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For this experiment, I am running another case of primary causal deviance like the cases in Experiments 1, 3, and 4. This was planned in the registration for Experiment 4. For this experiment, I will keep my hypothesis from Experiments 3 and 4 the same: if people's perception of how much an agent's having desired the outcome caused the outcome does not explain judgments of intentionality in cases of causal deviance, then (1) people should judge the potential action as less intentional in the deviant scenario than in the normal, non-deviant scenario, and (2) people should judge that the agent's having desired the outcome was just as causal in bringing about the outcome in the deviant scenario as in the normal scenario (i.e., no evidence to reject the null). Nonetheless, I expect the results of this experiment to be in line with the results of Experiments 3 and 4—i.e., I expect my hypothesis to be incorrect—as Experiments 3 and 4 found no evidence in support of this hypothesis. I am running another case of primary causal deviance here to determine whether my hypothesis was incorrect and the vignette from Experiment 1 was an aberrant case or whether my hypothesis from Experiments 3 and 4 was correct but the case from Experiments 3 and 4 was aberrant. If this experiment's results are in line with those in Experiments 3 and 4, then I have some evidence to suggest that something about Experiment 1 is unusual and my hypothesis from Experiments 3 and 4 was incorrect. If, however, these results are in line with those in Experiment 1, then I have reason to think there was something unusual about the case from Experiments 3 and 4 and that the hypothesis may be correct. If the former is the case, then I will accept that my hypothesis from Experiments 3 and 4 is incorrect. If the latter is the case, I will likely need to run another experiment to determine what aspect of the case produced the pattern of results in Experiments 3 and 4.

For this experiment, I am running another case of primary causal deviance like the cases in Experiments 1, 3, and 4. This was planned in the registration for Experiment 4. For this experiment, I will keep my hypothesis from Experiments 3 and 4 the same: if people's perception of how much an agent's having desired the outcome caused the outcome does not explain judgments of intentionality in cases of causal deviance, then (1) people should judge the potential action as less intentional in the deviant scenario than in the normal, non-deviant scenario, and (2) people should judge that the agent's having desired the outcome was just as causal in bringing about the outcome in the deviant scenario as in the normal scenario (i.e., no evidence to reject the null). Nonetheless, I expect the results of this experiment to be in line with the results of Experiments 3 and 4—i.e., I expect my hypothesis to be incorrect—as Experiments 3 and 4 found no evidence in support of this hypothesis. I am running another case of primary causal deviance here to determine whether my hypothesis was incorrect and the vignette from Experiment 1 was an aberrant case or whether my hypothesis from Experiments 3 and 4 was correct but the case from Experiments 3 and 4 was aberrant. If this experiment's results are in line with those in Experiments 3 and 4, then I have some evidence to suggest that something about Experiment 1 is unusual and my hypothesis from Experiments 3 and 4 was incorrect. If, however, these results are in line with those in Experiment 1, then I have reason to think there was something unusual about the case from Experiments 3 and 4 and that the hypothesis may be correct. If the former is the case, then I will accept that my hypothesis from Experiments 3 and 4 is incorrect. If the latter is the case, I will likely need to run another experiment to determine what aspect of the case produced the pattern of results in Experiments 3 and 4.

