Downloads & Free Reading Options - Results

.

467 p. : 25 cm

This edition of Carl von Clausewitz's Two Letters on Strategy was made possible by the Army War College Foundation and by the Art of War Colloquium of the Army War College, which sponsors the volume as part of its program of republishing military classics for the professional development of the officer corps. The Army War College wishes to express its gratitude to the co-editors and translators, Professor Peter Paret, Spruance Professor of International History at Stanford University, and Dr. Daniel Moran. In recent years, Carl von Clausewitz's On War has attracted many new readers in this country, stimulated in large part by the publication in 1976 of a new translation and edition of the work by Professors Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Generally readers have concentrated on Clausewitz's philosophy, theory, and strategic concepts, as developed in Books One, Two, Three, and Eight of On War. His views on operations, on the other hand, have been largely neglected. The present work provides us with an opportunity to study Clausewitz's thinking on operational issues in a specific strategic context. Two Letters on Strategy deals with the planning and conduct of a campaign, based on problems set by the Chief of Prussian General Staff in 1827.

In the normal course of things it is modern commentators that critique their predecessors. In the following pages I will turn this idea on its head by critically reviewing the strategic thought of Bernard Brodie (1910-1978) using the strategist thought of Carl von Clausewitz (1710-1831) as the basis for my critique . Specifically, I propose to compare their thought using four major criteria as a framework. These criteria include what is war; why employ military power; when, or under what conditions should military power by employed; and how should military power be used. To put this effort in proper perspective it is necessary first to say a few words about the lives and times of these two military thinkers. Clausewitz lived his life over a hundred years before the advent of nuclear weapons. he was a professional military officer for most of his life. He knew war at first hand. Brodie, by contrast, was an academic. He never wore a uniform nor did he know from direct personnel experience about the horrors of war. He was, however, associated throughout his life with military institutions. He was, in fact, a member of the faculty that opened the National War College in 1946.

This paper presents a fictional dialog between the author and one of the most famous military strategists who ever lived: Karl von Clausewitz. The author questions Clausewitz about the French-Algerian War, particularly how Clausewitz's concepts can be applied to that war.

As the events of September 11, 2001 crashed down on millions of Twin Towers and Pentagons on every television and information medium worldwide, the American psyche suffered feelings of shock, sorrow, fear, and anger. But perhaps the emotion hardest to deal with was that of vulnerability how could someone use our very way of life as a weapon to attack the world's superpower? Osama bin Laden must have read Clausewitz. The terrorist acts of September 11th illustrate a thorough understanding of the nature and conduct of war as presented by Clausewitz in On War. By analyzing those same theories as they relate to the events of September 11th, I plan to suggest a strategic course of action that strikes back at Osama bin Laden's center of gravity.

This essay is a fictional letter written by military strategist Carl von Clausewitz to General William Slim, commander of Allied troops in Burma during World War II. Clausewitz analyzes the military strategy and tactics Slim used in his defense of Burma against the Japanese Army.

Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz would be proud. While certainly not perfect, U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf War was strategically successful, both militarily and politically. An analysis of this success demonstrates that the United States understood and appropriately applied Clausewitz's theory of the paradoxical trinity. Clausewitz is probably best known for his statement that war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means. Some have challenged this statement on the basis that war is abhorrent and has no place in policy. The author believes these challenges are mistaken. Clausewitz's statement neither glorifies nor advocates war. Rather, it simply states that war is a tool, and if used, it must be subordinated to a purpose other than violence. Wars must never be fought for the sake of military objectives alone; military objectives must serve a political purpose toward the ensuing peace. Clausewitz theorized that war is a phenomenon of three tendencies, forming a paradoxical trinity, affecting military operations. The three elements of this trinity are reason, the creative spirit, and a natural force. Clausewitz argues that the subordination of war to policy is subject to reason, and therefore principally the concern of government; the creative spirit, working within the play of chance and probability on the battlefield, is the arena of the commander and his army; and the blind, natural force composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, is embodied by the people. The three elements of the trinity are bonded by a force called will. The paradox of the trinity lies in the seeming contradictions between the pure logic of reason, the artistry of the creative spirit and the uncontrollable passion of primordial violence, hatred and enmity. In this paper the author will explore each element of the trinity and examine its application to the conduct of U.S. military operations in the Persian Gulf War.

