Downloads & Free Reading Options - Results

The Art Of Deception Training For A New Generation Of Online Covert Operations, The Role of Bot Squads in the political propaganda on Twitter, The ultimate guide to bust fake tweeters, VCFI Impact Report, leaked memos reveal GCHQ efforts to keep mass surveillance secret, Obama confidant's spine chilling proposal

This monograph investigates the value of analyzing Russian deception doctrine and operations with a goal of improving US deception doctrine or operations. The question asked is: can an analysis of Russian deception doctrine and their use of deception lead to improvements in US deception doctrine, training, or operations? Brief investigation has revealed that deception is not used often at Combat Training Centers and that the loss of surprise is the single greatest cause of poor performance. Deception is a key tool in surprising the enemy. This monograph first summarizes popular deception theory and US doctrine. It concludes that US doctrine, although unapproved, is prescriptive and focuses on the concepts of developing a deception plan. It does not highlight the "how" of a deception operation and examples are only available through reading history. Theory supports surprise as a goal during all operations, but theorists support varying levels of commitment to the use of deception to attain surprise. The author concludes that in light of today's improved strategic and operational mobility each theorist considered would support the use of deception. After summarizing deception theory and US doctrine the monograph considers deception in Russian military operations. First, the social, historical, and political influences are described. From this it is evident that deception is endemic to Russian culture and is part of their military culture as well. Second, Russian doctrine is summarized. The summary is of open source writings and WWll experiences. The information tends to be directive in nature. The doctrine tells Russians units what actions they must do to deceive the enemy. Finally, five deception operations are summarized to give the reader a sense for the Russian ability to conduct deception.

This paper attempts to show that operational deception, as an operational art, still has a purpose in America's military today. Historical case studies have shown that at a relative inexpensive cost, deception is a force multiplier that can change the outcome of a conflict and can allow a weaker force to defeat a stronger force. Some have argued that recent advances in technology and Information Warfare make deception unnecessary and a waste of resources and time. Conversely, as military leaders become more dependent on information technology, there will be more opportunities to use deception in order to achieve military objectives. The study and practice of deception must improve if the Joint Force Commander expects to be able to conduct effective deception operations. There should be more emphasis at professional education institutions, joint doctrine should be revised to emphasize the role of deception for the commander, and a new Directorate for Deception Operations on the Joint Staff should be established in order to strengthen America's ability to conduct deception operations.

Urban operations are a significant and enduring challenge by virtually any measure; but a battle on friendly urban terrain offers the weaker of combatants a chance to reduce the advantages of a stronger adversary. Something similar might be said of deception, historically a frequent resort of the underdog. Both the battle on friendly urban terrain and the employment of deception might be fairly characterized as asymmetric strategies, aimed at reducing an opponent's strengths and exposing his weaknesses. The admixture of these two strategies-when deception is employed in the urban environment-produces a powerful synergy. This research was undertaken for the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) and was conducted in the Force Development and Technology Program of RAND's Arroyo Center. The Arroyo Center is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army. This study will be of interest to armed forces, law enforcement, or intelligence community personnel planning for or conducting operations and training in urban areas. Other governmental or non- governmental agencies considering policies involving dedication of military, law enforcement, or intelligence assets in urban settings will likewise find herein material of value in determining the risks and potential costs or benefits of such policies.

British deception operations in Palestine during World War I, and in particular the Haversack Ruse used in preparation for the third battle for Gaza, represent a modern revival of the use of deception in war. General Sir Edmund Allenby, the British commander in Palestine, conceived of and planned his two major operations, Gaza and Megiddo, with deception as an integral part. His success against Turkish-German armies in each was due, in large part, to his creative and thorough operational deception plans. Allenby's use of deception provides an excellent example because World War I represents one of the first modem wars, with regard to technology'.'and techniques that we still use today. Using the two successful major deception operations and one unsuccessful attempt at strategic deception as examples, I have derived the basic elements, advantages and limitations of deception. I found the elements of deception to be: good intelligence and security; knowledge of your enemy's perceptions and expectations; deception and operational planning integration; adequate time to both plan and execute operational deception; air superiority or the ability to control your enemy's reconnaissance of your forces; and creativity in blending these elements into a clever and innovative plan. Deception's advantages are its low cost, that it is difficult for your enemy to counter, and the surprise it gives you over your enemy. The limitations of deception are that it is not a panacea, that you still need adequate force to win in battle, and that you must have good enough intelligence feedback to know if your enemy has accepted your deceptive picture.