For this experiment, I am running another case of primary causal deviance like the cases in Experiments 1, 3, and 4. This was planned in the registration for Experiment 4. For this experiment, I will keep my hypothesis from Experiments 3 and 4 the same: if people's perception of how much an agent's having desired the outcome caused the outcome does not explain judgments of intentionality in cases of causal deviance, then (1) people should judge the potential action as less intentional in the deviant scenario than in the normal, non-deviant scenario, and (2) people should judge that the agent's having desired the outcome was just as causal in bringing about the outcome in the deviant scenario as in the normal scenario (i.e., no evidence to reject the null). Nonetheless, I expect the results of this experiment to be in line with the results of Experiments 3 and 4—i.e., I expect my hypothesis to be incorrect—as Experiments 3 and 4 found no evidence in support of this hypothesis. I am running another case of primary causal deviance here to determine whether my hypothesis was incorrect and the vignette from Experiment 1 was an aberrant case or whether my hypothesis from Experiments 3 and 4 was correct but the case from Experiments 3 and 4 was aberrant. If this experiment's results are in line with those in Experiments 3 and 4, then I have some evidence to suggest that something about Experiment 1 is unusual and my hypothesis from Experiments 3 and 4 was incorrect. If, however, these results are in line with those in Experiment 1, then I have reason to think there was something unusual about the case from Experiments 3 and 4 and that the hypothesis may be correct. If the former is the case, then I will accept that my hypothesis from Experiments 3 and 4 is incorrect. If the latter is the case, I will likely need to run another experiment to determine what aspect of the case produced the pattern of results in Experiments 3 and 4.

For this experiment, I am running another case of primary causal deviance like the cases in Experiments 1, 3, and 4. This was planned in the registration for Experiment 4. For this experiment, I will keep my hypothesis from Experiments 3 and 4 the same: if people's perception of how much an agent's having desired the outcome caused the outcome does not explain judgments of intentionality in cases of causal deviance, then (1) people should judge the potential action as less intentional in the deviant scenario than in the normal, non-deviant scenario, and (2) people should judge that the agent's having desired the outcome was just as causal in bringing about the outcome in the deviant scenario as in the normal scenario (i.e., no evidence to reject the null). Nonetheless, I expect the results of this experiment to be in line with the results of Experiments 3 and 4—i.e., I expect my hypothesis to be incorrect—as Experiments 3 and 4 found no evidence in support of this hypothesis. I am running another case of primary causal deviance here to determine whether my hypothesis was incorrect and the vignette from Experiment 1 was an aberrant case or whether my hypothesis from Experiments 3 and 4 was correct but the case from Experiments 3 and 4 was aberrant. If this experiment's results are in line with those in Experiments 3 and 4, then I have some evidence to suggest that something about Experiment 1 is unusual and my hypothesis from Experiments 3 and 4 was incorrect. If, however, these results are in line with those in Experiment 1, then I have reason to think there was something unusual about the case from Experiments 3 and 4 and that the hypothesis may be correct. If the former is the case, then I will accept that my hypothesis from Experiments 3 and 4 is incorrect. If the latter is the case, I will likely need to run another experiment to determine what aspect of the case produced the pattern of results in Experiments 3 and 4.

For this experiment, I am running another case of primary causal deviance like the cases in Experiments 1, 3, and 4. This was planned in the registration for Experiment 4. For this experiment, I will keep my hypothesis from Experiments 3 and 4 the same: if people's perception of how much an agent's having desired the outcome caused the outcome does not explain judgments of intentionality in cases of causal deviance, then (1) people should judge the potential action as less intentional in the deviant scenario than in the normal, non-deviant scenario, and (2) people should judge that the agent's having desired the outcome was just as causal in bringing about the outcome in the deviant scenario as in the normal scenario (i.e., no evidence to reject the null). Nonetheless, I expect the results of this experiment to be in line with the results of Experiments 3 and 4—i.e., I expect my hypothesis to be incorrect—as Experiments 3 and 4 found no evidence in support of this hypothesis. I am running another case of primary causal deviance here to determine whether my hypothesis was incorrect and the vignette from Experiment 1 was an aberrant case or whether my hypothesis from Experiments 3 and 4 was correct but the case from Experiments 3 and 4 was aberrant. If this experiment's results are in line with those in Experiments 3 and 4, then I have some evidence to suggest that something about Experiment 1 is unusual and my hypothesis from Experiments 3 and 4 was incorrect. If, however, these results are in line with those in Experiment 1, then I have reason to think there was something unusual about the case from Experiments 3 and 4 and that the hypothesis may be correct. If the former is the case, then I will accept that my hypothesis from Experiments 3 and 4 is incorrect. If the latter is the case, I will likely need to run another experiment to determine what aspect of the case produced the pattern of results in Experiments 3 and 4.

