Downloads & Free Reading Options - Results

The Chelmsford, Massachusetts Tax Classification Study Committee Meeting from September 18, 2018

Tonight's Chelmsford, Massachusetts Tax Classification Study Committee Meeting from September 11, 2018.

Approved For Release 200 N F"ftt1194R001000243 37!5 Wo 8 August 1979 Classification Review Procedure CRP 79-33 INFORMATION INDICATIVE OF QUESTIONABLE ACTIVITIES 1. A serious responsibility rests on every reviewer to be alert during classification reviews of CIA material for any information on activities which have been challenged as questionable, or which appear to provide evidence of possible wrongdoing or of suggestions and recom- mendations for actions which could have led to wrongdoing had they been carried out. This may include information not only on actions readily recognizable as potentially illegal, but also on any which the majority of Americans might view as immoral, unethical, or reprehensible according to present standards and beliefs. The Agency has been criticized for alleged involvement in attempted assassinations, testing drugs on un- witting subjects, seeking ways to affect human behavior (often referred to under the umbrella cryptonym MKULTRA), mail censorship, operations involving student organizations, and the operational use of American journalists. 0 2. Reviewers should be alert to information concerning such activities as well as others which might also be considered questionable. All such cases should be noted, even those involving recommendations turned down and never implemented. This often happened, and in one sense has a positive connotation for the Agency by demonstrating that such sties were not acceptable as a policy matter even at the time. 3. If information concerning such activities is uncovered, CRD must ensure that the responsible Directorate or Office is-advised so that action can be taken to notify senior Agency management and intel- ligence oversight bodies as appropriate. Reviewers finding such infor- mation, or having questions as to whether certain information might fit within the defined categories, should bring it to the attention of the Branch Chief representing the Directorate involved. Branch Chiefs will be responsible for advising C/CRD and taking action as may be required with the appropriate Directorate or other component. Should a document requiring transmission to a component be found, the CRD Branch Chief concerned will forward a copy thereof to that component and obtain a receipt. 7 25X1A lZee Alsso S CA P"? S '~- ie , Classification Review Division ORIGINAL CL BY _ D DECL PS REVW ON ~" ~~yy~~ [ ~ ~1 IAI EXT BYND 6 YRS BY Approved For Release 2002/.0 24 Ft%A~R~"9 61194RfOA.8QOV 0037;,

Approved For Releatw2002/06/24: CIA-RDP93BOl194R001 J240051-9 12 March 1979 Classification Review Procedure CRP 79-19 USE OF A REGISTRY NUMBER AS THE DOCUMENT NUMBER 1. Ascertaining the unique number of a document -- as discussed in RRP 78-22 of 28 April 1978 -- is important for computer matching and identification of duplicate documents in the DARE system. In most cases, such as those of finished intelligence or series documents, identifying the unique number of the document is no great problem. In some types of material, however, especially correspondence that may have only a registry number -- or worse yet, several registry numbers -- the decision is not easy. 2. If a reviewer must use a registry number in the absence of a document number, the registry. number must meet two requirements. First, it must be the registry number of the office originating the correspon- dence, as spelled out in paragraph 7 of CRP 78-38 dated 11 October 1978. Second, the number must be typed on the document or written in ors an official registry stamp in such a manner that the reviewer is reasonably certain that it will appear on all copies of that.. document.`' If this is not the case, enter the document as unnumbered by drawing a line through the document number field on form 4023A. 3. Examples: a. Usable registry numbers: ER-4-7805 or b. Registry numbers not usable-as document numbers: Ek-5--770V or (pencil) (ink) Chief, Classification Review Group STATINTL Approved For Release 2002/06/24, CIA-RDP93B01194RO01000240051-9.

Approved For Relea 2002/06/24: CIA-RDP93B01194R00lOM240073-5 Classification Review Procedure Review of Directorate of Administration Records All Offices 1. Check the shelf list to verify that folders which are supposed to be in the box are actually there and that folder numbers and titles correspond to the shelf list. In the event they do not agree, do not begin work on the box but notify the Chief, Administration Branch imme- diately who will notify the DDA RMO and request corrective action. This same procedure will be followed for any other problems encountered in the classification review process (except for duplicate material and obviously non-applicable material, which may be destroyed). Stop work on the box immediately and let the RMOs correct the problem before clas- sification review is performed. 2. Do not stamp documents or make entries on the Form 4023A until you have thoroughly examined all the material in the folder and under- stand the filing system used. 3. File should be perused for documents which are singularly identifiable. Once this is determined, proceed with the review. 4. All routing sheets, cryptic notes, buck slams, etc. which are attached to the file and ap cable to the matter-_a hand will be retained and reviewed as part of the file. All loose materials, routing stet ets, cryptic notes, buck slips, etc. which are unattached_and_not applicable to the_mat-tar-at hand-.wi1J h ~PGtjj &. Duplicate copies o 3entifiable documents will be destroyed provided that no substantive comments are contained thereon. Reviewers are reminded that routing sheets may contain substantive information such as names of personnel and organizational components. 5. All pencil notes, draft copies, etc. pertaining to a single finished document will be attached to the document if, in the reviewer's judgment, they in fact constitute a single document. 6. Stamp the single finished document in Step 4 above with the review/declassification action indicators. Approved For Release 2002/06/24: CIA-RDP93B01194R001000240073-5 Approved For Relea 002/06/24: CIA-RDP93B01194R001%W240073-5 7. Be alert to proper document identification numbers. Make entries exactly as given if it is clear that only one number applies. In the event several numbers appear on the document, use the identi- fication number of the office of the person who signed the document. If no such number appears, use the number applied by the senior office. Example: 0/F , DD/S ; ER 8. Review and follow instructions set forth in RRP 78-5 on the handling and processing of TS material (including cover and control sheets). STATINTL Classification Review Group -2- Approved For Release 2002/06/24: CIA-RDP93B01194RO01000240073-5

Sec. ', Q ~ywwwitiwwJww /7.. Approved For Releas: e 2009/03/23: CIA-RDP94B00280R001200050026-3 (a) Information shall be'considered for classification if it concerns: (1) military plans, weapons, or operations; (2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems,' installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security; (3) foreign government information; (4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods; (5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States; (6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security; (7) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; (8) cryptology; (9) a confidential source; or (10) other categories of information that are related to the national security and that require protection against unauthorized disclosure as determined by the President or. by agency heads or other officials who have been delegated original classification authority by the President. Any determination made under this subsection shall be reported promptly to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office. (b) Information that is determined to concern one or more of the categories in Section 1.3(a) shall be classified when an original classification authority also determines that its unauthorized disclosure, either by itself or in the context of other information, reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security. (d) Information classified in accordance with Section 1.3 shall not be declassi- fied automatically as a result of any unofficial publication or inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure in the United States or abroad of identical or similar information. JW_ Approved For Release 2009/03/23: CIA-RDP94B00280R001200050026-3