Description. This document is an internal GCHQ presentation prepared by the Joint Threat Intelligence Research Group (JTRIG). It describes the division's  covert   online   operations , specifically the control, infiltration and manipulation of  online   communication between targets.

Desperate Deception: British Covert Operations in the United States 1939-44 by Thomas E. Mahl

Desperate Deception: British Covert Operations in the United States 1939-44 by Thomas E. Mahl

Approved For Release 2006/0MAT RDP83M00914RO00800180031-5 The Director of Central Intelligence 15 April 1982 Lieutenant General Philip C. Gast, USAF Director J-3 (Operations) Joint Chiefs of Staff Washington, D.C. 20301 Dear General Gast: As you are aware, as been working with members of your staff on a joint three- ay seminar on deception operations- lessons learned. The seminar will feature several eminent allied practioners of deception operations in World War II. Their par- ticipation will serve as the basis for a series of. subsequent dis- cussions with policymakers and planners concerned with this activity. As part of the seminar, I will host a dinner on Monday, 10 May, at 6:00 p.m. at CIA Headquarters for a small group of senior officials. The dinner will provide an opportunity for you to exchange views with these planners of past successful-major de- ception operations. Hopefully you will find the company and the discussion stimulating and informative with respect to devising new uses of this much neglected but important instrument of national security. Your attendance will be helpful and appreciated. Sincerely, Approved For Release 2006/06/28: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800180031-5 Approved For Release 2006/06/28: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800180031-5 CCIS/ICS Distribution: 0 - Addee (w/enc) 1 - PP (wn/Pn ) 1 - (w/enc) Approved For Release 2006/06/28: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800180031-5

Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84B00049R001403610012-9 S. SECRET WASHINGTON February 28, 1980 80-6557 Ti THE SECRETARY OF STATE THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SUBJECT: National Deception Operations (C) REFERENCE: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs memorandum dated January 12, 1977, subject: Double Agent and Deception Operations On March 1, 1978, the Special Coordination Committee (Counter- intelligence) agreed that the referenced memorandum should be superseded by new NSC guidance which would treat double agent operations as separate from national deception activities. National-level guidance governing double agent operations has been subsequently adopted by the SCC(CI). Staff elements of the SCC have studied the circumstances and problems concerning U.S. national deception operations. The principles of deception judiciously applied can be a vital element in the attainment of U.S. objectives. Based upon those recommendations, the President has determined that the following activities should be undertaken. (S) 1. Policy guidance, approval and annual review of all national deception will be provided by the Special Coordination Committee, composed of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chairman), the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence. Heads of other agencies will be in attendance when proposed activities coming under their purview are under review or when their assets or expertise can be used in support of national deception activities. The SCC shall have no approval authority under this memorandum as to any activities that require review or approval in accordance with other laws, executive orders cr Presidential directives. (S) 2. A Special Working Group consisting of representatives of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence, and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, plus augmentation by other SECRET Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84B00049R001403610012-9 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84B00049R001403610012-9 S. SECRET agencies as required, will be established. The Special Working Group will be responsible for (a) developing procedures for the review and coordination of national deception concepts, plans and for providing proposed activities to the SCC for approval; and (b) making recommendations to the SCC on plans, proposals and concepts. (S) 3. There will be a Joint Secretariat established composed of\\one representative from the Secretary of Defense and one from the Director of Central Intelligence. The Joint Secretariat will be responsible for maintaining central records; receiving and reviewing all proposals, plans and concepts before submission to the Special Working Group; accomplishing necessary coordination; and recommending disposition to the Special Working Group. The Secretariat must bring each proposal, plan or concept received by it to the Special Working Group for action by the latter. The Secretariat will be responsible for establishing security procedures and maintaining security controls over all these matters. 4. National deception proposals, plans or concepts may b developed by any Government department or agency; however, each must be forwarded to the Secretariat for the required review and approval in accordance with the procedures described above. (S) 5. Departments and agencies conducting authorized national deception operations will provide status reports on these activities to the Secretariat for annual review by the SCC. The first such report will be due on March 1, 1981. (C) 6. The National Security Council Intelligence Directive of August 15, 1950 entitled "Controlled Foreign Agents" is cancelled. In addition, in view of this statement of policy, the related Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs memorandum of July 6, 1976, subject: Revision of NSCID's, is also cancelled. (S) Zbigniew Brzezinski cc: The Attorney General. Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director, National Security Agency SECRET (S) Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84B00049R001403610012-9