For this experiment, I am running another case of primary causal deviance like the cases in Experiments 1, 3, and 4. This was planned in the registration for Experiment 4. For this experiment, I will keep my hypothesis from Experiments 3 and 4 the same: if people's perception of how much an agent's having desired the outcome caused the outcome does not explain judgments of intentionality in cases of causal deviance, then (1) people should judge the potential action as less intentional in the deviant scenario than in the normal, non-deviant scenario, and (2) people should judge that the agent's having desired the outcome was just as causal in bringing about the outcome in the deviant scenario as in the normal scenario (i.e., no evidence to reject the null). Nonetheless, I expect the results of this experiment to be in line with the results of Experiments 3 and 4—i.e., I expect my hypothesis to be incorrect—as Experiments 3 and 4 found no evidence in support of this hypothesis. I am running another case of primary causal deviance here to determine whether my hypothesis was incorrect and the vignette from Experiment 1 was an aberrant case or whether my hypothesis from Experiments 3 and 4 was correct but the case from Experiments 3 and 4 was aberrant. If this experiment's results are in line with those in Experiments 3 and 4, then I have some evidence to suggest that something about Experiment 1 is unusual and my hypothesis from Experiments 3 and 4 was incorrect. If, however, these results are in line with those in Experiment 1, then I have reason to think there was something unusual about the case from Experiments 3 and 4 and that the hypothesis may be correct. If the former is the case, then I will accept that my hypothesis from Experiments 3 and 4 is incorrect. If the latter is the case, I will likely need to run another experiment to determine what aspect of the case produced the pattern of results in Experiments 3 and 4.

one stop step by step deviance cure 13th step devolution reprisal loss through finding inverse paradigm degenerating entropy gain

one stop step by step deviance cure 13th step devolution reprisal loss through finding inverse paradigm degenerating entropy gain

one stop step by step deviance cure 13th step devolution reprisal loss through finding inverse paradigm degenerating entropy gain

one stop step by step deviance cure 13th step devolution reprisal loss through finding inverse paradigm degenerating entropy gain

one stop step by step deviance cure 13th step devolution reprisal loss through finding inverse paradigm degenerating entropy gain

one stop step by step deviance cure 13th step devolution reprisal loss through finding inverse paradigm degenerating entropy gain

This article is from PLoS ONE , volume 8 . Abstract Mismatch Negativity (MMN) is an N-methyl-d-aspartic acid (NMDA)-mediated, negative deflection in human auditory evoked potentials in response to a cognitively discriminable change. MMN-like responses have been extensively investigated in animal models, but the existence of MMN equivalent is still controversial. In this study, we aimed to investigate how closely the putative MMN (MMNp) in rats exhibited the comparable properties of human MMN. We used a surface microelectrode array with a grid of 10×7 recording sites within an area of 4.5×3.0 mm to densely map evoked potentials in the auditory cortex of anesthetized rats under the oddball paradigm. Firstly, like human MMN, deviant stimuli elicited negative deflections in auditory evoked potentials following the positive middle-latency response, termed P1. Secondly, MMNp exhibited deviance-detecting property, which could not be explained by simple stimulus specific adaptation (SSA). Thirdly, this MMNp occurred focally in the auditory cortex, including both the core and belt regions, while P1 activation focus was obtained in the core region, indicating that both P1 and MMNp are generated in the auditory cortex, yet the sources of these signals do not completely overlap. Fourthly, MMNp significantly decreased after the application of AP5 (D-(-)-2-amino-5-phosphonopentanoic acid), an antagonist at NMDA receptors. In stark contrast, AP5 affected neither P1 amplitude nor SSA of P1. These results provide compelling evidence that the MMNp we have examined in rats is functionally comparable to human MMN. The present work will stimulate translational research into MMN, which may help bridge the gap between electroencephalography (EEG)/magnetoencephalography (MEG) studies in humans and electrophysiological studies in animals.