No Description

Approved Fc~~- F~elease 2003/09/10 :CIA-RDP96-0079,2000100140065-1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 1. THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DOD INDUSTRIAL SECURITY MANUAL CONTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SPECIFICATION APPLY TO ALL SECURITY ASPECTS OF THIS TOt~t Secret FFORT TH F T P . E E ACILI Y CLEARANCE REQUIRED i5: Z THIS SPECIFICATION ~ CO DENTIFICAT ON NUMBERER 4 DATE TO DE !5, THIS SPECIFICATION IS: . IS FOR: (prime contracts must br shown COMPLETED (See s`NOTE?r below. J/ Item b w r is '?Jt'dr~, /or ail subcontracts) (Estimated) also enter date for item a) a? ~ a. PRIME' CON TRACT NUMDER a. a. A D TE X PRIME CONTRACT p NIDA9O8-81-C-OOO~+ 82APR05 ~ete e f ~ (~ 81APR06 dare ln aft crasa) ~ b? aUBCON TRACT(Ute Item JS for subcontract/ng b, FIRST TIER fUDCON TRACT NO. b. ,REVISED Cetrperaedsa REVIf10N Np. DATE beyond second yet) X ipre/~leiYons 1 ~lAUG21 c? REDO EST FOR 61 D, c? IDENTIFICATION NUMDER c. DUE DATE c. DATE REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL OR REp FOR OU4TA TIpN - FINAL ' 6. is this r_follow;on contract? ~] Yes _ Q No. If YES, complete the following; a..MOA903-~~ -1.-0292 b. r, Accountability for classified material oa preceding contract P RECEDIN~ CONTRACT NUMDER DATE COMPLETED `yy r ;,pals L,) ]s not, transferred to this follow-an cantract. 7a. Name, Address h Zip Code of Prime Contractor * b. FSC Number c. }tame, Address 61 Zip Code of ognlzant Seclalty O tiee SRI International DCASR Los Angeles, ATTN: Direc$orate of 333 Ravenswood Ave industrial Security,_11099_S.La Cienga M nl0 Park A Blvd., _Las Angeles, CA 9001x5 tla. Name, Address tk 21p Code of Firt:t Tier Subcontractor ? b. FSC Number c. Name, Address ~. 2ip Code of Cognizant Security Ottice 9a. Name, Addreec k Zip Code of Second Tier Subcontractor, or b. FSC Number c, Name, Address tr. Zip Code of Cognizant Security Office facility ssaociated with IFB, RFP OR RFQ ? , ? R'hen actual performance is at a location other than that aprcified, identity wch other'1aceUOn to item I5. toe. General idrntifieaeinn of the Procurement for which this specification applies b. ~o~AA Number o Procuring cavity S&T Intel l igenee Study/Analysis identified m Item 16d. e. Are there additional security requirements established in accordance with paragrrph 1-114 or 1-115, 1SR? Q Yes ?No. 1f YES, identity the pertinent contractual documents in Item 15. d. Arr any elements of this contract outside the inspection responalbility of the cognisant security office? ~ yes ~ No. If YES, ezplain in , ]rein 15 and identity specific arrrc or elements. 11, ACCESS REQUIREMENTS YES NC ACCESS REQUIREMENTS (Continued) YES NO a. 'Aeceas to Classified Information Only at other j. Access to SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION. X contractor/Government activities. k Access to other S eeisl Access Pro ram I for ti b. Receipt of classified documents or other material . p g n ma on (Specify In Item JS). for reference rnly jne, generetlan). X 1. Access to U. S. classified fntormatlon outside the V. S. Psname Canal Zone, Puerto Rieo, U. S, possessions X c. Receipt and generation of classified documeMS y and Trust Territories, or other materiel. /t m. Defense Documentation Center or Defense information d. Fabrication/Madlfication/Storage of classified hardware. X Analycis Crntrr Services may be requested. X e. Caaphic arts cervices only. n. Classified ADP processing w!1] be involved. f. Aeceas to IPO iNormatlon. o. REMARKS: g. Access to RESTRICTED DATA. h A l ifi d f DOD DIR 5200.17 . eeesa to c ass e COMSEC ln armaian? i. Cryptographic Access Authorisation required. X DOD DIR 5200.18 12. Rrfer al] questions prrlrintng to contract srcttrity elasstfication specification to the official named below (NORMALLY. thru ACO (item J6e); EMERGENCY. direct w(th wr/tten retard of Inquiry and raeponer to AGO) (thru prime eontraetar for aubeontracts). a. The cla:sifieation Guidance tontained in this speeiffcet on and attachments rcfrreneed herein !s complete and rdequate. b? ther c. Activity name, address, Zip Code, tslaphotx nttmber and office symbol Defense Intelligence Agency SG1 ATTN: DT-lA Tefhnical Intelligence SG1 NOTE: Origlnsl Spedticatlon (Item Sa) Is euthorlty for contractors to mark elusitl one tome Sb and are (I authority for contractors to remark the regraded ctassllled Inlomlatlon. Such actions by contractors shaft be taken In accordsnce with the provfrlans of the IndusMlal Security Manual. d~ I JAN 7B~ /~p~roved For Release 2003/09/10 :CIA-RDP96-007928000100140065-1 TION OF 1 APR 7 1; OBSOLETE. ALSO REPLACES OD FORM 2St?e 1N-tiCH IS 0850LETE ., .? "~ Approved Fo~._Release 2003/09/10 :CIA-RDP96-0079~R00100140065-1 13a. Information pertaining to clssalfird contracts or projects, even though such information is considered unclessitled, shalt not be relersed for public dissemination ascept as provlded by the Industrial Security Manual (paragraph 5o and Appendfz /)I). b. Proposes publle releases shat! be submitted for approval prior to release f:~ Direct [~ Through (Specify): Public Release of SCI is not Authorized. to the Dlrectonte For Freedom of Information and Security keview, Office of the Assistant 8ecrstary of Defense (publle Aflalrs) ? for rwtew In accordance with paragraph 50 of the lnduserial Security Manuel. ? In the case of non-DoD User Agencies, see footnote a ra h So Industrial Securlt Manual. 11. Security Clasiiflcation Specifications for this solicitation contract are identified below (??X?' applicable boz(os) and supply aftrclunenfs ar required). Any narrative or classification guide(s) furnished shall be annotated or have information appended to clearly and precisely identify eoch elamrm of information which requires ? classification. When ^ classlflcatlon guide is utilised, that portion of the guide(s) pertaining to the specific rontraetual effort may be etctraeted and famished the contractor. When a total guide(s) Ia utilized, each individual portion of the guide(s) which pertains to the contractual effort shall be clearly Identified in Item lib. The following lnfortnatlon must Dc provlded for each item o! classlfled information idcntlt-ed in an a:tract or guide: (I) Category of ciaasitieation. (lI) Date or event for deelassifleation or review for declassllfeatfon, and (III) The date or event for downgrading (If applicable), The official named !n Item 12b, is reaponalble for furnishing the contactor copies of all guides and changes thereto that are made a part of Phis apeeificatlon. Claasttled information may be attached or furnished ender separate cotter. [~f a. A completed nrrrative ls.(I) 0 attached, or (2) ?transmitted under aeparale toter and madc ? part of this ttpeetflcation. j b. The following classification guide(s) is made a part of this specification and is (1) ~ attached, or (2) Q transmitted under separate cover. (L1N guider undsr Item 15 or in an attachment by rifle, reference number and data). ~j e, Service-type contract/aubeontract. (Specify instructions in accordance with ISR/ISM, as spprapriate.), [] d. ??X" only if this la a final epeelfication and Item 6 is ? ??NO" answer. In response to the eontractor?s request dated retention of the identified classlfled material is ruthorised for a period of Q e. Annual review of this DD Form 251 is required. If ??X'd?', provide date such review is due: . 15. Remarks {Whenever possible, illustrate propsr classification, deelassitleation, end tl applicable, downgrading lnatructfonal. a. This contract requires access to SCI. The Defense Intelligence Agency has exclusive security responsibility for such information released to the contractor ar developed under this contract. DIAM 50-5 provides the necessary guidenace for physical, personnel and information security measures and is a part of the security specifications for this contract. DCASR is relieved of responsibility for all SCI material or information released to the contractor under this contract. b. foreign national employees of the Contractor or subcontractor(s) are not authorized access to classified information resulting from or use in the performance of this Contract. c. The Contractor-shall notify the COTR in writing no later than five (5) days after receipt of the contract of the following information regarding the individuals assigned to work on this contract. (l) Name (2) Date and Place of Birth 3) Social Security Number (SEE CONTINUATION SHEET) 16a. Contract Security Classlficrtion 6peci[icatltxns !or Subcontracts issuing Isom this contract wtll be approved by the Office named in Item 16e below, or by the prime contractor, as authorized. This Contract Security Classlficatlon Spec![ieation and attachments referenced herein are approved by the Vesr Agency Contacting Officer or his Representative named !n Uem 16b below. REQUIRED DISTRIBUTION: prime Contractor (Item 7a) ~(] Cognizant Security Oftiee (item 7e) ? Adminlatatlve.Contracting Otfiee (Item I6e) ? Quality Aaswastee Representative Q Subcontractor (Item aa) ? cognizant Security Office (cram at) Q program/Project ylanager (item 126) Defens 11 i g Agency p v. s, Activity Responsible for Overseas Security Administration The Pentagon, Rss SG 1 J Washin ton, D.C. 20301 ADDITIONAL D1STRf8VTiON: e. Name, address and Zip Code of Administrative Contracting Office , ~ DCASMA San Francisco C' ~ ~ 1250 Bayhill Drive O ?Approved Fo~C_Release 2003/09/10: CIA-RDP96-0079~F?00100140065-1 DD Form 254 (Continued) . (4) Certification of clearance investigation and clearance, .date clearance granted, and name of agency granting clearance. c. Final classification of the information generated under this Contract is the responsibility of DIA~(DT-lA). Information generated under this Contract is subject to the guidelines contained in DaD Regulation 5200.18, dated 2 November 1978, which implements EO 12065 which became effective 1 December 1978. Technical reports classified as .high as TOP SECRET SI/SAO will be provided the Contractor by DIA and other DoD activities, and other DoD contractors for use in connection with this Contract. These reports may be retained far the duration of this Contract unless no longer needed. Upon termination of this 6ontract, the reports shall be returned to the sender (if required) or destroyed in accordance with current security regulations. If these documents are to be retained beyond the ending date of this Eontract, written justification must be forwarded to and authorization given by the Eontracting Officer. e. All copies of final documents generated by the Eontractor under this Contract will be transmitted to DIA (DT-lA) for dissemination to the Grill Flame Committee. No other distribution is authorized. f. Use of the ARFCOS system is required.. Approved For Release 2003/09/10: CIA-RDP96-007928000100140065-1