Approved For Release 2006/06/28: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800180032-4 SEC ET The Director of Central Intelligence Washington. D C. 20505 15 April 1982 The Honorable William H. Webster Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C. 20535 Dear Bill: Together with the Department of Defense, we are hosting a three-day seminar on deception operations-lessons learned. The seminar will feature several eminent allied practitioners of de- ception operations in World War II. Their participation will serve as the basis for a series of subsequent discussions with policymakers and planners concerned with this activity. As part of the seminar, I will host a dinner on Monday, 10 May, at 6:00 p.m. at CIA Headquarters for a small group of senior officials. The dinner will provide an opportunity for you or your deputy (I understand you may be out of the city on the date in- volved) to exchange views with these planners of past successful major deception operations. Hopefully the company and the dis- cussion will be stimulating and informative with respect to de- vising new uses of this much neglected but important instrument of national security. Your attendance will be helpful and appreciated. Sincerely, William J. Enclosure Approved For Release 2006/06/28: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800180032-4 CCIS/ICS: Distribution: 0 - Add ee (w/enc) 1 - FR (wn/P ) 1 (w/enc)

This thesis analyzes the role deception serves in the armed forces of the Soviet Union. The analysis focuses on the Soviets' mindset, historical application, military doctrine, organization, and current application of military deception. Before addressing the Soviet use of deception, an introduction is provided which includes some definitions and related terms, a historical look at deception, and some basic deception principles. The thesis closes with a summary of the main points concerning Soviet military deception and briefly compares it to past and current application of deception in the U. S. military.

Over the last ten years, initiatives at both the Department of Defense and Department of the Army levels have attempted to encourage a resurgence in the art of deception as a sustained war-fighting capability. This has seen an increased emphasis on deception in both U.S. doctrinal literature and in expanded coverage at our professional military institutions. This study seeks to examine the doctrinal foundation and historical perspective of deception operations to determine whether or not they should become an operational imperative at the Operational Level of War, or merely a doctrinal side show U.S. Military Forces. In addition, a review of present and for future issues, the technological necessities that could impact on our future deception operations, the overriding soviet emphasis on deception, and our current U.S. doctrinal education system will be addressed to provide an answer and recommendations to the question posed by the study title.

This study explores the concept of trust and its relevance to deception operations. It proposes that trust is a belief or characteristic that can be exploited or undermined to achieve a desired objective. By using a trust framework to analyze several case studies in deception, the paper will examine how the deception target beliefs and preconceptions affected the success of the deception and the impact or consequences of exploiting or undermining trust. Finally, the study will attempt to draw conclusions from this analysis that may be helpful in the analysis of other deception operations and in future deception planning.