This article is from PLoS ONE , volume 8 . Abstract Mismatch Negativity (MMN) is an N-methyl-d-aspartic acid (NMDA)-mediated, negative deflection in human auditory evoked potentials in response to a cognitively discriminable change. MMN-like responses have been extensively investigated in animal models, but the existence of MMN equivalent is still controversial. In this study, we aimed to investigate how closely the putative MMN (MMNp) in rats exhibited the comparable properties of human MMN. We used a surface microelectrode array with a grid of 10×7 recording sites within an area of 4.5×3.0 mm to densely map evoked potentials in the auditory cortex of anesthetized rats under the oddball paradigm. Firstly, like human MMN, deviant stimuli elicited negative deflections in auditory evoked potentials following the positive middle-latency response, termed P1. Secondly, MMNp exhibited deviance-detecting property, which could not be explained by simple stimulus specific adaptation (SSA). Thirdly, this MMNp occurred focally in the auditory cortex, including both the core and belt regions, while P1 activation focus was obtained in the core region, indicating that both P1 and MMNp are generated in the auditory cortex, yet the sources of these signals do not completely overlap. Fourthly, MMNp significantly decreased after the application of AP5 (D-(-)-2-amino-5-phosphonopentanoic acid), an antagonist at NMDA receptors. In stark contrast, AP5 affected neither P1 amplitude nor SSA of P1. These results provide compelling evidence that the MMNp we have examined in rats is functionally comparable to human MMN. The present work will stimulate translational research into MMN, which may help bridge the gap between electroencephalography (EEG)/magnetoencephalography (MEG) studies in humans and electrophysiological studies in animals.

This article is from PLoS ONE , volume 8 . Abstract Mismatch Negativity (MMN) is an N-methyl-d-aspartic acid (NMDA)-mediated, negative deflection in human auditory evoked potentials in response to a cognitively discriminable change. MMN-like responses have been extensively investigated in animal models, but the existence of MMN equivalent is still controversial. In this study, we aimed to investigate how closely the putative MMN (MMNp) in rats exhibited the comparable properties of human MMN. We used a surface microelectrode array with a grid of 10×7 recording sites within an area of 4.5×3.0 mm to densely map evoked potentials in the auditory cortex of anesthetized rats under the oddball paradigm. Firstly, like human MMN, deviant stimuli elicited negative deflections in auditory evoked potentials following the positive middle-latency response, termed P1. Secondly, MMNp exhibited deviance-detecting property, which could not be explained by simple stimulus specific adaptation (SSA). Thirdly, this MMNp occurred focally in the auditory cortex, including both the core and belt regions, while P1 activation focus was obtained in the core region, indicating that both P1 and MMNp are generated in the auditory cortex, yet the sources of these signals do not completely overlap. Fourthly, MMNp significantly decreased after the application of AP5 (D-(-)-2-amino-5-phosphonopentanoic acid), an antagonist at NMDA receptors. In stark contrast, AP5 affected neither P1 amplitude nor SSA of P1. These results provide compelling evidence that the MMNp we have examined in rats is functionally comparable to human MMN. The present work will stimulate translational research into MMN, which may help bridge the gap between electroencephalography (EEG)/magnetoencephalography (MEG) studies in humans and electrophysiological studies in animals.