Approved For Release 2008/12/10: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01500080050-6 Iq Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied STAT Approved For Release 2008/12/10: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01500080050-6 Approved For Release 2008/12/10: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01500080050-6 Se-iera \~. Services Na.ic-;o_ Arcn:vves anc ` . . 1J~~\ Administration Records Service Abilene. Kansas 67-iL August 27, 1982 SEP 1 3 4 IPD, Registry Information and Privacy Coordinator Central Intelligence Agency Room 1107, Ames Building Washington, DC 20505 STAT STAT STAT Under the provisions of Section 3.4 .. Executive Order 12356, a researcher has requested the mandatory classification review of the enclosed documents STAT from the holdings of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Also enclosed are copies of the researcher's request form and a document list. The identifi- cation of the Library file is given in the document list. If there is any question concerning this request, do not hesitate to contact us. The Library staff has reviewed these documents under guidelines issued by your agency for systematic review of classified presidential papers or records as provided by Section 3.3 of E.O. 12356. After applying guidelines, the staff has determined that these documents must be reviewed by authorized personnel within your agency. Please review the documents, obtain any concurrences if necessary, and advise the researcher if, in your opinion, the documents may be declassified. If the documents may now be declassified, please mark them with the appropriate declassification authority and send the copies to the researcher. If any documents or any portions thereof should remain classified in the interest of national security, please provide the researcher with the applicable exemption category from Section 1.3 of E.O. 12356 and specify a date or event when declassification may be accomplished. The researcher should also be advised of his rights to appeal any denials in accordance with provisions of Section 3.4 (d) of E.O. 12356. Should any denials be appealed, please notify the Eisenhower Library of the actions taken. When you inform the researcher of the results of this review, please send the Eisenhower Library a copy of your letter to the researcher so that we may take appropriate action on the original copies of these documents in our holdings. Whenever any documents are declassified only in part, please also provide the Library with copies clearly marked to identify those portions which have been exempted from declassification. The Eisenhower Library's case number and document numbers should be used in any correspondence with the researcher or the Library. Sincerely, JAMES W. 1EYERZ Supervisory Archivist Dwight D. Eisenhower Library In reply refer to: NLE- 82-475 STAT C,9.A,jnn[NT AL UNCLASSIFIED WHEN ATTAC ARE DETACHED G 4171'T'AL UNCLASSIFIED WHEN Enclosures ATTACHMENTS ARE DETACHED Approved For Release 2008/12/10: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01500080050-6 Approved For Release 2008/12/10: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01500080050-6 Request for Mandatory Review of Classified Material in the Custody of the National Archives and Records Service Date of request: August 27, 1982 Name of depository: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library Address: Abilene, Kansas 67410 I hereby request mandatory review of classified materials (as per attached list) in the SPEC;A1 VS'STA;N;'c r?: 21" 1 SPIER r DULLES, JOHN FOyTER1 Pt.P s, Lm" in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 12065 Sec. 3-5. STAT Approved For Release 2008/12/10: CIA-RDP86M00886RO01500080050-6

Approved For Release 2009/04/17: CIA-RDP87-008688000100050016-4 ? ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE~LY During the week of 23 March discussions were held with PMCD regarding the proposed title and grade classification of a GS09 Computer Technician position. Although we are not totally in agreement with the determination, we propose placing the position on the Staffing Complement as is and seeking a re-review after we begin programming our accounting and preparing for the other new computer applications. Meanwhile I have asked the incumbent of the position to identify training courses which will be needed to insure the most timely and effective liaison with the contractor during automation. Approved For Release 2009/04/17: CIA-RDP87-008688000100050016-4