Carl von Clausewitz was the first military theorist to recognize and articulate in his writings the nature of war as a political instrument of government policy. In his words, war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. (Clausewitz 87) Thus, [w]hen whole communities go to war -- whole peoples and especially civilized peoples -- the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object. (Clausewitz 86-7) That political object, the reason for going to war, will thus determine the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires. (Clausewitz 81) He cautioned against allowing war to take over national policy, saying that [p]olicy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice versa. (Clausewitz 607) Thus, the military point of view must be subordinate to the political. Within this context, the purpose of this paper is to examine the Gulf War from a political-military perspective to identify any Clausewitz fingerprints on the U.S. decision-making process leading to war, the stated political and military objectives, the political-military dynamics during the crisis, and when and how the United States ended the war.

Carl Von Clausewitz advises us in his book, On War, that the distinctive feature of the great generals is genius, the ability to see through the fog of war and make the correct decision at the critical time. If one agrees that war is as much art as it is science, then it would make sense to develop those parts of our personality and intellect that deal with artistry so that whatever level of genius we are blessed with may be fully realized. The approach this study recommends is the inclusion of literature, fiction, in professional development programs as this offers the best possibility for addressing and understanding the essential truths of the profession of arms. The examples used are two plays by Shakespeare, Othello and Henry V, Nathaniel Hawthorne's short story Roger Malvin's Burial, and Herman Melville's novel Billy Budd.

This paper explores the hypothesis that although Clausewitz has been criticized for not specifically addressing naval warfare in his seminal work On War, Clausewitzian principles are in fact not only applicable, but highly relevant to the modern conduct of war at sea. The 1982 Falkland Islands conflict between Great Britain and Argentina will be used as the framework to examine this hypothesis. As the largest and most significant series of naval engagements since World War II, the Falklands War provides a rich database of both traditional and nontraditional lessons learned about the conduct of war at sea. This paper begins with a brief discussion of critiques of Clausewitz and his apparent lack of focus on the naval element of warfare. It will be followed by a historical review of significant events leading up to, and during the Falkland Islands War. Key events in the war will then be reviewed and examined within a framework of Clausewitzian principles. The motives, key assumptions, military strategy, and tactics of Great Britain and Argentina will be discussed within the context of the Clausewitzian dictum that war is the continuation of politics by other means. Selected specific events in the campaign will then be addressed in terms of Clausewitzian principles of war to determine their relevance or irrelevance to modern naval strategy and campaigning.

Carl Von Clausewitz Vom Kriege Hinterlassenes Werk ( 1905, 827 S., Scan, Fraktur)

Carl Von Clausewitz Vom Kriege Hinterlassenes Werk ( 1905, 827 S., Scan, Fraktur)

Carl Von Clausewitz Vom Kriege Hinterlassenes Werk ( 1905, 827 S., Scan, Fraktur)

Carl Von Clausewitz Vom Kriege Hinterlassenes Werk ( 1905, 827 S., Scan, Fraktur)

カール・フォン・クラウセヴィッツ『遺稿著作集』3巻。『戦争論』を含む。『戦争論』を鴎外がドイツ留学中に本書を熟読し、のちに陸軍中将となる田村(早川)怡与造にその内容を講じていたことは『独逸日記』の明治21(1888)年1月18日の記述にもみられる。帰国後の小倉時代に本書の抄訳に着手、『大戦学理』として明治36(1903)年に出版した。本書にはペン(インク)と鉛筆の二種類の書入れが見られるが、ペンの書入れはドイツ留学中の覚書とみられ、読書の進捗を記したとみられる日付の書入れがある。また鉛筆の書入れは帰国後、本書を翻訳したときの訳語などのメモと考えられるが、そのほとんどが鴎外の抄訳した始めの5分の1に集中している。第1巻の内表紙に「明治二十一年一月校合 鴎外逸人」の識字が見られる。(河) 関連作品: 『大戦学理』（全集34巻） 関連作品: 『独逸日記』（全集35巻） 参考文献: 小堀桂一郎『森鴎外−文業解題』翻訳編，岩波書店，1982年