This article is from PLoS ONE , volume 8 . Abstract Mismatch Negativity (MMN) is an N-methyl-d-aspartic acid (NMDA)-mediated, negative deflection in human auditory evoked potentials in response to a cognitively discriminable change. MMN-like responses have been extensively investigated in animal models, but the existence of MMN equivalent is still controversial. In this study, we aimed to investigate how closely the putative MMN (MMNp) in rats exhibited the comparable properties of human MMN. We used a surface microelectrode array with a grid of 10×7 recording sites within an area of 4.5×3.0 mm to densely map evoked potentials in the auditory cortex of anesthetized rats under the oddball paradigm. Firstly, like human MMN, deviant stimuli elicited negative deflections in auditory evoked potentials following the positive middle-latency response, termed P1. Secondly, MMNp exhibited deviance-detecting property, which could not be explained by simple stimulus specific adaptation (SSA). Thirdly, this MMNp occurred focally in the auditory cortex, including both the core and belt regions, while P1 activation focus was obtained in the core region, indicating that both P1 and MMNp are generated in the auditory cortex, yet the sources of these signals do not completely overlap. Fourthly, MMNp significantly decreased after the application of AP5 (D-(-)-2-amino-5-phosphonopentanoic acid), an antagonist at NMDA receptors. In stark contrast, AP5 affected neither P1 amplitude nor SSA of P1. These results provide compelling evidence that the MMNp we have examined in rats is functionally comparable to human MMN. The present work will stimulate translational research into MMN, which may help bridge the gap between electroencephalography (EEG)/magnetoencephalography (MEG) studies in humans and electrophysiological studies in animals.

mocumentary

Zabalaza (2005) "Deviance" and Punishment in Anarchist Society Zabalaza Books Johannesburg, South Africa

http://tasvideos.org/676S.html

http://tasvideos.org/676S.html

http://tasvideos.org/676S.html

Experiments 1, 3, 4, and 5 were cases of primary causal deviance. Experiments 1 and 5 found a different pattern of causal judgments than Experiments 3 and 4. One explanation for this difference is that while all other experiments in this project asked for causal judgments about causing an event, Experiments 3 and 4 asked for causal judgments about causing an action. As in all experiments in this project, participants in the deviant conditions in Experiments 3 and 4 may not have agreed that the potential action was an intentional action—or an action at all. Because of this, participants might have had lower agreement with the causal statement about the action in Experiments 3 and 4 because the agent's mental state caused an event rather than an action. Specifically, other experiments in this project asked for agreement with causal statements of the form: S's having wanted to [action] caused [event]. Experiments 3 and 4, however, asked for agreement with causal statements of the form: S's having wanted to [action] caused [action]. For instance, in Experiment 5, I asked participants for their agreement with the following: "Louie’s having wanted to knock on the table caused his leg to knock on the table." In Experiments 3 and 4, however, I asked for their agreement with the following: "Louie’s having wanted to loosen his hold caused him to loosen his hold." The idea is that participants in the deviant conditions in Experiments 3 and 4 might have disagreed with this causal statement, not because they disagreed with the causal relation, but because they disagreed that the agent's mental state caused an action at all. Specifically, they might have thought that Louie's having wanted to loosen his hold didn't cause him to loosen his hold because he didn't perform an action in this case—but it did cause his hands to loosen their hold (an event). The present experiment aims to address this potential confound. I used the same vignette and design as Experiment 4, and I changed only the causal statement so that it is about an event rather than a potential action. If my explanation for the different pattern of causal judgments in Experiments 3 and 4 is correct, then the results should show that (1) participants judge the potential action as less intentional in the deviant scenario than in the normal, non-deviant scenario, and (2) they judge that the agent's having desired the outcome was just as causal in bringing about the outcome in the deviant scenario as in the normal scenario.

A try at a harder tekno style piece than normal. Inspired by a night dancing under the stars, listening to a great sounding tekno rig at a free party in the countryside.

A try at a harder tekno style piece than normal. Inspired by a night dancing under the stars, listening to a great sounding tekno rig at a free party in the countryside.

A try at a harder tekno style piece than normal. Inspired by a night dancing under the stars, listening to a great sounding tekno rig at a free party in the countryside.

A try at a harder tekno style piece than normal. Inspired by a night dancing under the stars, listening to a great sounding tekno rig at a free party in the countryside.