T '134RD00500140073-6 MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director FROM: Harry E. Fitzwater . Deputy Director for Administration SUBJECT: Classification of DCID 1/14 1. 1 have looked into the matter, raised with you by the Inspector General, of the classification of Director of Central. Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/14. 2. Because DCIDs are an Intelligence Community matter, the Chairman, DCI Security Committee (SECOM), was asked to place the Inspector General's concern before SECOM for consideration. At the 17 February SECOM meeting, the members voted unanimously to go on record in support of maintaining the unclassified status of this Directive. 3. The SECOM made a conscious decision. not to classify DCID 1/14 when it was adopted on 1 July 1968. This was well before the initiative of the seventies to declassify everything possible. On 24 September 1979, the HPSCI Subcommittee on Over- sight released the text of DCID 1/14 to the press. The SECOM members believe the initial decision not to classify DCID 1/14 was correct. Its public release and its unclassified status for more than a decade further weigh against a change at this time. Finally, SECOM considers it necessary to have an unclassified policy to deal effectively with such matters as appeals of denials of SCI access. 4. In view of this background, I believe it would be unproductive to pursue this matter any further. Harry E. Fitzwater Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP87B01034R000500140073-6 ORM f--i9 V I V "'I' Approved For, Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP87B01034R000500140073-6 Approved For. Release 2006/01103 : GIA=RDP87B01034R000500140073-6 ROUTING AND RECORD '~T FEB COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom., Draw a line across column after each comment.) Attached is .a memo-] from the DDA to the Executive 'Director explaihin.g why. )CID I/14 'is uriclassifi.ed. This matter was raised by -he, Inspector..Gen.eral. STOAT'

Approved For Release 2002/05/10: CIA-RDP77-00389R00Q 00110003-1 29 March 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence SUBJECT: Review of Classification Authority Delegations Mr. Colby has completed his review of the proposed deletions of classification authority delegations. In conjunction with this review, he has asked that I respond to your memorandum of March 1973, advising you that he wishes you to proceed with the deletions of the Secret classification authority delegations identified in the attachment to that memorandum. The Top Secret delegations must be authorized by the Director and this office will initiate action on those deletions. Special Assistant for Information Control GFD:bec Distribution: Orig - Adse 1-SAIC Approved For Release 2002/05/10 : CIA-RDP77-00389R000100110003-1

STANDARD FORM NA proved Release W,p 1h ;CJA RpP,71 TG073ff 0700010176-1 (Mice Memorindiim ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO THRU 25X1 D FROM Chief, D/S SUBJECT: Removal of Codeword Classification 25X1 D 25X1A5a1 25X1 D 1. It is requested that the attached material be reduced to SECRET classification for inclusion a report of the Economic FOIAb3c 25X11 . According to NSA the material utilized is not COCOM matters. 25X1 D 2. Publication at a higher classification would prevent the dissemination of key material in this report for use by policy makers at the Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Export- Import Bank, ICA, OCDM, Department of the Treasury, USIA, CFEP, OCB, All of the preceding consumers need the information contained in this repcrt for making of policy decisions relative to 25X1A9a Executive Secretary ^ 25X1 D d3'~LS ONLY Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP71T0073OR000700010176-1 DATE: 16 June 1960

Approved For Re'le'ase 2001 1A-RDP33-02415A000200370022-4 '25X1A2g X2823-63 Copy-,; W NRO DECLASSIFICATION/RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS ON FILE I MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy for Field Activities, OSA SUBJECT : Classification of Training and Test Film from the B Camera System 25X1A2g REFERENCES : A. W2603-63 to DNRO frm: DD/R, Subj: As Above 25X1A2g B. M2464-63 to COMOR f rm: C/COMOR, Subj: As Above 1. In reference A. the Deputy Director (Research) informed the NRO that 111. Taking cognizance of the cumulative extent of publicity focused upon the performance capability of the U-2 aircraft in recent years a valid question has been raised as to the security requirement that all U-2 photography, regardless of content, bear a minimum classification of Secret. "2. Effective immediately this requirement is rescinded, and U-2 photography henceforth should bear the security classification warranted by the content of the photography. Photography of non- sensitive targets classified Secret in the past merely because it was obtained by a U-2 aircraft can be downgraded as appropriate. This change is not intended to affect the special security classification of photography collected under Project IDEALIST nor the procedures established for downgrading such photo- graphy." 2. These paragraphs were quoted for the benefit of the members of the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance in reference B. 25X1A2g Approved For Release 2001/08/29S~ P33-02415A000200370lIf$e via ^ Control System Approved For Release 2001/0~9:1-RDP33-02415A000200370022-4 25X1A2g =2823-63 Page 2 25X1A9a 3. The basic memorandum signed by the DD/R was pre- pared by this Staff and prior to its release was coordi- nated with the D/TECH, D/FA, and Chairman, COMOR. 4. The Operations Division, OSA, has solicited guidance with regard to the security classification which should be given to training and test film of the B camera in the U-2 taken from IDEALIST U-2s. 5. It is the opinion of this Staff that such training and test film taken by the B camera system of non-sensitive targets can be processed and handled as unclassified material. 6. This particular authorization to handle this mater- ial in an unclassified manner applies only to film from the B camera system. This fact is reemphasized here since, of course, future developments may well make available more advanced camera systems for employment in this vehicle. 7. Although authority is granted here to treat this material as unclassified, it. still must be borne in mind that this is official government property and the film should not under any circumstances be made available for personal purposes. It will, therefore,, be necessary to stamp all such photography with the caveat "For Official Use Only." It must similarly be borne in mind that this authorization does not relieve the field Detachment Com- mander from his responsibility to ensure that the product of such photographic training and testing is not observed by unauthorized persons under circumstances wherein our photographic mission should not be disclosed. ief, Security Staff OSA Approved For Release 2001/08/29 CIA- Approved For Release 2001/08/29 1 f~1P33-02415A0Q0200370022-4 25X1A2g _2823-63 Page 3 25X1A9a OSA/SS: mpr Distribution: Copies 1 & 2 D/TA/OS4 3 - DAD/OSA. 4 - D/TECH/OSA 5 - C/ID/OSA 6 - C/COMOR 7 - SAL/OSA 8 - PS/OSA 9 - DDS 10 -' NPIC 11 - SS/OSA 12 - RB/OSA Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : ~yl -, 3-02415A000200370022-4

