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In this study, we would like to explore sufficiency of information input as a boundary condition. We would like to test whether consumers who bargain with an algorithm still adjust their counteroffer less when the counterparty no longer propose the initial offer based on sufficient information input. Meanwhile, we will test the moderated mediation effect of counterparty type on the counteroffer adjustment through accuracy perception.

In the current research, we would like to investigate the underlying mechanism by testing the level of precision of the initial offer as a boundary condition. We would like to test whether people who receive an initial offer from an algorithm still adjust their counteroffer less when the initial offer itself lacks precision.

In this study, we would like to text the main effect of counterparty type (algorithm vs. human) on consumers' counteroffer adjustment behavior. Meanwhile, we would like to examine the mechanism that underlies the proposed effect by measuring participants’ perception of accuracy on the offer proposed by either an algorithm or a human staff.

In the current research, we would like to investigate the underlying mechanism by testing the level of precision of the initial offer as a boundary condition. We would like to test whether people who receive an initial offer from an algorithm still adjust their counteroffer less when the initial offer itself lacks precision.

In the current research, we would like to investigate the underlying mechanism by testing the level of precision of the initial offer as a boundary condition. We would like to test whether people who receive an initial offer from an algorithm still adjust their counteroffer less when the initial offer itself lacks precision. Meanwhile, we will test the moderated mediation effect of counterparty type on the counteroffer adjustment through accuracy perception.

In the current research, we would like to investigate the underlying mechanism by testing the level of precision of the initial offer as a boundary condition. We would like to test whether people who receive an initial offer from an algorithm still adjust their counteroffer less when the initial offer itself lacks precision.

In the current research, we would like to investigate the underlying mechanism by testing the level of precision of the initial offer as a boundary condition. We would like to test whether people who receive an initial offer from an algorithm still adjust their counteroffer less when the initial offer itself lacks precision.

In the current research, we would like to investigate the underlying mechanism by testing the level of precision of the initial offer as a boundary condition. We would like to test whether people who receive an initial offer from an algorithm still adjust their counteroffer less when the initial offer itself lacks precision.

In the current research, we would like to investigate the underlying mechanism by testing the level of precision of the initial offer as a boundary condition. We would like to test whether people who receive an initial offer from an algorithm still adjust their counteroffer less when the initial offer itself lacks precision.

In the current research, we would like to investigate the underlying mechanism by testing the level of precision of the initial offer as a boundary condition. We would like to test whether people who receive an initial offer from an algorithm still adjust their counteroffer less when the initial offer itself lacks precision.

In the current research, we would like to investigate the underlying mechanism by testing the level of precision of the initial offer as a boundary condition. We would like to test whether people who receive an initial offer from an algorithm still adjust their counteroffer less when the initial offer itself lacks precision.

In this study, we would like to test consumers' individual difference as a boundary condition. Specifically, we would like to test whether the effect of counterparty type (algorithm vs. human) on consumers' counteroffer behavior is stronger for certain groups (e.g., vulnerable consumers with low SES).

In the current research, we would like to investigate the underlying mechanism by testing the level of precision of the initial offer as a boundary condition. We would like to test whether people who receive an initial offer from an algorithm still adjust their counteroffer less when the initial offer itself lacks precision.