Metsch, Horst von - Zeitgemaesse Gedanken um Clausewitz (1937, 26 S., Scan, Fraktur)

For years, many philosophers, strategists, poets, politicians, and warriors have pointed to the similarities between playing poker and combat. Perhaps the late Colonel David Hackworth, one of America's most decorated soldiers, said it best when he stated, Great warriors were usually great poker players -- it made sense, too, because in many ways the skills required in poker are the same ones you need on a battlefield: boldness, a cool head, and the ability to bluff. It isn't just military leaders who see the power that training in poker provides. Bill Gates was an avid poker player before he went on to become the world's most successful businessman. Richard Nixon financed his first political campaign with his poker winnings. President Truman, General Eisenhower, and Secretary of War Henry Stimson played avidly during WW-II. The list goes on, and all these men credit playing poker with aiding their life successes. What these men keyed in on is supported by almost overwhelming anecdotal evidence, but little scientific study. What exactly are the similarities between poker and combat, and more importantly, how can a modern commander use this information to better prepare for future wars? The similarities between poker and combat are striking. Taking the analogy one step further, both activities stress a type of crisis action thinking and decision making in an environment filled with uncertainty and high risk. In addition, the options a player faces on a poker table closely parallel the options a commander faces on a battlefield. Poker is a unique training aid that a commander can employ to help his troops develop essential leadership traits that they can call upon in both combat and other crisis management situations. As such, competitive poker playing should be adopted into the military training regimen in the same manner as the military Physical Training (PT) program.

The leader of a powerful western nation decided to intervene in a large, sparsely populated desert country across the ocean to stop atrocities perpetrated by that government on its people and to gain influence in that region. He was convinced by exiles from that country that his army would be met with tears of joy by the entire population who were eager to throw off local rule and let an outsider have control. Leery of going it alone, this leader built a coalition of the willing and invaded. After swift initial successes, the army found itself campaigning in a country three times the size of Texas against guerilla forces supported by a neighboring country. There were calls for more troops but the leader refused to increase the force. The resources expected from the invaded country to offset campaign costs failed to materialize as promised, and the western nation suffered significant economic drain. Is this President George W. Bush in Iraq in 2003? Actually this story, 140 years old, describes French Emperor Napoleon III s invasion of Mexico in 1862. Had Carl von Clausewitz been Napoleon III s military advisor from 1862 to 1867, he would have counseled against a military campaign for regime change in Mexico as unwinnable due to American opposition; and if initiated anyway, his campaign plan would have focused on neutralizing the two centers of gravity.

This paper reviews the lives of Henri Jomini and Carl von Clauswitz. It also covers the main concepts contained in their greatest works and the influence they had on subsequent warfare and military thinking. Jomini's influence is traced through the American Civil War to current military doctrine. Clausewitz' influence is traced from the post Napoleonic period, through the two world wars, to current military doctrine.

Military officers must be skilled in strategy and the operational art of campaigning. To acquire these skills, part of their learning must include study of the warfighting experiences of others as well as understanding the concepts of the classic military theorists. Young officers probably don't read enough of yet that is where the conceptual ability to strategize is gained. In this study, a comparison is made of the two greatest classic military strategists, Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Using the WW I battle of Verdun and the 1950's battle of Dienbienphu as a framework, this study uses tangible historical examples to highlight and compare their teachings on war and strategy in such a way that the young military officer can gain a basic understanding of these concepts.