Deception is widely appreciated as a powerful instrument of war, yet it is surprisingly understudied. There is much to be learned from the flexibility and innovation demonstrated at times by opposing forces. The authors believe that this holds as true in training exercises as in actual deployments. While there is no lack of ingenuity and guile among U.S. service members (at any rank), there is little training in how to craft and employ ruses and relatively few resources tasked to support deception operations. The authors have also noted that there is little analysis or doctrinal guidance for combatants or commanders to mull over when making tradeoffs regarding deception, even for so simple a question as whether to employ camouflage or decoys. This research was conducted in an attempt to delve more deeply into the theory of deception and, in so doing, to reveal new avenues of experimentation. These pathways may lead to new technologies or new training techniques, and hopefully will provoke a new look at deception doctrine applicable at every level of war. After reviewing the military deception literature, the authors examined a wide range of research on deception in the animal kingdom, where ruses of virtually infinite variety are applied to offense, defense, and intelligence gathering. What fundamentally ties animal deception to military deception? Since all entities seek accuracy in their perceptions, and accurate perceptions rely heavily upon the performance of an individual's sensors, improvements to sensors or sensory processing are significant contributors to survival; this is as true for human combatants as it is for any animal in any environment. It should not be surprising, therefore, that the reverse holds true: capabilities that engender inaccuracy in the perceptions of the foe (be it attacker or defender) tend to be highly advantageous.

The invasion of Normandy is widely used by military professionals and historians to draw examples of successes or failures from this complex operation. While the Normandy invasion ultimately led to the liberation of France and Europe from Nazi Germany, it was not achieved without a considerable amount of planning. Popular history has ignored some of the key aspects of this operation that illustrate the complexity of the planning in this undertaking. The research conducted in support of this monograph includes the use of source documents concerning the planning and preparations for the invasion by the Allies. The source documents center on three operations: Operation Fortitude, the deception operation; Operation Neptune the amphibious assault; finally, Operation Crossbow, the air operation. The source documents range from the operation orders used by the invasion forces; the ULTRA signals intelligence used to decode intercepted German radio traffic and the transcripts between senior Allied commanders and their staffs. Enhancing the source documents is a variety of historical works written by both British and American authors covering the invasion from varying perspectives. The research into the planning, preparations, and execution of the Normandy invasion revealed several constraints that the Allies placed upon themselves, and how those constraints led to an increased rate of operational friction. The operational friction became apparent in the sluggish progress through the Norman Bocage and the vicious fighting in the city of Caen. The Allied progress became so slow that it hindered the efforts of the Allied corps and divisions to achieve their key objectives for several weeks. Throughout most of the summer of 1944, the Allied objectives at the corps and division level became focused on the next hedgerow or road intersection, rather than the next city or port.

The invasion of Normandy is widely used by military professionals and historians to draw examples of successes or failures from this complex operation. While the Normandy invasion ultimately led to the liberation of France and Europe from Nazi Germany, it was not achieved without a considerable amount of planning. Popular history has ignored some of the key aspects of this operation that illustrate the complexity of the planning in this undertaking. The research conducted in support of this monograph includes the use of source documents concerning the planning and preparations for the invasion by the Allies. The source documents center on three operations: Operation Fortitude, the deception operation; Operation Neptune the amphibious assault; finally, Operation Crossbow, the air operation. The source documents range from the operation orders used by the invasion forces; the ULTRA signals intelligence used to decode intercepted German radio traffic and the transcripts between senior Allied commanders and their staffs. Enhancing the source documents is a variety of historical works written by both British and American authors covering the invasion from varying perspectives. The research into the planning, preparations, and execution of the Normandy invasion revealed several constraints that the Allies placed upon themselves, and how those constraints led to an increased rate of operational friction. The operational friction became apparent in the sluggish progress through the Norman Bocage and the vicious fighting in the city of Caen. The Allied progress became so slow that it hindered the efforts of the Allied corps and divisions to achieve their key objectives for several weeks. Throughout most of the summer of 1944, the Allied objectives at the corps and division level became focused on the next hedgerow or road intersection, rather than the next city or port.