A try at a harder tekno style piece than normal. Inspired by a night dancing under the stars, listening to a great sounding tekno rig at a free party in the countryside.

A try at a harder tekno style piece than normal. Inspired by a night dancing under the stars, listening to a great sounding tekno rig at a free party in the countryside.

Includes bibliographical references and indexes

Includes bibliographical references and indexes

Includes bibliographical references and indexes

Includes bibliographical references and indexes

Includes bibliographical references and indexes

Includes bibliographical references and indexes

Includes bibliographical references and indexes

Slashed Under Deviance Wiki dumped with WikiTeam tools.

In order to examine empirically the impact of race on aspects of the nature and etiology of criminal deviance, questionnaires were administered to 234 predominantly lower class black and white inmates in a prison for youthful offenders. The data thus provided indicated that the different experiences associated with race in contemporary America provide a major cutting-edge in the expectations and self-perceptions of these youths. While both blacks and whites interviewed show similar criminal histories, increasing levels of criminal income and of the expected value of criminal choice are associated with increases in self-esteem and self-stability for blacks, but with decreases in esteem and stability for whites. In corollary fashion, while both races sampled appear to define themselves as more "criminal" than "straight", increasing criminal identification is associated with marked decreases in self-esteem and stability for whites, but only marginal decreases for blacks. Such differences do not appear attributable to the potentially confounding influence of socioeconomic status, but, on the contrary, suggest that racial experience has been badly neglected as a factor in the process and perception of becoming criminally deviant. Race-specific etiological scenarios consonant with the present data are offered for consideration in future research. (Author/JM)

In order to examine empirically the impact of race on aspects of the nature and etiology of criminal deviance, questionnaires were administered to 234 predominantly lower class black and white inmates in a prison for youthful offenders. The data thus provided indicated that the different experiences associated with race in contemporary America provide a major cutting-edge in the expectations and self-perceptions of these youths. While both blacks and whites interviewed show similar criminal histories, increasing levels of criminal income and of the expected value of criminal choice are associated with increases in self-esteem and self-stability for blacks, but with decreases in esteem and stability for whites. In corollary fashion, while both races sampled appear to define themselves as more "criminal" than "straight", increasing criminal identification is associated with marked decreases in self-esteem and stability for whites, but only marginal decreases for blacks. Such differences do not appear attributable to the potentially confounding influence of socioeconomic status, but, on the contrary, suggest that racial experience has been badly neglected as a factor in the process and perception of becoming criminally deviant. Race-specific etiological scenarios consonant with the present data are offered for consideration in future research. (Author/JM)

In order to examine empirically the impact of race on aspects of the nature and etiology of criminal deviance, questionnaires were administered to 234 predominantly lower class black and white inmates in a prison for youthful offenders. The data thus provided indicated that the different experiences associated with race in contemporary America provide a major cutting-edge in the expectations and self-perceptions of these youths. While both blacks and whites interviewed show similar criminal histories, increasing levels of criminal income and of the expected value of criminal choice are associated with increases in self-esteem and self-stability for blacks, but with decreases in esteem and stability for whites. In corollary fashion, while both races sampled appear to define themselves as more "criminal" than "straight", increasing criminal identification is associated with marked decreases in self-esteem and stability for whites, but only marginal decreases for blacks. Such differences do not appear attributable to the potentially confounding influence of socioeconomic status, but, on the contrary, suggest that racial experience has been badly neglected as a factor in the process and perception of becoming criminally deviant. Race-specific etiological scenarios consonant with the present data are offered for consideration in future research. (Author/JM)