Approved For Re'le'ase 2001 1A-RDP33-02415A000200370022-4 '25X1A2g X2823-63 Copy-,; W NRO DECLASSIFICATION/RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS ON FILE I MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy for Field Activities, OSA SUBJECT : Classification of Training and Test Film from the B Camera System 25X1A2g REFERENCES : A. W2603-63 to DNRO frm: DD/R, Subj: As Above 25X1A2g B. M2464-63 to COMOR f rm: C/COMOR, Subj: As Above 1. In reference A. the Deputy Director (Research) informed the NRO that 111. Taking cognizance of the cumulative extent of publicity focused upon the performance capability of the U-2 aircraft in recent years a valid question has been raised as to the security requirement that all U-2 photography, regardless of content, bear a minimum classification of Secret. "2. Effective immediately this requirement is rescinded, and U-2 photography henceforth should bear the security classification warranted by the content of the photography. Photography of non- sensitive targets classified Secret in the past merely because it was obtained by a U-2 aircraft can be downgraded as appropriate. This change is not intended to affect the special security classification of photography collected under Project IDEALIST nor the procedures established for downgrading such photo- graphy." 2. These paragraphs were quoted for the benefit of the members of the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance in reference B. 25X1A2g Approved For Release 2001/08/29S~ P33-02415A000200370lIf$e via ^ Control System Approved For Release 2001/0~9:1-RDP33-02415A000200370022-4 25X1A2g =2823-63 Page 2 25X1A9a 3. The basic memorandum signed by the DD/R was pre- pared by this Staff and prior to its release was coordi- nated with the D/TECH, D/FA, and Chairman, COMOR. 4. The Operations Division, OSA, has solicited guidance with regard to the security classification which should be given to training and test film of the B camera in the U-2 taken from IDEALIST U-2s. 5. It is the opinion of this Staff that such training and test film taken by the B camera system of non-sensitive targets can be processed and handled as unclassified material. 6. This particular authorization to handle this mater- ial in an unclassified manner applies only to film from the B camera system. This fact is reemphasized here since, of course, future developments may well make available more advanced camera systems for employment in this vehicle. 7. Although authority is granted here to treat this material as unclassified, it. still must be borne in mind that this is official government property and the film should not under any circumstances be made available for personal purposes. It will, therefore,, be necessary to stamp all such photography with the caveat "For Official Use Only." It must similarly be borne in mind that this authorization does not relieve the field Detachment Com- mander from his responsibility to ensure that the product of such photographic training and testing is not observed by unauthorized persons under circumstances wherein our photographic mission should not be disclosed. ief, Security Staff OSA Approved For Release 2001/08/29 CIA- Approved For Release 2001/08/29 1 f~1P33-02415A0Q0200370022-4 25X1A2g _2823-63 Page 3 25X1A9a OSA/SS: mpr Distribution: Copies 1 & 2 D/TA/OS4 3 - DAD/OSA. 4 - D/TECH/OSA 5 - C/ID/OSA 6 - C/COMOR 7 - SAL/OSA 8 - PS/OSA 9 - DDS 10 -' NPIC 11 - SS/OSA 12 - RB/OSA Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : ~yl -, 3-02415A000200370022-4

No Description

No Description

No Description

1974

1974

1974

The metadata below describe the original scanning. Follow the "All Files: HTTP" link in the "View the book" box to the left to find XML files that contain more metadata about the original images and the derived formats (OCR results, PDF etc.). See also the What is the directory structure for the texts? FAQ for information about file content and naming conventions.

Sanitized - Approved. For Relea&e : CIA-RDP63-00084AOQ0200110004-9 25X1A9a 25X1A2g MR-KORUSI-Irl yo/t49 7 Jenne 1956 25X1A2g 1. M.b "act; Clearance Classification for.infor. Lion Used 25X1A2d1 i ~Prograan, 2. Co ant: This MErn ?andwn has been Prepared in Draft Fora for Consideration by=Members. 25X1A2g Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP63-00084AO00200110004-9

Approved For Relego 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP80-00679A00010(030053-6 PLANS BRANCH R PRDS 4 STATINTL TITLE 'DM re Document Classification '1-(DS PROJECT NO 11c DEADLINE, DATES PRDS JPD I)D/A OTHER )4,. STAFF ASSIGNMENT - SOURCE OPD BASIC DCu0, TENTS L.O. 2.0501 (Fed. Reg. 10 Nov 53); mew from ADD/A dtd 9 Nov 53,E n&M frnm r/PWI +.n A_M A+A I-) W-- eft 74 DATE RECEI t IN PLANNS BRANCH' ..23 Nov 53 8., PROGRESS RECORD DATE ACTION STATI NTL 3 Dec 53 Forwarded in final, form. Dee 53 Recalled from OPD to incorporate delegations of authority required by 10 Dec 53 Forwarded to OPD by hand; signed: reproduced and distributed ast PDM 99-53, 10 December 1953: DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION CATEGORIES Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP80-00679A000100030053-6

Approved For Release 2007/07/06: CIA-RDP86-00674R000100080008-6 1 May 1979 SPECIAL SECURITY CENTER/SECOM STAFF CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE FOR SCI MATERIAL Pursuant to E.O. 12065, the following is submitted as interim classification and marking guidance for SCI material: a. The overall classification of an SCI document, whether or not, permanently bound, will be stamped or marked at the top and bottom of the outside of the front cover (if any), on the title page (if any), on the first page, on the back page and on the outside of the back cover (if any). Each interior page of a classified document shall be marked or stamped at the top and bottom either according to the highest classification of the content of the page, including Unclassified when appro- priate, or according to the highest overall classification of the document. b. B codewords and/or designators (B study numbers, etc.) shall be annotated on the bottom of the first page and on the bottom of each page which contains information requiring code- word/designator protection. TK and SI codewords and/or designators shall be annotated on the top and bottom of the title page (if any), first page and on each page which contains information requiring codeword designator protection. c. Portion markings shall be placed at the end following the text by placing a parenthetical designator of (TS) for Top Secret, (S) for Secret, (C) for Confidential and (U) for Unclassified. In addition to showing the levels of classifica- tion, the system control caveats and dissemination control markings will be shown in the parenthetical designator following the text; i.e. place The B project indicators are not in the parenthetical designator following the text. d. At the present time in the B system, the documents will be classified by Derivative authority: 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/07/06: CIA-RDP86-00674R000100080008-6 Approved For Release 2007/07/06: CIA-RDP86-00674R000100080008-6 Next 6 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2007/07/06: CIA-RDP86-00674R000100080008-6

No Description

Approved For Rel s~ 2~0~0~6g//0p1//112 b91? ~ WASHINGTON-. THE DISTRICTOF COLUMBIA 1 5 ~qti i~ MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS SUBJECT: Executive Order on Classification This is in response to the December 23, 1981 memorandum from the Counsellor to the President that requests that this Department's comments on the latest draft replacement for Executive Order 12065, "National Security Information" be provided to you. While we can support much in the new revision, we note that only some :300 of previous DoD comments have been incorporated into this :revised draft. Of greatest concern is the failure to include in this current draft our previous proposal to establish a fourth level of .classification, namely,"Restricted." We believe this omission is unfortunate. By its omission from the current draft, other departments and agencies of the Executive Branch will not have the opportunity to review and comment on its merits. The existing three-level classification scheme has not provided adequate protection for a large body of sensitive national security information, particularly militarily critical techno- logy and operational data developed solely for the use of our Armed Forces. The current uncontrolled dissemination of this sensitive information, especially when taken in the aggregate, is demonstrably disadvantageous to U.S. national security interests. The loss of such information and the consequent advantages gained by our adversaries require that steps be taken now to provide legal and positive control of it. Of course, some will say that an added classification category will draw criticism that the revised Order increases the sup- pression of government information by broadening what can be classified and increasing the amount of classified information. While the number of classified documents will probably increase as a result of the fourth classification, this increase does not mean denial to the general public of information it needs to be informed. At issue is the establishment of a more equitable balance between open government and the government's responsibility On file OSD release instructions apply. Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP87B01034R000200050021-6 1S 000 62 Approved For Release 2006/01/12: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000200050021-6 to secure the public interest. Restricting the public availability of scientific and technical data and, for example, Army field manuals describing the operational deployment of the LANCE missile, does not constrain informa- tion the public requires to be informed about the activities and operating functions of its government. Expansion of the current classification system should not'be viewed as a radical departure but rather as a reasonable, necessary, and responsible extension of access control over certain information based on legitimate national security concerns. It is an immediate and proper solution to preclude further loss of such information. While we are willing to limit the scope of the fourth level of classification to military technical and operational information, we believe it would be a serious and unfortunate .mistake not to take this opportunity to help stem the flow of U.S. national security information that is now freely available and useful to our adversaries. Attachment 1 contains a detailed rationale supporting the establishment of the fourth level of classification - RESTRICTED. The Department's other changes to the replace- ment order are contained in Attachment 2. Copy furnished: Counsellor to the President 2 Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP87BO1034R0002000500021-6 O's z QZ5