Clausewitz' contribution to the study of war is certainly invaluable. However, the military, politicians and scholars alike need to move away from Clausewitz except as a source of discussion to generate alternatives to strategy. Clausewitz essentially deals with the operational and tactical levels of war as he observed it in the Napoleonic era. While Clausewitz is better known and frequently quoted for espousing the primary of politics in war, he does not adequately discuss the relationship between politics and war, the problems of higher direction of war or the nature of civil-military relations. Starting with his definition of strategy as the use of engagements for the purposes of the war, he repeatedly emphasizes the direct strategy of destruction of enemy's armies as the main objective and even calls the political purpose a modification of this objective. Unfortunately, due to his contradictory style of writing, his adherents have been able to link his theories to all subsequent wars to suit their particular needs. The controversy is fueled by the fact the Clausewitz could not complete his book 'On War' before his death. This paper examines Clausewitz' validity in the modern era with a new approach of evaluating his emphasis on theories at the strategic level to derive his intent

Carl von Clausewitz completed his initial, unrevised draft of On War more than thirty years before the first shots were fired at Fort Sumter. His writings, unlike those of his Swiss contemporary, Antoine-Henri Jomini, had not become a part of American military curriculum by the middle of the 19th century, and most Civil War commanders probably were unfamiliar with his work. Moreover, the conflict in which those commanders were engaged proved to be qualitatively and quantitatively different -- in scale, in violence, in technology, in resultant changes in tactics -- from the Napoleonic wars on which Clausewitz based many of his observations. Nevertheless, the Civil War is replete with examples of Clausewitzian principles applied or ignored. The writings of the Prussian military philosopher provide a useful framework for analyzing how the two sides pursued that conflict and for identifying factors affecting victories and defeats. To examine the entire war through that lens would require volumes. Instead, this paper will attempt to consider several questions on the scale of a single engagement, the battle of Fredericksburg. Which of Clausewitz's theses were most relevant to that campaign? Which commanders reflected, understood, applied those principles more? What role did this play in the outcome? Could a different application of Clausewitz's lessons have affected the results of the battle? Do aspects of Fredericksburg contradict the Prussian's teachings? Examination of these questions demonstrates that, while the Fredericksburg campaign illustrates many of Clausewitz's theses, fog, friction and military genius best explain how a promising Union initiative ended in disaster.

The purpose of the study is to reveal characteristics of the strategic cultures in Britain, France, and Germany as the major member states of the European Union (EU), Assuming that national differences can be detected, the study proceeds in assessing whether there is an opportunity to reconcile them, or even to establish a European paradigm of strategic thinking as a core element of the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU, Based on the interpretation of Clausewitz's theory of war and strategy in Britain, France, and Germany, main commonalities and diversities in strategic thinking are discussed, Analyzing, on the international and state level, why Clausewitz has been misunderstood, this study establishes Clausewitz's theory of war and strategy as the theoretical framework of strategy-making within the EU, The fruitfulness of the Clausewitzian paradigm is shown in two areas: first, Clausewitz's theoretical approach assists in gaining an improved understanding of the political and military strategic environment of the EU; second, it provides awareness of the challenges given with multinationality as a strategic principle of the EU, Finally, Clausewitz's theory allows institutional and educational consequences to be drawn.

Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, former commander of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, reportedly coined the expression crossing the Mogadishu line while describing the key dilemma faced by UN troops in Bosnia: how do armed peacekeepers maintain the appearance of neutrality in the midst of civil war while achieving the political objectives for which they were sent? Indeed, when one considers the difficulties the United States has experienced in a long string of recent interventions, to include Lebanon, Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkan wars of Bosnia and Kosovo, the historical record suggests that the solution to this dilemma has yet to be identified.