In order to examine empirically the impact of race on aspects of the nature and etiology of criminal deviance, questionnaires were administered to 234 predominantly lower class black and white inmates in a prison for youthful offenders. The data thus provided indicated that the different experiences associated with race in contemporary America provide a major cutting-edge in the expectations and self-perceptions of these youths. While both blacks and whites interviewed show similar criminal histories, increasing levels of criminal income and of the expected value of criminal choice are associated with increases in self-esteem and self-stability for blacks, but with decreases in esteem and stability for whites. In corollary fashion, while both races sampled appear to define themselves as more "criminal" than "straight", increasing criminal identification is associated with marked decreases in self-esteem and stability for whites, but only marginal decreases for blacks. Such differences do not appear attributable to the potentially confounding influence of socioeconomic status, but, on the contrary, suggest that racial experience has been badly neglected as a factor in the process and perception of becoming criminally deviant. Race-specific etiological scenarios consonant with the present data are offered for consideration in future research. (Author/JM)

In order to examine empirically the impact of race on aspects of the nature and etiology of criminal deviance, questionnaires were administered to 234 predominantly lower class black and white inmates in a prison for youthful offenders. The data thus provided indicated that the different experiences associated with race in contemporary America provide a major cutting-edge in the expectations and self-perceptions of these youths. While both blacks and whites interviewed show similar criminal histories, increasing levels of criminal income and of the expected value of criminal choice are associated with increases in self-esteem and self-stability for blacks, but with decreases in esteem and stability for whites. In corollary fashion, while both races sampled appear to define themselves as more "criminal" than "straight", increasing criminal identification is associated with marked decreases in self-esteem and stability for whites, but only marginal decreases for blacks. Such differences do not appear attributable to the potentially confounding influence of socioeconomic status, but, on the contrary, suggest that racial experience has been badly neglected as a factor in the process and perception of becoming criminally deviant. Race-specific etiological scenarios consonant with the present data are offered for consideration in future research. (Author/JM)

In order to examine empirically the impact of race on aspects of the nature and etiology of criminal deviance, questionnaires were administered to 234 predominantly lower class black and white inmates in a prison for youthful offenders. The data thus provided indicated that the different experiences associated with race in contemporary America provide a major cutting-edge in the expectations and self-perceptions of these youths. While both blacks and whites interviewed show similar criminal histories, increasing levels of criminal income and of the expected value of criminal choice are associated with increases in self-esteem and self-stability for blacks, but with decreases in esteem and stability for whites. In corollary fashion, while both races sampled appear to define themselves as more "criminal" than "straight", increasing criminal identification is associated with marked decreases in self-esteem and stability for whites, but only marginal decreases for blacks. Such differences do not appear attributable to the potentially confounding influence of socioeconomic status, but, on the contrary, suggest that racial experience has been badly neglected as a factor in the process and perception of becoming criminally deviant. Race-specific etiological scenarios consonant with the present data are offered for consideration in future research. (Author/JM)

In order to examine empirically the impact of race on aspects of the nature and etiology of criminal deviance, questionnaires were administered to 234 predominantly lower class black and white inmates in a prison for youthful offenders. The data thus provided indicated that the different experiences associated with race in contemporary America provide a major cutting-edge in the expectations and self-perceptions of these youths. While both blacks and whites interviewed show similar criminal histories, increasing levels of criminal income and of the expected value of criminal choice are associated with increases in self-esteem and self-stability for blacks, but with decreases in esteem and stability for whites. In corollary fashion, while both races sampled appear to define themselves as more "criminal" than "straight", increasing criminal identification is associated with marked decreases in self-esteem and stability for whites, but only marginal decreases for blacks. Such differences do not appear attributable to the potentially confounding influence of socioeconomic status, but, on the contrary, suggest that racial experience has been badly neglected as a factor in the process and perception of becoming criminally deviant. Race-specific etiological scenarios consonant with the present data are offered for consideration in future research. (Author/JM)