Approved For Release 2005/08/15: CIA-RDP87B01034R000200070f9-A JUSTIFICATION FOR EXTENSION OF CLASSIFICATION Only officials with Top Secret classification authority may cl&s,sify information for more than six years from the date of the original clas- sification. (his authority shall be exercised sparingly and :-hen used, a declassification date or event, or a date for review of the information must be established. This date or event shall be as early as natioral security permits but no longer than twenty years after original clas- sification, except that for foreign government information the. 4te or event may be up to thirty years after original classification. (Sec.. 1-402, E.O. 12065.) Classification may be extended beyond six years for one or more of the following reasons: 1. The information is "foreign government information" as defined in this Agency Classification Guide. treaty. 2. The information is specifically protected by statute or 3. Continued protection of the information is essential to the national security because it reveals intelligence sources or methods which, if lost, cannot be regained or replaced, or whose disclosure would cause identifiable damage to the national security. 4. The information pertains to cryptography and thus its continued protection is absolutely essential to the national security. 5. The information could reveal vulnerability or capability data, the unauthorized disclosure of which can reasonably be expected to result in negating or nullifying the effectiveness of a system, installation or project important to the national security. 6. The information concerns plans, operations, or activities important to national security, the unauthorized disclosure of which can reasonably be expected to result in negating or nullifying- the effectiveness of the plan, operation or activity, or impeding its orderly implementation. 7. The information concerns foreign relations matters, the continued protection of which is essential to the national security. e. Disclosure of the information would place in -._c'iate jeopardy a person important to the national security. Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP87BO1034R000200070059-3

Approved For Release 2005/08/15: CIA-RDP87B01034R000200070f9-A JUSTIFICATION FOR EXTENSION OF CLASSIFICATION Only officials with Top Secret classification authority may cl&s,sify information for more than six years from the date of the original clas- sification. (his authority shall be exercised sparingly and :-hen used, a declassification date or event, or a date for review of the information must be established. This date or event shall be as early as natioral security permits but no longer than twenty years after original clas- sification, except that for foreign government information the. 4te or event may be up to thirty years after original classification. (Sec.. 1-402, E.O. 12065.) Classification may be extended beyond six years for one or more of the following reasons: 1. The information is "foreign government information" as defined in this Agency Classification Guide. treaty. 2. The information is specifically protected by statute or 3. Continued protection of the information is essential to the national security because it reveals intelligence sources or methods which, if lost, cannot be regained or replaced, or whose disclosure would cause identifiable damage to the national security. 4. The information pertains to cryptography and thus its continued protection is absolutely essential to the national security. 5. The information could reveal vulnerability or capability data, the unauthorized disclosure of which can reasonably be expected to result in negating or nullifying the effectiveness of a system, installation or project important to the national security. 6. The information concerns plans, operations, or activities important to national security, the unauthorized disclosure of which can reasonably be expected to result in negating or nullifying- the effectiveness of the plan, operation or activity, or impeding its orderly implementation. 7. The information concerns foreign relations matters, the continued protection of which is essential to the national security. e. Disclosure of the information would place in -._c'iate jeopardy a person important to the national security. Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP87BO1034R000200070059-3

Approved For Release 2005/08/15: CIA-RDP87B01034R000200070f9-A JUSTIFICATION FOR EXTENSION OF CLASSIFICATION Only officials with Top Secret classification authority may cl&s,sify information for more than six years from the date of the original clas- sification. (his authority shall be exercised sparingly and :-hen used, a declassification date or event, or a date for review of the information must be established. This date or event shall be as early as natioral security permits but no longer than twenty years after original clas- sification, except that for foreign government information the. 4te or event may be up to thirty years after original classification. (Sec.. 1-402, E.O. 12065.) Classification may be extended beyond six years for one or more of the following reasons: 1. The information is "foreign government information" as defined in this Agency Classification Guide. treaty. 2. The information is specifically protected by statute or 3. Continued protection of the information is essential to the national security because it reveals intelligence sources or methods which, if lost, cannot be regained or replaced, or whose disclosure would cause identifiable damage to the national security. 4. The information pertains to cryptography and thus its continued protection is absolutely essential to the national security. 5. The information could reveal vulnerability or capability data, the unauthorized disclosure of which can reasonably be expected to result in negating or nullifying the effectiveness of a system, installation or project important to the national security. 6. The information concerns plans, operations, or activities important to national security, the unauthorized disclosure of which can reasonably be expected to result in negating or nullifying- the effectiveness of the plan, operation or activity, or impeding its orderly implementation. 7. The information concerns foreign relations matters, the continued protection of which is essential to the national security. e. Disclosure of the information would place in -._c'iate jeopardy a person important to the national security. Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP87BO1034R000200070059-3

Approved For Release 2009/02/12 : CIA-RDP90B01370R001301680019-3 (-UL L:/ G/l'~~! /UJ OLL 84-1950/1 18 May 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations Attn: Deputy Director for Science & Technology Chief, Legislation Division Office of Legislative Liaison SUBJECT: CLassification Review of DIA Statement Concerning U.S. Collection Capabilities 1. Attached is an "unclassified" Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) statement concerning United States collection capabilities which has been prepared in response to a Congressional inquiry. DIA intends to provide this statement to various Congressional members for their use in addressing constituents and other public groups on this subject. 2. DIA has requested that we review the attached statement to confirm that it is, in fact, unclassified and to provide whatever other comments we feel are appropriate. I would appreciate your comments by COB Monday, 21 May, on the attached statement. DISTRIBUTION: Original - 1 Each Addressee 1 - OLL Chrono 1 - OLL Record 1 - S'?RH Signer 1 - D/OLL 1 - DD/OLL SWH: csh (18 May 1984) Approved For Release 2009/02/12 : CIA-RDP90BO1370R001301680019-3 Approved For Release 2009/02/12 : CIA-RDP90BO1370R001301680019-3 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Iq Approved For Release 2009/02/12 : CIA-RDP90BO1370R001301680019-3