Available from National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Va

Approved For Release 2006/04( i, TDP83MOO914R000800180030.6 The Director of Central Intelligence ? Washington. D. C. 20505 15 April 1982 Lieutenant General Paul F. Gorman, USA Assistant to the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Washington, D.C. 20301 Dear General Gorman: Our staffs have been working together to develop a three-day seminar on deception operations-lessons learned. As part of the seminar, I will host a dinner on Monday, 10 May, at 6:00 p.m. at CIA Headquarters for a small group of senior officials. The dinner will provide an opportunity for you to exchange views with these planners of past successful major de- ception operations. Hopefully you will find the company and the discussion stimulating and informative with respect to devising new uses of this much neglected but important instrument of national security. Your attendance will be helpful and appreciated. Sincerely, } 5 1 J F 4u j SLR Approved For Release 2006/06/28: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800180030-6 CCIS/ICS Approved For Release 2006/06/28: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800180030-6 Distribution: 0 - Addee (w/enc) 1 - FR (wo/ c) 1 (w/enc) Approved For Release 2006/06/28: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800180030-6

Approved For Release 20065 f ff F , DP83MOO914ROO0800180028-9 The Director of Central intelligence 15 April 1982 General John W. Vessey, USA Vice Chief of Staff Department of the Army Washington, D.C. 20310 Dear General Vessey: The Department of Defense and I are hosting a three-day seminar on deception operations-lessons learned. The seminar will feature several eminent allied practitioners of deception operations in World War II. Their participation will serve as the basis for a series of subsequent discussions with policymakers and planners concerned with this activity. As part of the seminar, I will host a dinner on Monday, 10 May, at 6:00 p.m. at CIA Headquarters for a small group of senior officials. The dinner will provide an opportunity for you to ex- change views with these planners of past successful major deception operations. Hopefully you will find the company and the discussion stimulating and informative with respect to devising new uses of this much neglected but important instrument of national security. Your attendance will be helpful and appreciated. Sincerely, Approved For Release 2006/06/28: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800180028-9 CCIS/ICS Approved For Release 2006/06/28: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800180028-9 } Distribution: 0 - Addee (w/enc) 1 1 w/enc) Approved For Release 2006/06/28: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800180028-9

Approved For Release 2006/ : FfRDP83M00914R000800180029-8 The Director of Central intelligence 15 April 1982 General David C. Jones, USAF Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Washington, D.C. 20301 Dear General Jones: XA- Our staffs have been working together to develop a three-day seminar on deception operations-lessons learned. As part of the seminar, I will host a dinner on Monday, 10 May, at 6:00 p.m. at CIA Headquarters for a small group of senior officials. The dinner will provide an opportunity for you to exchange views with these planners of past successful major de- ception operations. Hopefully you will find the company and the discussion stimulating and informative with respect to devising new uses of this much neglected but important instrument of national security. Your attendance will be helpful and appreciated. Sincerely, Enclosure ET Approved For Release 2006/06/28: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800180029-8 CCIS/ICS Distribution: 0 - Addee (w/enc) 1 - ER (wo/enc) 1 - (w/enc)

#Worldwar2 #wwii #nationalsocialism #thirdreich #nsdap #jwo #nwo #communismkills #whitegenocide #music #EuropeanPride #Wehrmacht #WorldWar1 #wwi #TreatyofVersailles #jewworldorder #betterdeadthanred #newworldorder #greatestally

This thesis analyzes the role deception serves in the armed forces of the Soviet Union. The analysis focuses on the Soviets' mindset, historical application, military doctrine, organization, and current application of military deception. Before addressing the Soviet use of deception, an introduction, is provided which includes some definitions and related terms, a historical look at deception, and some basic deception principles. The thesis closes with a summary of the main points concerning Soviet military deception and briefly compares it to past and current application of deception in the U.S. military.