Wild Geraas: rebels nieuws met humor! Elke maandagochtend om zeven uur. Oorlogen die de kopstukken bespreken zijn o.a die in de Oekraine, WO II, en Gelderland tegen 't Gooi... Gooien we met sponzen of met bakstenen? U hoort het in de nieuwe aflevering van Wild Geraas! 0:01:15 Clausewitz' leven 0:04:40 Pruisen en de eer van een staat 0:14:00 Waardoor ontstaat een totale oorlog? 0:18:06 Van professioneel leger naar volksleger 0:25:10 Oekraine: totale oorlog, VS en Rusland pragmatisch 0:33:06 Operatie Barbarossa: gebrek aan inzet. 0:35:15 Clausewitz vs Hitler over politiek 0:45:45 WO 2: Evolutie naar een totale oorlog 0:47:10 Herrijzenis van een verslagen volk? 0:47:32 Christelijke of heidense motieven bij Clausewitz? 0:54:50 Herrijzenis moet komen van leiders in ballingschap 0:57:38 Dit geldt ook voor de nationale beweging 1:00:15 Het aankweken van een officierenklasse 1:06:56 De eer als het centrale begrip

Decision making in combat is one of the core competencies most valued in leaders. Much effort is dedicated to the analysis of decision-making models, processes, and methodologies in order to develop skills that enable leaders to make qualitatively better decisions under duress. However, little attention is directed toward the study of decision-making with respect to complexity, the fundamental environment of combat. In addressing a legendary tale of military failure, this monograph synthesizes historical analysis, classical theory, and contemporary science. Rather than revisit an argument worn by time, the intent of this document is to overlay the elements of complexity theory onto a map of history, then present the problem from the perspective of the Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz. Ultimately, this monograph seeks to resolve whether the defeat of the U.S. 7th Cavalry at the Little Big Horn was due to a logic of failure brought on by George Armstrong Custer's inability to recognize and predict the behavior of the complex nature of the environment of combat. The first section of the monograph examines the historical events leading to the Battle of the Little Big Horn. Chapter Two proceeds into a comparative analysis of the complex metaphors presented in On War while the third chapter details the effects of decision-making in a complex system. Finally, Chapter Four addresses the logic of failure that defined the chain of events eventually leading to Custer 's defeat. The monograph conclusions presented in Chapter Five bring together the elements of complexity present in the environment of battle and resolves the basic research question.

La geopolitica, lâazione delle élite e delle classi dirigenti, le strategie, il conflitto visti da Massimo Morigi. A cura di conflitti e strategie: Un contributo agli amici alla riflessione da Massimo Morigi a proposito di âRepubblicanesimoâ, âRepubblicanesimo Geopoliticoâ e lâattuale situazione culturale e geopolitica della crisi dellâOccidente. Giuseppe Germinario di âConflitti e Strategieâ intervista il professor Massimo Morigi sul âRepubblicanesimo Geopoliticoâ e le chiavi interpretative che tale definizione riesce ad offrire allâanalisi politica

Wild Geraas: rebels nieuws met humor! Elke maandagochtend om zeven uur. Oorlogen die de kopstukken bespreken zijn o.a die in de Oekraine, WO II, en Gelderland tegen 't Gooi... Gooien we met sponzen of met bakstenen? U hoort het in de nieuwe aflevering van Wild Geraas! 0:01:15 Clausewitz' leven 0:04:40 Pruisen en de eer van een staat 0:14:00 Waardoor ontstaat een totale oorlog? 0:18:06 Van professioneel leger naar volksleger 0:25:10 Oekraine: totale oorlog, VS en Rusland pragmatisch 0:33:06 Operatie Barbarossa: gebrek aan inzet. 0:35:15 Clausewitz vs Hitler over politiek 0:45:45 WO 2: Evolutie naar een totale oorlog 0:47:10 Herrijzenis van een verslagen volk? 0:47:32 Christelijke of heidense motieven bij Clausewitz? 0:54:50 Herrijzenis moet komen van leiders in ballingschap 0:57:38 Dit geldt ook voor de nationale beweging 1:00:15 Het aankweken van een officierenklasse 1:06:56 De eer als het centrale begrip