Approved Foriftase 2004/11/29 : CIA-RDP75-00792240 8001 - / /v C THE WHITE. HOUSE'" I~~ K MEMORANDUM FOR: WILLIAM E. COLBY CIA RICHARD C. TUFARO The attached memorandum is an example of the kind of classification abuse Executive Order 11652 seeks to avoid. On what ground is classification required? Your name is published in the Federal Register. The quarterly report furnished by the General Counsel of CIA gives the figure 797 in unclassified form. It is also deeply disturbing to see Section 5 (B) (2) used when E. O. 11652 admonishes that "use of the exemption authority shall be kept to the absolute minimum. " Please advise whether attached has been declassified and action taken. Approved For Release 2004/11/29 : CIA-RDP75-00793R000200180011-7 Approved Forrase 2004'Fia2 t;' FA:-F '5-0079200180011-7 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20S0'J OR: Mr. Richard C. Tufaro Staff Assistant to the Interagency CKaGSKiCaU0n Review Committee S;_s VIOCT: Top Secret Classifying Authorities Mr. William E. Colby, Chairman, CIA. Information Review C.;; n ittee, has asked that I respond to your letter of 6 October 191:', As you know, at the first met ting of the Interagency CL. fication Review Committee, it was agreed by Arnbassador ;.'sewer and Mr. Houston that because of the security ns inherent in the release of lists of nit nes of CIA. ens. :Oyccs the Agency would retain its lists within our installation, for spection as required. Further, there rnight be. some l .l s(' c e i `,.y implications in direct communication by Ambassador is .,::haver Nvi.th some of our Top Secret classifiers who are under va:z io .:: covers. Accordingly, it would not be appropriate for Panhn rs- dor Eisenhower to mail his letter directly to our employees. Eut %,,c- .: oald be glad to transmit his letter to each of our Top Se cY,.; C ssi.fie.rs by either of the following methods you may prefer, o]" !.; j other m cans: you provide u s With the basic text in, a master form. signcd by Ambassador Eisenhower and we will distribute to our ''c Secret classifiers; or, h. provide us 797 letters signed by Ambassad or E:,iseni) ;',.e] and we distribute those to our Top Secret p ech---. .r .ssistant for niorrn 'ioIl -Ion:'ro Approved For Release 004/11/29: CIA-RDP75-00793R000200180011-7 ST Approved For lease 2004/11/29 : CIA-RDP75-00790200180011-7. ,ENDER W LL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM iiP:ULASSIF1PD C( IDENTIAL SECRET OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP TO Phd ANA DATE INITIALS 1 -- Room 7D 07 (BX5) 2 3 4 OGC SUBJ: SECURITY-E.0 . 11652-C assifica- 6 ACTION DIRECT REPLY PREPARE REPLY APPROVAL DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION COMMENT FILE RETURN CONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGNATURE Remarks : (Sue: Per our conversation, would you please xerox copy for and return original to us) FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. DATE SAIL, -4 ZE 42, Hqs. 1 Nov 72 CONFIDENTIAL SECRET FOAM NO. 237 Use previous editions 1-67 1 NOTE ATTACHED TO MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM E. COLBY DATED OCTOBER 20, 1972 Approved For Release 2004/11/29 : CIA-RDP75-00793R000200180011-7 ST

t1. Ci40pproved For Rase 2002/11/08 : CIA-RDP79-01147~O 400030029-1 P THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF Y JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE WASHINGTON 25, D. C. JOINT INTELLIGENCE STUDY PUBLISHING BOARD LASALLE BUILDING, 1034 CONNECTICUT AVENUE WASHINGTON 6, D. C. 4 February 1946 MEMORANDUM FOR: Military Branch, G-2 Subject: Cancellation of Classification of Certain JANIS publications. 1. At the direction of the Joint Topographical Sub- committee this Board is requesting JANIS contributors to consider what portions of Chapter I, Brief, of JANIS publications now classified "RESTRICTED" may be lowered to "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY". The request is being made in order that the chapter may be distributed to repository libraries where they may be available to scientists and scholars whose work is potentially so valuable to the government. It is hoped that the whole chapter may be so declassified. 2. The JANIS it is proposed to declassify are the following: JANIS 38 Bulgaria JANIS 103 Palau Island JANIS 70 Indochina TT JANIS 104 Caroline Island s JANIS 72 North China JANIS 150 Borneo JANIS 74 Manchuria,.-,JANIS 153 Java-Timor JANIS 75 Korea JANIS 154 Philippines JANIS 75-1 Korea Routes (excluding Mi ndanao) JANIS 76 China East Coast JANIS 155 Celebes Sea JANIS 76-1 China East Coast ,JANIS 157 Netherlands New Guinea (Supplement) JANIS 84-1 Southwestern Japan (Supplement) JANIS 85 Central Japan (Central & Northern Honshu) JANIS 85-2 Central Japan (Supplement) JANIS 87 Formosa JANIS 81 Northern Japan (Hokkaido) JANIS 81-1 it It (Supplement) JANIS 84 Southwestern Japan (Kyushu, Shikoku, SW Honshu) JANIS 77 China, South Coast DOCUMENT Nil, NO CHANGE IN CLASS- 0 DECLASSIFIED 1LASS, f.H.NCiftl TD. TS S 'C NEXT REVIEW DATES AUTH: lift 70.2 DA' 15-ML-M-20 1IEWE1I 25X1 JCS review(s) completed. Approved For Release 2002/11/08 : CIA-RDP79-01147A000400030029-1

t1. Ci40pproved For Rase 2002/11/08 : CIA-RDP79-01147~O 400030029-1 P THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF Y JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE WASHINGTON 25, D. C. JOINT INTELLIGENCE STUDY PUBLISHING BOARD LASALLE BUILDING, 1034 CONNECTICUT AVENUE WASHINGTON 6, D. C. 4 February 1946 MEMORANDUM FOR: Military Branch, G-2 Subject: Cancellation of Classification of Certain JANIS publications. 1. At the direction of the Joint Topographical Sub- committee this Board is requesting JANIS contributors to consider what portions of Chapter I, Brief, of JANIS publications now classified "RESTRICTED" may be lowered to "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY". The request is being made in order that the chapter may be distributed to repository libraries where they may be available to scientists and scholars whose work is potentially so valuable to the government. It is hoped that the whole chapter may be so declassified. 2. The JANIS it is proposed to declassify are the following: JANIS 38 Bulgaria JANIS 103 Palau Island JANIS 70 Indochina TT JANIS 104 Caroline Island s JANIS 72 North China JANIS 150 Borneo JANIS 74 Manchuria,.-,JANIS 153 Java-Timor JANIS 75 Korea JANIS 154 Philippines JANIS 75-1 Korea Routes (excluding Mi ndanao) JANIS 76 China East Coast JANIS 155 Celebes Sea JANIS 76-1 China East Coast ,JANIS 157 Netherlands New Guinea (Supplement) JANIS 84-1 Southwestern Japan (Supplement) JANIS 85 Central Japan (Central & Northern Honshu) JANIS 85-2 Central Japan (Supplement) JANIS 87 Formosa JANIS 81 Northern Japan (Hokkaido) JANIS 81-1 it It (Supplement) JANIS 84 Southwestern Japan (Kyushu, Shikoku, SW Honshu) JANIS 77 China, South Coast DOCUMENT Nil, NO CHANGE IN CLASS- 0 DECLASSIFIED 1LASS, f.H.NCiftl TD. TS S 'C NEXT REVIEW DATES AUTH: lift 70.2 DA' 15-ML-M-20 1IEWE1I 25X1 JCS review(s) completed. Approved For Release 2002/11/08 : CIA-RDP79-01147A000400030029-1

Book digitized by Google from the library of Oxford University and uploaded to the Internet Archive by user tpb.