This thesis analyzes the role deception serves in the armed forces of the Soviet Union. The analysis focuses on the Soviets' mindset, historical application, military doctrine, organization, and current application of military deception. Before addressing the Soviet use of deception, an introduction, is provided which includes some definitions and related terms, a historical look at deception, and some basic deception principles. The thesis closes with a summary of the main points concerning Soviet military deception and briefly compares it to past and current application of deception in the U.S. military.

The focus of this bibliography is on deception at the operational level of war. However, because successful deception at this level depends on successful tactical-level deception and excellent camouflage and concealment, material on these related topics is also included.

Deception has been a part of warfare throughout history and has proven a very effective force multiplier when employed correctly. Many esteemed military theorist have espoused the merits of deception including: Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, Mao Tse Tung, and Basil Liddell Hart. The challenge, however, in incorporating military deception is that it can be very difficult to plan, coordinate, and synchronize from the strategic through the operational and tactical levels of war. The increased demand for intelligence, information superiority, as well as the increased need for operational security to conduct successful deception also present a significant challenge to military planners. Additionally, deception requires a great deal of creativity and unconventional thinking on the part of the deceiver and is considered more art than science which makes it difficult to train within the military. Although the U.S. conventional military practiced deception at all levels of war on a number of occasions during World War II, it has since significantly reduced its use of deception above the tactical level, opting instead, to rely on its superior firepower, maneuver, and technology. However, while the conventional military has decreased its use of deception over the last sixty years, another force within the U.S. military, Special Operations Forces (SOF) has included the art of deception in their operations throughout their history. These highly trained soldiers depend on deception as a force multiplier and provide the U.S. military a unique tool with which to employ deception in support of large-scale conventional operations. This monograph examines the art of deception and analyzes the potential use of employing U.S. Special Operations Forces to conduct deception in support of conventional shaping and decisive operations.

CIA Deception Program 9 Civil Disturbance Operations

CIA Deception Program 9 Civil Disturbance Operations

art of deception

Revealed on 24 February 2014 by "Intercept", this is a document from GCHQ’s previously secret unit, JTRIG (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group) entitled “The Art of Deception: Training for Online Covert Operations.”

Mau, Christine A. Military Deception in Counterinsurgency Operations. AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLL MAXWELL AFB AL, 2009. "MILDEC can bring about distinct advantages to a military force and can be just as valuable in COIN as it is in conventional operations. This paper will provide a brief background on COIN operations and military deception and present ways to effectively combine the two." ---- Also see: Military Deception (MILDEC) https://archive.org/details/military_deception_daniel1980

Check the channel for more related content

The operational environment for assault operations in 1975-1980 is described. The U. S. philosophy of amphibious assault, anticipated capabilities for the period, and major phases in amphibious operations are discussed. The enemy philosophy of defense, reinforcement capabilities, and intelligence collection and processing methods are discussed. The state of communications technology in 1975-1980 is extrapolated from the present state of the art and is described in terms of frequency spectrum usage, modulation techniques, and operational capabilities. Communications deception, both manipulatallative (transmissiision of false information) and imitative (intrusion into enemy nets) is discussed in terms of objectives and techniques, and jamming is also considered. Likely enemy antideception activities are described.

MILDEC can bring about distinct advantages to a military force and can be just as valuable in COIN as it is in conventional operations. This paper will provide a brief background on COIN operations and military deception and present ways to effectively combine the two.

MILDEC can bring about distinct advantages to a military force and can be just as valuable in COIN as it is in conventional operations. This paper will provide a brief background on COIN operations and military deception and present ways to effectively combine the two.

This study explores the concept of trust and its relevance to deception operations. It proposes that trust is a belief or characteristic that can be exploited or undermined to achieve a desired objective. By using a trust framework to analyze several case studies in deception, the paper will examine how the deception target beliefs and preconceptions affected the success of the deception and the impact or consequences of exploiting or undermining trust. Finally, the study will attempt to draw conclusions from this analysis that may be helpful in the analysis of other deception operations and in future deception planning.