‘Teoria della Distruzione del Valore’: teoria elaborata da Massimo Morigi afferente al ‘Repubblicanesimo Geopolitico’, al ‘Repubblicanesimo’, al ‘Neo-repubblicanesimo’, al ‘Marxismo’ e al ‘Neo-marxismo’. Pur condividendo la critica di Karl Marx all’individualismo metodologico dell’economia classica (in specie la critica ad Adam Smith e David Ricardo, individualismo metodologico che poi sarà in seguito trasmesso anche all’economia neoclassica o marginalismo), la ‘Teoria della Distruzione del Valore’ rovescia la teoria del plusvalore di Karl Marx, affermando che il rapporto sociale che va sotto il nome di ‘capitalismo’ non opera una sottrazione del valore del lavoro erogato dal lavoratore a vantaggio del capitale ma, invece, una distruzione del valore di questo lavoro, distruzione del valore che si evidenzia sul “libero mercato” dove s’incontrano – entrambi formalmente liberi – gli operai (decisori omega-strategici), che apportano su questo mercato un lavoro svalutato (distrutto quindi nel suo valore) originatosi proprio dalla libertà di questo mercato (ossia dalla sua mancanza di regole) e i datori di lavoro capitalisti (decisori alfa-strategici) che così possono avvalersi di questo valore-lavoro effettivamente svalutato (o, meglio, distrutto).

Clausewitz, Carl von - Vom Kriege (1832, 462 S.)

acceso abierto

Nach Erkläuterung der grundlegenden Erkenntnisse des Carl von Clausewitz werden diese auf den politischen Kampf der Gegenwart übertragen und anhand von praktischen Beispielen erläutert.

Nach Erkläuterung der grundlegenden Erkenntnisse des Carl von Clausewitz werden diese auf den politischen Kampf der Gegenwart übertragen und anhand von praktischen Beispielen erläutert.

14

Ever since the quickening of social and technological change that began during the Napoleonic era, there have been many strategic debates inspired by those developments. Six are discussed in this thesis Jomini vs. Clausewitz How useful are principles of war Mahan vs. Mackinder Is either land or sea power inherently more valuable for achieving national aims Bernhardi vs. Bloch Did industrialization make war an impractical endeavor Douhet vs. Mitchell What is the role of air power in national defense Brodie vs. Wohlstetter Is nuclear deterrence robust, or is there a delicate balance of terror Giap vs. Galula Can conventional forces defeat insurgencies, and, if so, how Though these debates are listed in their rough chronological order of appearance, they do not reflect discrete blocks of time and often overlap. The purpose of this thesis is not to judge whether any particular debater was right or wrong. Rather, the intent is to consider the debate itself. While problem definition may seem a less-than-ambitious undertaking, it is nonetheless necessary for understanding the root causes and conduct of war over the last two centuries, as well as for the understanding of possible forms of future conflict. In some cases the differences between the debaters are apparent. In others, the differences are subtle. The conclusion summarizes the debates and addresses underlying themes or patterns that were identified during the course of this research. Last, some possible future strategic debates are identified, along with some topics that may require further research.

The Culmination Point of Attack and the Culmination Point of Victory are concepts Clausewitz has developed in greater depth. Both concepts are based on his understanding of strategy. As we see it today, however, they are related to different levels of warfare. The Culmination Point of Attack is an operational concept. The Culmination Point of Victory is related to the strategic objectives of a campaign and the outcome of the war and therefore a strategic concept. Both concepts are different but they influence each other. As a deduction of Clausewitz's thoughts a new concept, the Culmination Point of Defense can be developed. It is an implied concept and can be used by the defender once the attacker has crossed his Culmination Point of Attack. It is not useful to look for recipes, to apply these concepts. Clausewitz gives no recipes, he show reader how to think. The concepts are examined in greater depth by using case studies. The war in North Africa during 1941 and 1942, and an excursion to the Eastern front is evaluated to find important criteria for the application of Clausewitz's concepts in modern warfare on the operational level, as well as, the level of military strategy.