Approved Pis` Rele . A- P78-04sM8A000600010130-2 To : Fran: Subject: 1. Cc Operations will govern tionas a ctor for Special Operations rsonnel Br ana ,, AM for Administration and Mgt, d Classification i>rograms 5 February 17!a8 t between the Assistant Director for Spec: eecutive for Administration and Management, the following, xsonael testing and desk audit program for the Office of Special a. A comprehensive program covering the activities under the supervision of the Assistant Director for Special Operations will be developed by designated representatives of his office in coordination with the Chief, Personnel. Branch, A&M. Testing ss terial.es utilised for other activities of CIA will be made available to and used by the Office of Special Operations in its testing program. b. Actual testing of individuals and desk audits of positions of Special Operations will be perforated by that office prior to submitting recommendations for promotion and/or reassign nt .of individuals assigned thereto* c. The Assietaant Director for Special Operations has agreed to unsure close supervision of this v to tie end that personnel under his Jurisdic- tion will be required to a gate standards as for all personnel assigned to other CIA activities. 'ereonn*i iraanch, . 2. The Chief,' Personnel Branch, will refer to the 'Fxecutive for WA for further action any Cass received from the Office of Special Operations which in his opinion involves doubt as to suitable qualifications of the individual con- ice of 'Special Operations will continue to be performed under the super- d. Testing of individuals being employed for departmental positions in In each such case a specific statement of reasons for doubt Will be 3. It is requested that a above agreement be furnished the CUM ~e s is n met To: H1 'u2 v of the final plan adopted to imp Live for Administration and an event.

No Description

App ed Release 2002/11/08 : CIA-RD 9-O'I,W 000400030028-2 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON 25, D.C. RESTRICTED 11 February 1946. M ![ORANDUX FOR THE SECRETARY, JOIN' INTELLIGE~NCB STUDY PUBLISHING BOARD: Subject: Classification of Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies. Reference: Restricted J.I.S.P.B. memo.d.td 17 Jan 46 to J.M.C., Subject: Cancellation of Classification of certain JANIS publications. 1. The Joint Meteorological Committee in its 173rd meeting on Tuesday, 5 February 1946, agreed ,k. That the. chapters on.Climateand Weather, prepared by the Joint Meteorological Committee for Inclusion in the Joint Army-Navy Intelli- gence Studies listed in the Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board memorandum.to the J.M.C. on 17 January 1946, continue to be classified RESTRICTED. .k? That the Joint Intelligence Study.Publishing.Board be notified that according to Army and Navy regulations, RESTRICTED implies FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. 2. The above agreement is submitted for information of the J.I.S.P.B. R," F. WILCOX, Major, U.S.A., Secretary. JCS review(s) CORi For Release 2002 DOCUMENT NO. ' 21 NO CHANGE IN CLASS. p DECLASSIFIED CLASS. C1JAPFC1D TO. TS S C NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: Ills 10-2 2 5 JUL 1980 DATE: REVIEWER: 79-01147A000400030028-2 25X1

App ed Release 2002/11/08 : CIA-RD 9-O'I,W 000400030028-2 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON 25, D.C. RESTRICTED 11 February 1946. M ![ORANDUX FOR THE SECRETARY, JOIN' INTELLIGE~NCB STUDY PUBLISHING BOARD: Subject: Classification of Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies. Reference: Restricted J.I.S.P.B. memo.d.td 17 Jan 46 to J.M.C., Subject: Cancellation of Classification of certain JANIS publications. 1. The Joint Meteorological Committee in its 173rd meeting on Tuesday, 5 February 1946, agreed ,k. That the. chapters on.Climateand Weather, prepared by the Joint Meteorological Committee for Inclusion in the Joint Army-Navy Intelli- gence Studies listed in the Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board memorandum.to the J.M.C. on 17 January 1946, continue to be classified RESTRICTED. .k? That the Joint Intelligence Study.Publishing.Board be notified that according to Army and Navy regulations, RESTRICTED implies FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. 2. The above agreement is submitted for information of the J.I.S.P.B. R," F. WILCOX, Major, U.S.A., Secretary. JCS review(s) CORi For Release 2002 DOCUMENT NO. ' 21 NO CHANGE IN CLASS. p DECLASSIFIED CLASS. C1JAPFC1D TO. TS S C NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: Ills 10-2 2 5 JUL 1980 DATE: REVIEWER: 79-01147A000400030028-2 25X1

The decision report of the Australian Classification Board for the film 'HOW NOT TO SUMMON A DEMON LORD COMPLETE SERIES' (file number: T19/3672; classification number: 286580) Released through administrative access on 24 January 2023.

Digit Recognizer A Multiclass Classification

Digit Recognizer A Multiclass Classification

Approved For Release 2002/06/14: CIA-RDP82-00357R000JO0020027-2 OF T LIE, UNI TE, STATES Ckassification Of = ire Vt!hlte oUU r Jobs . h u R i,t r Controlled 'C'ivil Service Commission Office of Management and Bu Fei Weak cootro!s and pressures exerted on job classifications have resulted in overgraded Federal positions. How maey is unknown. Overcraded positions increase costs and acfvers,ly affec empioyev morale and pro- ductivity, Top Federal ma1tarierrrcert must make a cony- mitment to improve ;cb clas~itications and to organize the work of `redsral dep

Animal Classification Project Wiki dumped with WikiTeam tools.

Anomaly detection has various applications including condition monitoring and fault diagnosis. The objective is to sense the environment, learn the normal system state, and then periodically classify whether the instantaneous state deviates from the normal one or not. A flexible and cost-effective way of monitoring a system state is to use a wireless sensor network. In the traditional approach, the sensors encode their observations and transmit them to a fusion center by means of some interference avoiding channel access method. The fusion center then decodes all the data and classifies the corresponding system state. As this approach can be highly inefficient in terms of energy consumption, in this paper we propose a transmission scheme that exploits interference for carrying out the anomaly detection directly in the air. In other words, the wireless channel helps the fusion center to retrieve the sought classification outcome immediately from the channel output. To achieve this, the chosen learning model is linear support vector machines. After discussing the proposed scheme and proving its reliability, we present numerical examples demonstrating that the scheme reduces the energy consumption for anomaly detection by up to 53% compared to a strategy that uses time division multiple-access.

We show that under Dickson's conjecture about the distribution of primes in the natural numbers, the theory Th(Z,+,1,0,Pr) where Pr is a predicate for the prime numbers and their negations is decidable, unstable and supersimple. This is in contrast with Th(Z,+,0,Pr,

We consider topological phases in periodically driven (Floquet) systems exhibiting many-body localization, protected by a symmetry $G$. We argue for a general correspondence between such phases and topological phases of undriven systems protected by symmetry $\mathbb{Z} \rtimes G$, where the additional $\mathbb{Z}$ accounts for the discrete time translation symmetry. Thus, for example, the bosonic phases in $d$ spatial dimensions without intrinsic topological order (SPT phases) are classified by the cohomology group $H^{d+1}(\mathbb{Z} \rtimes G, \mathrm{U}(1))$. For unitary symmetries, we interpret the additional resulting Floquet phases in terms of the lower-dimensional SPT phases that are pumped to the boundary during one time step. These results also imply the existence of novel symmetry-enriched topological (SET) orders protected solely by the periodicity of the drive.