Analysis of Soviet deception operations during World War II with emphasis on Operation URANUS in November 1942 and Operation BAGRATION in June 1944. Discussion of the planning process, technical means employed, and the degree of success in preventing the Germans from discerning the main Soviet effort in time to take countermeasures. Based on published sources, including recent Soviet accounts of deception.

Approved For Release 2007/09/11: CIA-RDP84B00049R001203000005-6 THE WHIT.- HOUSE THE. SECRETARY OF STATE .THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF THE.-DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SECRET WASHINGTON 80-6557 NCS REVIEW COMPLETED; MEMORANDUM FOR: February 28, 1980 the attainment of ' Z S -objectives. Based upon those recommendations, the President has determined that the following activities should be :undertake? _ (S) of _ decepZ. on.. judiciously applied can be a vital element in -agent operations as separate from national deception activities. .National--level guidance governing double agent operations has been subsequently adopted by the SCC(CI). Staff elements of the SCC have studied the circumstances and problems concerning U.S..-national deception operations. The principles ational_ Deception-..Operations (C) Assistant to the President for National .-Security Affairs memorandum dated January 12,. 1977, subject: Double Agent and Deception Operations .'On March 1, 1978, the Special Coordination. Committee (Counter- intelligence) agreed that the referenced memorandum should be superseded by-new-NSC guidance which would treat double 1. _. Policy __guidance, approval and annual review of all national deception will be provided by the Special .Coordination Committee, composed of. the Assistant to the- President for National Security Affairs _,,- Cha =ant, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of De?ense, the Attorney General and the Director of Cem al Intelligence. Heads of other agencies ~-will.be -in attendance when proposed activities ,coning under their purview are under review or when their assets or'expertise can be used in support of national deception activities- The SCC shall have no approval authority under this mermorandum .as to any activities that require review or approval .in-accordance with other laws, executive orders or Presidential'directives. (S) 2. A Special Working Group consisting of representatives of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, .Director of Central Intelligence, and Chairman, Joint Chiefs -of Staff,- plus augmentation by other S EC RE.,, CIA Approved For Release 2007/09/11: CIA-RDP84B00049R001203000005-6 Approved For Release 2007/09/11: CIA-RDP84B00049ROO1203000005-6 W,4 agencies as required, will be established. The Special Working Group will be responsible. for (a) developing. procedures for the review and coordination of national deception concepts, plans and for providing proposed activities-to the SCC for approval; and (b) making recommendations to the SCC on plans, proposals and concepts (S) There will be a Joint Secretariat established composed -or:\tione representative from the Secretary of Defense and, one from the Director of Central Intclligence.'The . Joint Secretariat. will be responsible for maintaining central records; receiving and reviewing all proposals, plans and concepts before submission to the Special -110;king-Group;. accomplishing necessary coordination; and recommending disposition to the Special Working. :Group. - The Secretariat must bring' each proposal, plan or concept-- received by it to the Special Working Group for action by the latter. The Secretariat will be responsible for establishing security procedures and main taining.security_controls over all these matters. National deception proposals, plans or concepts ma, be - developed by any Government department or agency; however-, each must be forwarded to the Secretariat for the- required review and approval in accordance with the procedures- described above. (S) Depa=tments'and agencies conducting authorized national deception operations will provide status reports on these--activities to the Secretariat for annual review by the: -SCC.. The first such report will be due on March The National Security Council Intelligence Directive of -August. 15:,. 1950 entitled "Controlled Foreign Agents" is cancelled. In.addition, in view of this statement of -poliicy,-the related Assistant to the President for ati anal Security Affairs memorandu-z . of July 6, 1976, subject=.. :Revision of NSCID's, is also cancelled. (S) ?Zbigniew Brzezinski cc: The Attorney General- Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation :Director, National Security Agency SECRET Approved For Release 2007/09/11: CIA-RDP84B00049R001203000005-6 S)

Check the channel for further content See this link for further info into this book: https://archive.org/details/michael-collins-piper-and-carolyn-yeager-desperate-deception-how-we-were-lured-i