Clausewitz, Carl von - Vom Kriege - Hinterlassenes Werk (1905, 827 S., Scan, Fraktur)

This paper presents an analysis of Dien Bien Phu and the TET Offensive of 1968 by the author, a student at the National War College. The analysis is in response to a request by President Lyndon B. Johnson to get some clarification on any linkage between Dien Bien Phu and the TET Offensive, and the role of Carl von Clausewitz's theories in explaining the two battles. The result is a comparative analysis between the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and the TET Offensive of 1968 in South Vietnam. On the tactical level of war the two operations could not be more dissimilar. The former was an outright tactical defeat of a French strong point by the Vietminh, while the latter was a defeat of a large number of South Vietnamese Communists by U.S. Forces. However, it is on the strategic level of war, in support of strategic national policy formulation and execution, that the lessons of Dien Bien Phu and TET 68 merge.

General Colin Powell describes the writings of Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz as follows: like a beam of light from the past, still illuminating present-day military quandaries. The frequency with which modern commentators quote von Clausewitz suggests that General Powell is not alone in his assessment. Two factors have helped von Clausewitz's writings to withstand the test of time. First, he approached the study of war from a broad, theoretical perspective, giving emphasis to motivational factors and other fundamental themes that operate across the full spectrum of human conflict. And second, while the stunning rate of technological advance since the early 19th century has changed the shape and size of the battlefield, technological advances have, with possibly one significant exception, left the fundamental nature of war and human conflict unchanged. That exception, the development of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), has for the first time given military and political leaders the capacity to bring about the annihilation of their enemy through execution of a single decision. This paper reexamines some of von Clausewitz's observations about the nature of war and human conflict in light of the development of nuclear weapons, and asks two questions: to what extent are von Clausewitz's insights still valid, and, if they are still valid, how are they, or might they be, reflected in efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war between two nuclear powers?

Between the European revolutions of the mid-nineteenth century and the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, Friedrich Engels functioned as a writer, analyst, and critic concerning military affairs. This project concentrates on the tactical, operational, and technical aspects qf Engel's military thought and the development of his concepts from his earliest writings until the Franco-Prussian War. This project will demonstrate that Engels possessed a remarkable level of military knowledge and a degree of insight at the operational and tactical levels of warfare and that he should be considered not only as an important social and economic thinker, but also among the most significant contributors to the field of nineteenth and twentieth century military history and theory. His contributions to the field of revolutionary military theory earn him distinction as one of the most important socialist writers of the nineteenth century.

‘Teoria della Distruzione del Valore’: teoria elaborata da Massimo Morigi afferente al ‘Repubblicanesimo Geopolitico’, al ‘Repubblicanesimo’, al ‘Neo-repubblicanesimo’, al ‘Marxismo’ e al ‘Neo-marxismo’. Pur condividendo la critica di Karl Marx all’individualismo metodologico dell’economia classica (in specie la critica ad Adam Smith e David Ricardo, individualismo metodologico che poi sarà in seguito trasmesso anche all’economia neoclassica o marginalismo), la ‘Teoria della Distruzione del Valore’ rovescia la teoria del plusvalore di Karl Marx, affermando che il rapporto sociale che va sotto il nome di ‘capitalismo’ non opera una sottrazione del valore del lavoro erogato dal lavoratore a vantaggio del capitale ma, invece, una distruzione del valore di questo lavoro, distruzione del valore che si evidenzia sul “libero mercato” dove s’incontrano – entrambi formalmente liberi – gli operai (decisori omega-strategici), che apportano su questo mercato un lavoro svalutato (distrutto quindi nel suo valore) originatosi proprio dalla libertà di questo mercato (ossia dalla sua mancanza di regole) e i datori di lavoro capitalisti (decisori alfa-strategici) che così possono avvalersi di questo valore-lavoro effettivamente svalutato (o, meglio, distrutto).