In order to examine empirically the impact of race on aspects of the nature and etiology of criminal deviance, questionnaires were administered to 234 predominantly lower class black and white inmates in a prison for youthful offenders. The data thus provided indicated that the different experiences associated with race in contemporary America provide a major cutting-edge in the expectations and self-perceptions of these youths. While both blacks and whites interviewed show similar criminal histories, increasing levels of criminal income and of the expected value of criminal choice are associated with increases in self-esteem and self-stability for blacks, but with decreases in esteem and stability for whites. In corollary fashion, while both races sampled appear to define themselves as more "criminal" than "straight", increasing criminal identification is associated with marked decreases in self-esteem and stability for whites, but only marginal decreases for blacks. Such differences do not appear attributable to the potentially confounding influence of socioeconomic status, but, on the contrary, suggest that racial experience has been badly neglected as a factor in the process and perception of becoming criminally deviant. Race-specific etiological scenarios consonant with the present data are offered for consideration in future research. (Author/JM)

Includes bibliographies

ix, 166 pages ; 22 cm

ix, 166 pages ; 22 cm

Audio Lecture for Module 1

This three volume report presents findings from an interview study with 103 children and adults regarding their awareness and conceptions of handicapping conditions and from a followup study of preschool handicapped and nonhandicapped students. Volume I details the design and results of the interview study focusing on Ss in five age groups: preschoolers, primary grade Ss, junior high school Ss, high school Ss, and adults. Among results were that there was a clear association between patterns of expressed awareness of handicap and age; there was no evidence of a relationship between sex and handicap awareness; a majority of confusions between handicaps involved mental retardation; patterns in explanation of causes varied with age; young children appeared to believe in immunity to handicaps; the percentages of Ss expressing realistic views of the curability of each handicap generally increased with age; Ss' understanding of adaptation appeared to begin as concrete and practical, becoming abstract and experiential with age; with age, Ss became more apt to mention phenomenological aspects of handicaps when asked what it would be like to be handicapped; and half the adolescents and nearly three-fourths of the adults expressed one or more nagative statements toward people with handicaps. Volume II reports results of systematic observation of handicapped and nonhandicapped Ss in mainstreamed preschools. Analysis of observation reports and teacher interviews were performed to determine which behaviors consistently differentiated handicapped from nonhandicapped Ss. Results revealed very few behaviors that were consistently associated with only one group of Ss across both preschools and all observation periods. In general, mildly handicapped Ss tended to behave more like their nonhandicapped classmates than did severely disabled Ss. Positive effects of socializing for both handicapped and nonhandicapped Ss were revealed, as were negative effects of the summer break on social behavior of handicapped Ss. Volume III contains the coding procedures used to analyze interview data. (CL)

This three volume report presents findings from an interview study with 103 children and adults regarding their awareness and conceptions of handicapping conditions and from a followup study of preschool handicapped and nonhandicapped students. Volume I details the design and results of the interview study focusing on Ss in five age groups: preschoolers, primary grade Ss, junior high school Ss, high school Ss, and adults. Among results were that there was a clear association between patterns of expressed awareness of handicap and age; there was no evidence of a relationship between sex and handicap awareness; a majority of confusions between handicaps involved mental retardation; patterns in explanation of causes varied with age; young children appeared to believe in immunity to handicaps; the percentages of Ss expressing realistic views of the curability of each handicap generally increased with age; Ss' understanding of adaptation appeared to begin as concrete and practical, becoming abstract and experiential with age; with age, Ss became more apt to mention phenomenological aspects of handicaps when asked what it would be like to be handicapped; and half the adolescents and nearly three-fourths of the adults expressed one or more nagative statements toward people with handicaps. Volume II reports results of systematic observation of handicapped and nonhandicapped Ss in mainstreamed preschools. Analysis of observation reports and teacher interviews were performed to determine which behaviors consistently differentiated handicapped from nonhandicapped Ss. Results revealed very few behaviors that were consistently associated with only one group of Ss across both preschools and all observation periods. In general, mildly handicapped Ss tended to behave more like their nonhandicapped classmates than did severely disabled Ss. Positive effects of socializing for both handicapped and nonhandicapped Ss were revealed, as were negative effects of the summer break on social behavior of handicapped Ss. Volume III contains the coding procedures used to analyze interview data. (CL)