed groups from war to peace? The implementation of a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program provides an effective method for building government trust and transitioning war-torn societies towards peace. The United Nations developed a model to assist countries with this process, which it described in the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS). The application of the UN's IDDRS model to three case studies in Sierra Leone, Oman, and Colombia demonstrates its usefulness. The challenges involved in implementing a DDR program also offer considerations for leaders as they evaluate and develop alliances with non-state armed groups.

The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was deployed following the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July of 1999. A core pillar of the mission -- disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs -- have attempted to address the issue of multiple armed nonstate actors operating primarily in the country's eastern districts of Ituri and North and South Kivu. MONUC's DDR initiatives can be subdivided into the national DDR program for Congolese combatants and the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRRR) of foreign armed groups. Although there has been some success in the DDR(RR) programs over the past 12 years of UN deployment, rampant insecurity attributed to the presence of armed groups in the DRC continues to plague the east. An examination of the DDR process in the east reveals that although the UN has assisted in the implementation of large, multidimensional DDR and DDRRR programs in the east, the situational context, voluntary approach, and links to Security Sector Reform (SSR) have all proven inadequate to achieving stability though DDR.

The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUC, was deployed following the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July of 1999. A core pillar of the mission, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs have attempted to address the issue of multiple armed nonstate actors operating, primarily in the country's eastern districts of Ituri, North and South Kivu. MONUC's DDR initiatives can be subdivided into the national DDR program for Congolese combatants and the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRRR) of foreign armed groups. Although there has been some success in the DDR(RR) programs over the past 12 years of UN deployment, rampant insecurity attributed to the presence of armed groups in the DRC continues to plague the east. An examination of the DDR process in the east reveals that although the UN has assisted in the implementation of large, multidimensional DDR and DDRRR programs in the east, the situational context, voluntary approach, and links to Security Sector Reform ((SSR) have all proven inadequate to achieving stability though DDR.