Designing denuclearization - Info and Reading Options

"Designing denuclearization" Table Of Contents:

• 1- Introduction
• 2- The transition problem
• 3- The concealed retained weapons problem
• 4- The concealed clandestine program problem
• 5- The problem posed by dissimilar non-nuclear
• 6- The problem of retained capacity for reconstitution
• 7- The problem of ongoing design
• 8- The problem of compensatory non-nuclear arming
• 9- The problem of joint simultaneous decision
• 10- The problem of regime enforcement
• 11- The problem that ZNW today would enhance the relative power of the conventionally powerful
• 12- The objection that conventional war will become more probable
• 13- The objection that nuclear devices serve missions other than nuclear deterrence
• 14- The objection that an advantage is being surrendered
• 15- The obstacle of patrio-opportunism
• 16- The obstacle of perceived interest
• 17- The objection that only self-reliance assures security under uncertainty
• 18- The objection that a nuclear abolition regime will prove unenforceable
• 19- The objection that nuclear weapons can be safely retained and prudently managed
• 20- The objection that ZNW is unrealistic
• 21- The Manhattan Project scientists and proposals for international control
• 22- The Acheson-Lilienthal report
• 23- The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission
• 24- The Eisenhower administration
• 25- The Kennedy administration : US, Russian, and Chinese proposals of 1961-1963
• 26- Zones
• 27- The Gorbachev initiative of 15 january 1986
• 28- Reykjavik
• 29- The Canberra Commission report (14 August 1996)
• 30- Model nuclear weapons convention
• 31- The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), NPT review conferences, and the New Agenda Coalition landmark post-cold war declarations, commentaries, and advocacy initiatives
• 32- The WMD Commission (1 June 2006)
• 33- Warhead and fissile material accounting
• 34- Verification
• 35- Whistle-blowing and "societal verification"
• 36- Systematic and open modeling
• 37- Simultaneous move to zero
• 38- Transparence
• 39- Review and dispute resolution procedures
• 40- Governmental and intergovernmental research units
• 41- Non-state research centers
• 42- Designing negotiability
• 43- Focused talks
• 44- Tests
• 45- "Collaborative governance" vs. "sovereign unilateralism"
• 46- Active reassurance
• 47- Conventional force limits
• 48- Collective security
• 49- Detargeting
• 50- Dealerting
• 51- HEU control and buydown
• 52- India and Pakistan : non-weaponization and non-deployment
• 53- "No first use" or "only for deterrence"?
• 54- Projects on denuclearization design
• 55- Empirical examples of denuclearization
• 56- Paths as I see them.

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